# Rd 1 vs K-State KM

## 1NC

### T-Restrictions

#### Restrictions are prohibitions—distinct from requirements which establish guidelines for how energy production works

Hayden ‘5 Timothy A. Hayden, “COMMENT: Reception on Nantucket Sound? A Summary of Current Offshore Wind Farm Litigation and a Federal Legislative Proposal Taking Cues From Cellular Tower Legislation,” Penn State Environmental Law Review, Summer, 2005, 13 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 217, lexis

B. Telecommunications Act of 1996 In 1996, a major piece of legislation dealing with most aspects of our nation's telecommunications industry was passed. n113 The portion of that legislation dealing with mobile services creates substantive restrictions and procedural requirements dealing with the use of state and local powers by limiting, but not completely preempting, those powers. n114 1. Substantive Restrictions The TCA of 1996 prevents state and local governments from either prohibiting or taking actions which prohibit erecting cellular towers. n115 It was essential that this law be passed because state and local governments could effectively limit the building of cellular towers by passing laws or using strict zoning procedures. n116 In addition to the statutory framework, the circuit courts have further developed case law clarifying what constitutes unreasonable discrimination between functionally equivalent [\*232] services, as well as what amounts to a prohibition. n117 The Third Circuit developed a two-prong test requiring that a significant gap in wireless service exist, and that the manner in which the cellular provider proposes to fill that gap must be the least intrusive in terms of the values the community is trying to preserve. n118 While this test has been modified by other circuits, it is the most widely used. n119 2. Preemption The TCA did not fully preempt the laws of state and local governments. n120 Federal legislation could have completely preempted the laws of the state and local governments which dealt with cellular towers but chose not to, instead allowing those entities to express their values within certain federally created constraints. n121 3. Procedural Requirements Finally, the TCA created procedural requirements that must be met by those seeking to keep a cellular tower from being built. n122 First, the decision making body must act upon the request for authorization within a reasonable period of time. n123 Second, any denial shall be in writing. n124 And lastly, such a denial must be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. n125 These procedural requirements ensure that when a ruling is challenged, the courts will have the information relied upon in the decision of the municipality, providing them with a record on which to decide the case. n126 In summary, the TCA of 1996 created substantive restrictions on the abuse of the possibly prohibitive powers wielded by state and local governments. It did so without leaving those entities completely bereft of their powers, and at the same time created procedural requirements allowing for meaningful judicial review of decisions. All of this was done with the policy of promoting national wireless service provision in [\*233] mind.

#### Restrictions are distinct from regulations

Johnson, District Court Judge ‘9 Judge Thomas E. Johnson, US District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, “Stover v. Fingerhut Direct Marketing, Inc. - Document 33,” 8/26/2009 http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/west-virginia/wvsdce/5:2009cv00152/61171/33

9 “Regulation” could be construed broadly as applying a system of laws, including penalties, affecting a particular manner of commercial speech. However, in subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has employed the narrower word, “restriction,” in place of “regulation.” See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 476 (1989) (“[G]overnment restrictions upon commercial speech may be no more broad or no more expansive than ‘necessary’ to serve its substantial interests”).

#### Voting issue

#### Precision and education—Broad definitions of ‘restrictions’ eliminate legal subtleties and undermine policy analysis—distracts focus from core topic concerns

#### Limits—topic’s already huge—vague sketchy interps of mechanisms multiply possible affs by six—destroys our ability to generate clash and test the aff

### Capitalism K

#### Energy production is inseparable from capitalist growth—quick tech fixes to scarcity are temporary at best and exclude radical historical critique

Clark and York ‘8 Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, coeditor of Organization & Environment and associate professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, “Rifts and Shifts: Getting to the Root of Environmental Crises,” Monthly Review, Vol. 60, Issue 06, November 2008

The development of energy production technologies provides one of the best examples of rifts and shifts, as technological fixes to energy problems create new ecological crises in the attempt to alleviate old ones. Biomass, particularly wood, has, of course, been one of the primary energy sources humans have depended on throughout their history. The development of more energy intensive processes, such as the smelting of metals, was, therefore, connected with greater pressure on forests, as trees were fed to the fires. By the time the Industrial Revolution began to emerge in Europe, vast regions of the continent had already been deforested, particularly in areas close to major sites of production, and much of this deforestation was driven by the demand for fuel. As industrialization advanced, new sources of power were desired to fuel the machines that allowed for production to take place on a growing scale. Whole forests could be devoured at an unprecedented rate, making wood ever more scarce. The tension between the desire of the capitalist owners of the new industrial technologies for expanding the accumulation of capital and the biophysical limits of Earth were apparent from the start of the Industrial Revolution. However, capitalists did not concern themselves with the internal contradictions of capitalism, except insofar as they were barriers to be transcended. Thus, efforts to achieve what we would today call sustainability were not even considered by the elite. Rather, coal (and subsequently other fossil fuels) quickly became the standard fuel of industry, temporarily sidestepping the fuelwood crisis (although forests continued to fall due to the many demands placed on them) but laying the foundations for our current global climate change crisis by dramatically increasing the emission of carbon dioxide.16 The pattern has remained similar to how it was in the early years of the Industrial Revolution. Oil was quickly added to coal as a fuel source and a variety of other energy sources were increasingly exploited. Among these was hydropower, the generation of which requires damming rivers, and thus destroying aquatic ecosystems. For example, the expansion of hydropower over the twentieth century in the U.S. Pacific Northwest was the primary force leading to the widespread depletion and extinction of salmon runs. Nuclear power was, of course, the most controversial addition to the power mix. Despite initial claims that it would provide clean, unlimited power that would be too cheap to meter, it proved to be an expensive, risky power source that produced long-lived highly radioactive waste for which safe long-term storage sites have been nearly impossible to develop. Now, in the twenty-first century, with global climate change finally being recognized by the elite as a serious problem, the proposed solutions are, as we would expect, to shift the problem from one form of energy to a new form of energy. Nuclear power, despite its drop in popularity toward the end of the last century, due to high costs and widespread public opposition, is now very much back on the agenda, with new promises of how the new nuclear plants are safer—never mind the issue of radioactive waste. We are also regaled with promises of agrofuels, ironically bringing us back to the pre-coal energy crisis. Recent scientific reports note that growing crops for agrofuel to feed cars may actually increase the carbon emitted into the atmosphere.17 But even this ignores the fact that the production of agrofuel would be based on unsustainable agricultural practices that demand massive inputs of fertilizers and would only further the depletion of soil nutrients, bringing us back to the metabolic rift that Marx originally addressed. Two recent examples of technical approaches to mitigating climate change are particularly illustrative of how technological optimism distracts us from the political-economic sources of our environmental problems. Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen, who admirably played a central role in identifying and analyzing human-generated ozone depletion in the stratosphere, recently argued that climate change can be avoided by injecting sulfur particles into the stratosphere to increase the albedo of the Earth, and thus reflect more of the sun’s energy back into space, which would counter the warming stemming from rising concentrations of greenhouse gases. Although no doubt offered sincerely and out of desperation stemming from the failure of those in power adequately to address the mounting climate crisis, the technical framing of the climate change issue makes it easy for political and business leaders to avoid addressing greenhouse gas emissions, since they can claim that technical fixes make it unnecessary to take action to preserve forests and curtail the burning of fossil fuels. Engineering the atmosphere on this scale is likely to have many far-reaching consequences (acid rain being only the most obvious), many of which have not been anticipated. In a similar vein, well-known physicist Freeman Dyson recently suggested that we can avoid global climate change by replacing one-quarter of the world’s forests with genetically engineered carbon-eating trees. The ecological consequences of such an action would likely be extraordinary. Both of these so-called solutions avoid addressing the dynamics of an economic system that is largely structured around burning fossil fuels, that must constantly renew itself on a larger scale, and that runs roughshod over nature. Often techno-solutions are proposed in a manner that suggests they are completely removed from the world as it operates. The irony is that such narrowly conceived “solutions” would only serve as a means to prop up the very forces driving ecological degradation, allowing those forces to continue to operate, as they create additional ecological rifts.18

#### Capitalism generates internal contradictions erupting in imperialism, nuclear war, and ecocide

Foster ‘5 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, "Naked Imperialism," Monthly Review, Vol. 57 No. 4, 2005

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue.

#### Vote negative in favor of classist politics

#### Revolutionary theory is a prior question—the aff is irrelevant in the grand scheme of capitalism—we should instead affirm the historical necessity of communism

Tumino ’12 Stephen Tumino, more marxist than Marx himself, “Is Occupy Wall Street Communist,” Red Critique 14, Winter/Spring 2012, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/isoccupywallstreetcommunist.htm

Leaving aside that the purpose of Wolff's speech was to popularize a messianic vision of a more just society based on workplace democracy, he is right about one thing: Marx's original contribution to the idea of communism is that it is an historical and material movement produced by the failure of capitalism not a moral crusade to reform it. Today we are confronted with the fact that capitalism has failed in exactly the way that Marx explained was inevitable.[4] It has "simplified the class antagonism" (The Communist Manifesto); by concentrating wealth and centralizing power in the hands of a few it has succeeded in dispossessing the masses of people of everything except their labor power. As a result it has revealed that the ruling class "is unfit to rule," as The Communist Manifesto concludes, "because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him." And the slaves are thus compelled to fight back. Capitalism makes communism necessary because it has brought into being an international working class whose common conditions of life give them not only the need but also the economic power to establish a society in which the rule is "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme). Until and unless we confront the fact that capitalism has once again brought the world to the point of taking sides for or against the system as a whole, communism will continue to be just a bogey-man or a nursery-tale to frighten and soothe the conscience of the owners rather than what it is—the materialist theory that is an absolute requirement for our emancipation from exploitation and a new society freed from necessity! As Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" (What Is To Be Done?). We are confronted with an historic crisis of global proportions that demands of us that we take Marxism seriously as something that needs to be studied to find solutions to the problems of today. Perhaps then we can even begin to understand communism in the way that The Communist Manifesto presents it as "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority" to end inequality forever.

#### Evaluate the debate as a dialectical materialist—you are a historian inquiring into the determinant factors behind the 1AC—Marx’s labor theory of value is the best possible description

Tumino ‘1 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before,” Red Critique, Spring 2001, http://redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory. Finally, it is only Orthodox Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule.

### Elections DA

#### Obama narrowly up but needs a strong October to win: swing states, electoral math, economy, incumbency

Silver 10/12 (Nate Romney Debate gains show staying power <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/oct-12-romney-debate-gains-show-staying-power/?gwh=EB0A7A5046CCC852A922C7B507944540>)

But the FiveThirtyEight forecast of Mr. Romney’s chances — 38.9 percent — is nearly identical to the one at the betting market Intrade, which put them at 38.5 percent as of early Friday evening.¶ Other prediction markets and bookmakers give Mr. Romney slightly lower chances, in the range of 30 or 35 percent.¶ Were there any bright spots at all for President Obama in Friday’s data? He did gain ground in two national tracking polls, from Ipsos and Investor’s Business Daily, although he lost ground in two others, from Gallup and Rasmussen Reports.¶ The Ipsos poll is interesting in that it was the only one to include a substantive number of interviews after the vice-presidential debate on Thursday night. (Ipsos conducts some of its online sampling late in the evening and early the next morning.) That poll showed Mr. Romney’s national lead narrowing to one point from three.¶ Still, the clear majority of its interviews preceded the vice-presidential debate. It will take a couple of days to determine whether it had any impact on the polls.¶ The only really good news for Democrats is that Mr. Obama had built up a large enough cushion that he could withstand a lot of damage without becoming the underdog. The forecast model still has him clinging to narrow leads in Ohio, Iowa, Wisconsin and Nevada, states that in some combination would give him 270 electoral votes.¶ Mr. Obama may also be just slightly underperforming the fundamentals in the election. His approval ratings remain near 50 percent, which would ordinarily predict a narrow re-election victory.¶ Some of the more visible economic numbers, like monthly and weekly jobs reports and consumer confidence figures, have also been stronger lately.¶ None of this is to say that a rebound is certain. It is late enough in the race that the polls need to be taken more at face value.¶ The forecast model adjusts Mr. Obama’s numbers up slightly based on its economic index and his incumbency status, but only by about 0.4 percentage points.

#### Plan disrupts Obama’s balancing strategy—ostracizes key parts of the base and critically widens the enthusiasm gap—swings the election

Schnur ‘12 Dan Schnur, director of the Jesse M. Unruh Institute of Politics at the University of Southern California, served as the national communications director of Senator John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2000, “The President, Gas Prices and the Pipeline,” New York Times, 4/9/2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/the-president-gas-prices-and-the-keystone-pipeline/

Like every president seeking re-election, Barack Obama walks the fine line every day between the discordant goals of motivating his party’s strongest loyalists and reaching out to swing voters for their support. A few weeks ago, that pathway took him to a tiny town in Oklahoma, where, caught between the anti-drilling demands of the environmental community and the thirst for more affordable gasoline from unions, business owners and drivers, the president announced his support for building half of an oil pipeline. The economic impact of rising energy prices in itself is considerable, but the psychological toll on voters is just as significant, as tens of millions of motorists are reminded by large signs on almost every street corner of the financial pain of filling their gas tanks. Obama and his political lieutenants are acutely aware that this growing frustration has the potential to complicate an election year that otherwise seems to be shifting in the incumbent’s favor. As a result, Obama has been hitting the energy issue hard in recent weeks, at least as hard as a candidate can hit when forced to navigate between two almost mutually exclusive political priorities. The result is a president who talks forcefully of the benefits of wind and solar power while also boasting about the amount of oil the nation produces under his leadership. There are times when this gets slightly uncomfortable. Obama recently called for increased exploration along the Atlantic Coast but stopped short of calling for expanded drilling in that region. This is the energy policy equivalent of admitting to an experiment with marijuana but not inhaling. Where the issue becomes more tangible and therefore trickier for Obama is when the multiple choices become binary. The debate over the proposed XL Keystone Pipeline that would transport Canadian oil through the nation’s heartland to the Gulf of Mexico crystallizes the choices involved and forces a shades-of-gray conversation into starker hues of black and white. Obama recognizes that the devoted environmentalists who represent a critical portion of the Democratic party base need some motivation to turn out for him in the fall. But he also understands that centrist voters who support him on a range of other domestic and foreign policy matters could be lured away by a Republican opponent who either promises relief at the gas pump or who can lay blame at the White House doorstep for those higher prices. Even more complicated is the role of organized labor, which has poured immense amounts of support into Obama’s re-election but also prioritizes the job-creation potential of the pipeline. The result of these competing political and policy pressures brought Obama to Ripley, Okla., where he tried to satisfy the needs of these various audiences without alienating any of them. First, the president endorsed the southern portion of the Keystone project in order to relieve the glut of domestically drilled oil that is now unable to make it to refineries near the Gulf of Mexico in a timely manner. This had the effect of irritating his environmental allies but failed to mollify the project’s advocates, who pointed out that the review process that the president called for was already underway. He then reiterated the administration’s antipathy toward the northern section of the pipeline, which would allow Canadian-drilled oil to be transported into this country. This provided some comfort to drilling opponents, but infuriated both the pro-oil forces and the Canadian government. The most likely outcome is that Canada will still build a pipeline, but rather one that goes westward to the Pacific Ocean north of the United States border and then ships Canadian oil to China instead of into this country.

#### Romney win causes Iran strikes—causes escalating conflict

Hussain 9-12 Murtaza Hussain, Toronto-based writer and analyst focused on issues related to Middle Eastern politics, “Why war with Iran would spell disaster,” Al-Jazeera, 9/12/2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html

Leading members of the House and Congress from both parties as well as the closest advisers to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney have called for attacking Iran, with some high-ranking GOP advisers even suggesting that the time is now for a Congressional resolution formally declaring war on the country. Romney and many other leading Republican figures have called for pre-emptive war against Iran, and have continually upped the ante in terms of threats of military action throughout the election campaign. This alarming and potentially highly consequential rhetoric is occurring in a context where the American people are still recovering from the disastrous war in Iraq and winding down the US occupation of Afghanistan, while at the same time coping with the worst economic drought since the Great Depression. Public statements claiming that the extent of the conflict would be limited to targeted airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities are utterly disingenuous, ignoring the escalating cycle of retribution that such "limited" conflicts necessarily breed. As did the war in Libya start off with calls only for a benign "no-fly zone" to protect civilians and seamlessly turned into an all-out aerial campaign to topple Muammar Gaddafi, any crossing of the military threshold with Iran would also likely result in a far bigger conflagration than the public has been prepared for by their leaders. War with Iran would be no quick and clean affair, as many senior political and military figures have pointed out it would make the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which cost trillions of dollars and the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians, seem like "a cakewalk". The fact that it is becoming increasingly likely, inevitable in the eyes of many, and that it is high on the agenda of so many leading political figures warrants exploration of what such a conflict would really entail. Conflict on an unprecedented scale Not a war of weeks or months, but a "generations-long war" is how no less a figure than former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy describes the consequences of open conflict with Iran. In comparison with Iraq and Afghanistan, both countries with relatively small populations which were already in a state of relative powerlessness before they were invaded, Iran commands the eighth largest active duty military in the world, as well as highly trained special forces and guerilla organisations which operate in countries throughout the region and beyond. Retired US General John Abizaid has previously described the Iranian military as "the most powerful in the Middle East" (exempting Israel), and its highly sophisticated and battle-hardened proxies in Lebanon and Iraq have twice succeeded in defeating far stronger and better funded Western military forces. Any attack on Iran would assuredly lead to the activation of these proxies in neighbouring countries to attack American interests and would create a situation of borderless war unprecedented in any past US conflicts in the Middle East. None of this is to suggest that the United States would not "win" a war with Iran, but given the incredibly painful costs of Iraq and Afghanistan; wars fought again weak, poorly organised enemies lacking broad influence, politicians campaigning for war with Iran are leading the American people into a battle which will be guaranteed to make the past decade of fighting look tame in comparison. A recent study has shown that an initial US aerial assault on Iran would require hundreds of planes, ships and missiles in order to be completed; a military undertaking itself unprecedented since the first Gulf War and representative of only the first phase of what would likely be a long drawn-out war of attrition. For a country already nursing the wounds from the casualties of far less intense conflicts and still reeling from their economic costs, the sheer battle fatigue inherent in a large-scale war with Iran would stand to greatly exacerbate these issues. Oil shocks and the American economy The fragile American economic recovery would be completely upended were Iran to target global energy supplies in the event of war, an act which would be both catastrophic and highly likely if US Iran hawks get their way. Not only does the country itself sit atop some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves on the planet, its close proximity to the shipping routes and oil resources of its neighbours means that in the event of war, its first response would likely be to choke off the global supply of crude; a tactic for which its military defences have in fact been specifically designed. The Strait of Hormuz, located in the Persian Gulf is the shipping point for more than 20 per cent of the world's petroleum. Iran is known to have advanced Silkworm missile batteries buried at strategic points around the strait to make it impassable in the event of war, and has developed "swarming" naval tactics to neutralise larger, less mobile ships such as those used by the US Navy. While Iran could never win in straightforward combat, it has developed tactics of asymmetrical warfare that can effectively inflict losses on a far stronger enemy and render the strait effectively closed to naval traffic. The price of oil would immediately skyrocket, by some estimates upwards several hundred dollars a barrel, shattering the already tenuous steps the US and other Western economies are taking towards recovery. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has said a war with Iran could drag out years and would have economic consequences "devastating for the average American"; but these facts are conspicuously absent in public discussion of the war. Every conflict has blowback, but if US politicians are attempting to maneouver the country into a conflict of such potentially devastating magnitude, potentially sacrificing ordinary Americans' economic well-being for years to come, it would behoove them to speak frankly about these costs and not attempt to obfuscate or downplay them in order to make their case. Conflict across borders Finally, a war with Iran would be not be like conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya where the fighting was constrained to the borders of the country in question. Despite widespread resentment towards the country due to the perception of it as a regionally imperialist power as well sectarian animosity towards it as Shia Muslim theocracy, Iran maintains deep links throughout the Middle East and South Asia and can count on both popular support as well as assistance from its network of armed proxies in various countries. In a report for Haaretz, Ahmed Rashid noted that an attack on Iran would likely inflame anti-American sentiment throughout the region, across both Shia and Sunni Muslim communities. Despite Iran's poor human rights record and bellicose leadership, polls have consistently shown that Iranian and Iranian-backed leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah remain among the most popular figures throughout the Arab and Muslim world. This popularity comes not necessarily out of respect for Iranian ideology, but from a perception that Iran is the only assertive power in the region and is the target of aggression from the United States and its allies. In Rashid's analysis, both the Middle East and South Asia would become unsafe for American citizens and their interests for years to come; popular anger would reach a level which would render these area effectively off-limits and would cause grave and immediate danger to both American businesses and troops based in the region. Again, this would be a situation quite different from the other wars of the past decade, fought against isolated regimes without the ability to call upon large and often well-funded numbers of regional sympathisers; a fact also rarely mentioned by war advocates. Not a political game Going to war with Iran would be an elective decision for the United States, but it is for too grave and consequential a choice to be left up to the whims of politicians seeking to win the approval of lobby groups and one-up each other to appeal to influential campaign donors who would like to see a war with Iran. Make no mistake, the possibility of war is very real and has become eminently more so in recent months. Many of the same politicians and political advisers responsible for engineering the Iraq War have returned to public life and are at the forefront of pushing a new American conflict with Iran. Mitt Romney's closest foreign policy advisers include leading hawks from the war with Iraq, including John Bolton, Eliot Cohen and Dan Senor. Many of them have enthusiastically and publicly expressed their desire to engineer a US military confrontation with Iran and have already begun to tout the inevitability of this action in a Romney presidency.

### Bataille K

#### Advocacy text: Do the plan for no reason.

#### Energy production under the sign of utility denies constitutive excess through the fiction of infinite accumulation. This necessitates conflict outbreak and nuclear escalation to discharge its built-up excess

Stoekl ‘7 Allan Stoekl, Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Penn State University, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2007, p. 56-58

Just as there are two energetic sources of economic value, then—muscle power and inanimate fuel power—so too there are two kinds of expenditure. The stored and available energy derived from fossil or inanimate fuel expenditure, for production or destruction, is different in quality, not merely in quantity, from muscular energy. The latter is profoundly more and other than the mere “power to do work.” No intimacy (in the Bataillean sense) can be envisaged through the mechanized expenditure of fossil fuels. The very use of fossil and nonorganic fuels—coal, oil, nuclear— implies the effort to maximize production through quantification, the augmentation of the sheer quantity of things. Raw material becomes, as Heidegger put it, a standing reserve, a measurable mass whose sole function is to be processed, used, and ultimately discarded.28 It is useful, nothing more (or less), at least for the moment before it is discarded; it is related to the self only as a way of aggrandizing the latter’s stability and position. There is no internal limit, no angoisse or pain before which we shudder; we deplete the earth’s energy reserves as blandly and indifferently as the French revolutionaries (according to Hegel) chopped off heads: as if one were cutting off a head of cabbage. “Good” duality has completely given way to “bad.” As energy sources become more efficiently usable—oil produces a lot more energy than does coal, in relation to the amount of energy needed to extract it, transport it, and dispose of waste (ash and slag)—more material can be treated, more people and things produced, handled, and dumped. Consequently more food can be produced, more humans will be born to eat it, and so on (the carrying capacity of the earth temporarily rises). And yet, under this inanimate fuels regime, the very nature of production and above all destruction changes. Even when things today are expended, they are wasted under the sign of efficiency, utility. This very abstract quantification is inseparable from the demand of an efficiency that bolsters the position of a closed and demanding subjectivity. We “need” cars and SUVs, we “need” to use up gas, waste landscapes, forests, and so on: it is all done in the name of the personal lifestyle we cannot live without, which is clearly the best ever developed in human history, the one everyone necessarily wants, the one we will fight for and use our products (weapons) to protect. We no longer destroy objects, render them intimate, in a very personal, confrontational potlatch; we simply leave items out for the trash haulers to pick up or have them hauled to the junkyard. Consumption (la consommation) in the era of the standing reserve, the frame - work (Ge - Stell), entails, in and through the stockpiling of energy, the stockpiling of the human: the self itself becomes an element of the standing reserve, a thing among other things. There can hardly be any intimacy in the contemporary cycle of production -consumption -destruction, the modern and degraded version of expenditure. As Bataille put it, concerning intimacy: Intimacy is expressed only under one condition by the thing [la chose]: that this thing fundamentally be the opposite of a thing, the opposite of a product, of merchandise: a burn -off [consumation] and a sacrifice. Since intimate feeling is a burn -off, it is burning -off that expresses it, not the thing, which is its negation. (OC, 7: 126; AS 132: italics Bataille’s) War, too, reflects this nonintimacy of the thing: fossil fuel and nuclear - powered explosives and delivery systems make possible the impersonal destruction of lives in great numbers and at a great distance. Human beings are now simply quantities of material to be processed and destroyed in wars (whose purpose is to assure the continued availability of fossil fuel resources). Killing in modern warfare is different in kind from that carried out by the Aztecs. All the sacrificial elements, the elements by which the person has been transformed in and through death, have disappeared. Bataille, then, should have distinguished more clearly between intimate and impersonal varieties of useless squandries when it came to his discussion of the Marshall Plan.29 (In the same way, he should have distinguished between energy that is stockpiled and put to use and energy that is fundamentally “cursed” not only in and through bodily excess but in its ability to do “work.”)30 It is not merely a question of our attitude toward expenditure, our “self -consciousness”: also fundamental is how it is carried out. Waste based on the consumption of fossil or inanimate (nuclear) fuels cannot entail intimacy because it is dependent on the thing as thing, it is dependent on the energy reserve, on the stockpiled, planned, and protected self: “[This is] what we know from the outside, which is given to us as physical reality (at the limit of the commodity, available without reserve). We cannot penetrate the thing and its only meaning is its material qualities, appropriated or not for some use [utilité], understood in the productive sense of the term. (OC, 7: 126; AS, 132; italics Bataille’s) The origin of this destruction is therefore to be found in the maximizing of the efficiency of production; modern, industrialized waste is fundamentally only the most efficient way to eliminate what has been over - produced. Hence the Marshall Plan, proposing a gift -giving on a vast, mechanized scale, is different in kind from, say, a Tlingit potlatch ceremony. “Growth” is the ever -increasing rhythm and quantity of the treatment of matter for some unknown and unknowable human purpose and that matter’s subsequent disposal/ destruction. One could never “self -consciously” reconnect with intimacy through the affirmation of some form of indus-trial production-destruction. To see consumer culture as in some way the fulfillment of Bataille’s dream of a modern -day potlatch is for this reason a fundamental misreading of The Accursed Share.31 Bataille’s critique is always an ethics; it entails the affirmation of a “general economy” in which the particular claims of the closed subjectivity are left behind. The stockpiled self is countered, in Bataille, by the generous and death -bound movement of an Amélie, of a Sadean heroine whose sacrifice puts at risk not only an object, a commodity, but the stability of the “me.” To affirm a consumption that, in spite of its seeming delirium of waste, is simply a treatment of matter and wastage of fossil energy in immense quantities, lacking any sense of internal limits (angoisse), and always with a particular and efficacious end in view (“growth,” “comfort,” “personal satisfaction,” “consumer freedom”) is to misrepresent the main thrust of Bataille’s work. The point, after all, is to enable us to attain a greater “self -consciousness,” based on the ability to choose between modes of expenditure. Which entails the greatest intimacy? Certainly not nuclear devastation (1949) or the simple universal depletion of the earth’s resources and the wholesale destruction of ecosystems (today).

#### Acting without regard for return shatters humanist individualism

Stoekl ‘7 Allan Stoekl, Professor of French and Comparative Literature at Penn State University, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 2007, p. 50-51

Bataille’s model in The Accursed Share ultimately depends on a distinction between types of expenditure and what we might call the modes of being associated with each type. This is significant because much of Bataille’s analysis entails a critique of the confusion between different types of expenditure and economy: the “restrained” and the “general.” Indeed, Bataille would argue that many of our current ills under capitalism derive from the confusion between the two realms; a Bataillean ethics would work to separate them. First, “good” expenditure. Bataille associates it with an uncontrollable “élan”: “riches prolong the burst of the sun and invoke passion”; “it’s the return of the breadth of living to the truth of exuberance” (OC, 7: 78; AS, 76). Here again we have the passions unleashed by a naive intimacy with the sun and the profound workings of the universe. But this intimacy is inseparable from the violence of enthusiasm. Contrary to the world of work, the world of expenditure entails spending without regard for the future, affirmation of ecstasy now, and the refusal of things (les choses) that only serve a purpose and that contribute only to one’s own personal security and satisfaction (profit). Thus Bataille’s theory is not only an economic one but an ethical one that criticizes the affirmation of self. As we have seen, however, this affirmation does not serve to deny what is usually, and perhaps wrongly, associated with the self: pleasure. For this reason Bataille proposes a subject, which, in its habitation of an intimate world, refuses the stable and reasonable order of things in order to enter into a profound communication with others and with the universe. This communication, this intimacy, this generosity, entails a kind of relation that is radically different from the use of a seemingly stable thing to achieve a purpose. In The Accursed Share, Bataille writes: The intimate world is opposed to the real as the measureless is to measure, as madness is to reason, as drunkenness is to lucidity. There is only measure in the object, reason in the identity of the object with itself, lucidity in the direct knowledge of objects. The world of the subject is night: this moving, infinitely suspect night, which, in the sleep of reason, engenders monsters. I propose, concerning the free subject, which is not at all subordinate to the “real” order and which is occupied only in the present, that in principle madness itself can give us only an adulterated idea. (OC, 7: 63; AS, 58; italics Bataille’s) In spite of this emphasis on the subject, it should be stressed that Bataille is attempting to put forward a concept of the instant and of experience— if those words have any meaning at all—which exit from the personal, individual realm; the very notion of a general economy means that individual, isolated interest is in principle left behind, and instead a larger perspective is embraced, one in which the individual’s concerns and worries are no longer paramount. Replacing them are the larger energy flows of the death -bound, erotic subject, of society in the grip of collective frenzy or revolt, and of the universe in the unrecoverable energy of a myriad of stars.

### Solvency

#### Natural gas will inevitably kill coal – it’s just too cheap

Miller 12 (RL, attorney and environment blogger with Climate Hawks, "The Rage Of A Dying Dinosaur: Coal’s Decline In The U.S.," Jun 23, [http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/06/23/504331/the-rage-of-a-dying-dinosaur-coals-decline-in-the-us/], jam)

A dinosaur backed into a corner by a pack of smaller dinosaurs may be mortally wounded, but it’s big and angry enough to do some serious damage in its death throes. The coal industry, long accustomed to being the Tyrannosaurus Rex of American politics, is on the ropes, battered by forces outside its control, but angry enough to damage people while it searches for an escape route. Long term use of coal in the US is declining: “The share of U.S. electricity that comes from coal is forecast to fall below 40% for the year, its lowest level since World War II. Four years ago, it was 50%. By the end of this decade, it is likely to be near 30%.” Coal’s decline is widely attributed to three reasons, which I’ve cleverly named EPA — Environmental Protection Agency, Price, Activists. One is far less important than the other two. Congressional Republicans blame the EPA, but every time I’ve looked at “EPA regulations force this coal plant shutdown” cries, I’ve found a decrepit old plant shut down most months because maintenance costs are too high. EPA regulations are a relatively minor factor in coal plant shutdowns. Most business analysts attribute coal’s fall to price. Coal’s price in the United States has stayed fairly stable, but prices of alternatives have plummeted. Natgas is at $2.50/MBTU – it was $9-10 during Bush years. Utilities are actively planning to replace older coal fired plants to natural gas. Things are so bad for Old King Coal that it’s fighting with two of its usual strong allies. The electric utilities, formerly joined at the hip with coal, are now bailing on coal: many now recognize that expending the political capital to fight for plants built in the middle of last century is not worth it — especially when they can construct combined cycle natural gas facilities with relative regulatory ease while releasing roughly half of the emissions in the meantime. A perfect storm is pulling the coal sector under: For example, “American Electric Power, meanwhile, has been one of the most vocal critics of EPA regs. But at the same time, it has admitted — according to Tierney’s paper — that its coal plants are running much less than intended because it is cheaper to operate the natural gas facilities.” While coal is flatlining or declining everywhere else, it's exploding in China Today, Arch Coal announces layoffs of 750 employees, blaming “current market pressures and a challenging regulatory environment.” To top off matters, electric utilities and the coal barons are picking a fight with the railroads, normally the third member of their power-hungry pack, demanding that anti-trust exemptions be removed from railroads. This will not end well for the tyrannosaurus, one hopes. The business analysts don’t like to acknowledge the third reason why coal in the United States is decreasing: the activists. The Sierra Club’s Beyond Coal program takes credit for shutting down 169 coal plants in the United States since Dick Cheney announced a need to build 200 more plants. It’s important to not let up the pressure to shut down coal plants wherever they may be proposed. Coal’s market-force-led decline may change if the market for natural gas picks up and renewables haven’t yet reached grid parity. The tyrannosaurus may be down, but it’s already planning its next move – a bolt overseas, one that is being aided by Obama’s massive expansion of the Powder River Basin and the six Pacific Northwest terminals on the drawing boards. Act locally to fight coal. Some examples: \* in Asheville, North Carolina, tell Progress Energy to move beyond coal \* in Austin, Texas, attend a volunteer orientation June 30 \* if you care about clean air in the national parks, tell the EPA you want strong haze protection. And while fighting coal, remember the alternative: the sun and wind, both of which have been around longer than the dinosaurs.

#### New Source Performance Standards have zero impact on production – investors are switching to natural gas anyway

Plumer 12 (Brad, reporter focusing on energy on environmental issues at the Washington Post, previously an associate editor at The New Republic, contributor to Ezra Klein’s ‘WonkBlog’, "Why EPA’s new carbon rules won’t have much impact — for now," Mar 27, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/how-much-carbon-will-the-epas-new-power-plant-rules-actually-cut/2012/03/27/gIQAuaTDeS\_blog.html/], jam)

On Tuesday, the Environmental Protection Agency unveiled its first-ever rules on carbon-dioxide emissions from new power plants. These rules are part of the EPA’s program to tackle global-warming pollution. But what sort of impact will they actually have? Not a whole lot — at least for the foreseeable future. First, a quick refresher: These latest carbon rules are the third step in the EPA’s ongoing effort to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. The first two phases involved setting stricter fuel-economy standards for cars and light trucks. Today’s rule, which falls under the New Source Performance Standard portion of the law, sets rules for power plants that haven’t been built yet. The rule, in short, is this: Any new plant built in the United States will have to emit no more than1,000 pounds of carbon-dioxide per megawatt-hour. The vast majority of modern natural-gas plants meet that standard, so they should be fine. Conventional coal plants, however, average upward of 1,800 pounds per megawatt-hour. They’re not so fine. This effectively means, analysts agree, that it will be impossible to build any new coal-fired power plant in the United States that can’t capture and store its own carbon emissions. Right now, there are two carbon-capture projects in development, one out in West Virginia and one in Texas, but the technology is still costly and unproven. For the time being, then, this is a moratorium on all new coal plants. Practically, though, that might not have a huge impact in the short term. The rule won’t affect existing power plants, and it won’t affect any coal-fired plants that are already permitted or set to begin construction within a year. According to a Department of Energy report (pdf), there are 24 such plants in the works. This rule would affect any future coal-fired plants — but right now there are hardly any such plants being planned in the United States. In recent years, utilities have been shifting away from coal on their own, largely due to other pollution regulations and the influx of cheap natural gas. The Energy Information Adminstration was already projecting that no coal plants would come online between 2017 and 2035. So this latest rule might be mostly symbolic — a way of recognizing that global warming is a problem but not taking dramatic steps to cut emissions further. Conventional coal-fired plants were looking increasingly uneconomical anyway, and the EPA’s rules mostly codify that trend. (On the other hand, as Grist’s Dave Roberts notes in his excellent primer, these rules might matter if natural gas prices were to ever spike again. In that case, these EPA rules would require utilities to seek out either renewables, nuclear power, or coal with carbon-capture as alternatives.) Meanwhile, this rule is only a first step. The EPA is still mulling over how to deal with existing power plants under a different section of the New Source Performance Standards program, section 111(d), that governs otherwise-unregulated pollutants. Details on these latter regulations are still murky, and it’s not clear when they’ll emerge.\* In theory, the EPA has a lot of flexibility under section 111(d) and could even give states the authority to set up a cap-and-trade system for existing plants. Yet many analysts think that option is unlikely. “The EPA has had a series of listening sessions on this topic,” said William Bumpers, a lawyer with Baker Botts, in a recent interview. “But it’s still struggling to develop these rules.” Beyond that, the EPA is also crafting carbon regulations for oil refineries and other stationary pollution sources. All of these future rules could matter a lot: A 2010 report from the World Resources Institute found that the EPA’s carbon rules, when fully deployed, could cover about three-quarters of the country’s greenhouse-gas sources and reduce U.S. carbon emissions anywhere from 5 percent to 12 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. For reference, the Obama administration pledged a 17 percent cut at the Copenhagen climate change conference. But that’s only if the rules are used to their fullest extent. For the time being, the EPA is just a little bit of the way there.

### Grid

#### Grid’s strong and resilient

Clark ’12 Paul Clark, MA candidate in intelligence studies at American Military University, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” 4/28/2012, http://www.academia.edu/1538543/The\_Risk\_of\_Disruption\_or\_Destruction\_of\_Critical\_U.S.\_Infrastructure\_by\_an\_Offensive\_Cyber\_Attack

In 2003, a simple physical breakdown occurred – trees shorted a power line and caused a fault – that had a cascading effect and caused a power blackout across the Northeast (Lewis 2010). This singular occurrence has been used as evidence that the electrical grid is fragile and subject to severe disruption through cyber-attack, a disruption that could cost billions of dollars, brings business to a halt, and could even endanger lives – if compounded by other catastrophic events (Brennan 2012). A power disruption the size of the 2003 blackout, the worst in American history at that time (Minkel 2008), is a worst case scenario and used as an example of the fragility of the U.S. energy grid. This perceived fragility is not real when viewed in the context of the robustness of the electrical grid. When asked about cyber-attacks against the electrical grid in April of 2012, the intelligence chief of U.S. Cyber Command Rear Admiral Samuel Cox stated that an attack was unlikely to succeed because of the “huge amounts of resiliency built into the [electrical] system that makes that kind of catastrophic thing very difficult” (Capaccio 2012). This optimistic view is supported by an electrical grid that has proven to be robust in the face of large natural catastrophes. Complex systems like the electrical grid in the U.S. are prone to failures and the U.S. grid fails frequently. Despite efforts to reduce the risk out power outages, the risk is always present. Power outages that affect more than 50,000 people have occurred steadily over the last 20 years at a rate of 12% annually and the frequency of large catastrophes remains relatively high and outages the size of the 2003 blackout are predicted to occur every 25 years (Minkel 2008). In a complex system that is always at risk of disruption, the effect is mitigated by policies and procedures that are meant to restore services as quickly as possible. The most visible of these policies is the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, a legally binding agreement allowing combined resources to be quickly deployed in response to a catastrophic disaster such as power outages following a severe hurricane (Kapucu, Augustin and Garayev 2009). The electrical grid suffers service interruptions regularly, it is a large and complex system supporting the largest economy in the world, and yet commerce does not collapse (Lewis 2010). Despite blizzards, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes that cause blackouts, the economy is affected but does not collapse and even after massive damage like that caused by Hurricane Katrina, national security is not affected because U.S. military capability is not degraded (Lewis 2010). Cyber-security is an ever-increasing concern in an increasingly electronic and interconnected world. Cyber-security is a high priority “economic and national security challenge” (National Security Council n.d.) because cyber-attacks are expected to become the top national security threat (Robert S. Mueller 2012). In response to the threat Congress is crafting legislation to enhance cyber-security (Brito and Watkins 2012) and the Department of Homeland Security budget for cyber-security has been significantly increased (U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2012).

#### No impact to meltdowns

Adams ’12 Rod Adams, MS in Systems Technology from US Naval Postgraduate School, works as procedure and process development lead for nuclear reactor development at the Babcock & Wilcox Company, “Has Apocalyptic Portrayal of Climate Change Risk Backfired?” Atomic Insights, 5/2/2012, http://atomicinsights.com/2012/05/has-apocalyptic-portrayal-of-climate-change-risk-backfired.html?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+AtomicInsights+%28Atomic+Insights%29

Not only was the discussion enlightening about the reasons why different people end up with different opinions about climate change responses when presented with essentially the same body of information, but it also got me thinking about a possible way to fight back against the Gundersens, Caldicotts, Riccios, Grossmans and Wassermans of the world. That group of five tend to use apocalyptic rhetoric to describe what will happen to the world if we do not immediately start turning our collective backs on all of the benefits that abundant atomic energy can provide. They spin tall tales of deformed children, massive numbers of cancers as a result of minor radioactive material releases, swaths of land made “uninhabitable” for thousands of years, countries “cut in half”, and clouds of “hot particles” raining death and destruction ten thousand miles from the release point. Every one of those clowns have been repeating similar stories for at least two solid decades, and continue to repeat their stories even after supposedly catastrophic failures at Fukushima have not resulted in a single radiation related injury or death. According to eminent scientists – like Dr. Robert Gale – Fukushima is unlikely to EVER result in any measurable increase in radiation related illness. One important element that we have to consider to assess cancer risks associated with an accident like Fukushima is our baseline risk for developing cancer. All of us, unfortunately, have a substantial risk of developing cancer in our lifetime. For example, a 50-year-old male has a 42% risk of developing cancer during his remaining life; it’s almost the same for a 10-year-old. This risk only decreases when we get much older and only because we are dying of other causes. It’s true that excess radiation exposure can increase our cancer risk above baseline levels; it’s clear from studies of the survivors of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of people exposed to radiation in medical and occupational settings, and of people exposed to radon decay products in mines and home basements. When it comes to exposures like that of Fukushima, the question is: What is the relative magnitude of the increased risk from Fukushima compared to our baseline cancer risk? Despite our fears, it is quite small. If the nuclear industry – as small and unfocused as it is – really wanted to take action to isolate the apocalyptic antinuclear activists, it could take a page from the effective campaign of the fossil fuel lobby. It could start an integrated campaign to help the rest of us to remember that, despite the dire predictions, the sky never fell, the predicted unnatural deaths never occurred, the deformations were figments of imagination, and the land is not really irreversibly uninhabitable for generations. The industry would effectively share the story of Ukraine’s recent decision to begin repopulating the vast majority of the “dead zone” that was forcibly evacuated after the Chernobyl accident. It would put some context into the discussion about radiation health effects; even if leaders shy away from directly challenging the Linear No Threshold (LNT) dose assumption, they can still show that even that pessimistic model says that a tiny dose leads to a tiny risk. Aside: My personal opinion is that the LNT is scientifically unsupportable and should be replaced with a much better model. We deserve far less onerous regulations; there is evidence that existing regulations actually cause harm. I hear a rumor that there is a group of mostly retired, but solidly credentialed professionals who are organizing a special session at the annual ANS meeting to talk about effective ways to influence policy changes. End Aside. Most of us recognize that there is no such thing as a zero risk; repeated assertions of “there is no safe level” should be addressed by accepting “close enough” to zero so that even the most fearful person can stop worrying. The sky has not fallen, even though we have experienced complete core meltdowns and secondary explosions that did some visible damage. Nuclear plants are not perfect, there will be accidents and there will be radioactive material releases. History is telling me that the risks are acceptable, especially in the context of the real world where there is always some potential for harm. The benefits of accepting a little nuclear risk are immense and must not be marginalized by the people who market fear and trembling.

### Rails

#### Train industry resilient – expanding to new sectors and rapidly growing due to high fuel prices and manufacturing boom. Any risk from coal is already priced in by the industry and inevitable from nat gas transition

ZER 12 Zacks Equity Research Railroad Industry Stock Outlook - Feb. 2012 <http://www.zacks.com/stock/news/69095/railroad-industry-stock-outlook-feb-2012>

The U.S. Freight Railroads performed exceptionally well in 2011 despite difficult weather conditions and an extremely volatile U.S. economy. Solid commodities volumes, effective cost management, and improved rail efficiency helped U.S railroads to continue their strong performance.¶ The railroads are gaining momentum over the trucking industry due to significant rise in fuel costs of truckers. Currently, the railroads are carrying more cargos, which is helping them gain market share.¶ During fiscal 2011, the railroads benefited from strong pricing gain reflecting both solid yield improvement and higher fuel surcharges. Shipments of construction components, lumber and motor vehicle volumes increased over 30% year over year. Petroleum product shipment rose 29% year over year.¶ Importantly, industry players are now more confident that this excellent performance will get further momentum during fiscal 2012. In the first half of January 2012, total rail carloads increased 5.5% year over year, of which intermodal volume rose 7.4%.¶ Here are some of the key attributes of the U.S. railroad industry:¶ The Railroad industry is characterized as high barriers to entry. It is not easy to lay railway tracks and start shipments. The rail operators need to spend a significant amount of money as capital expenditures to maintain safety and technical improvements. Association of American Railroads (AAR), the main trade body of the industry, reported that the freight railroads together have spent a record high of $12 billion in 2011 for manpower recruitment, installation of new rail tracks and other capital projects.¶ There are six large freight railroad operators in the U.S., and they actually enjoy a duopolistic situation. While the western part is controlled by Union Pacific and Burlington Northern Santa Fe, the eastern part is controlled by CSX Corp. and Norfolk Southern. On the other side, Canadian Pacific and Canadian National control inter-country rail shipment between the U.S. and Canada. This duopolistic situation helps freight railroad operators to reap maximum benefit from rising prices as overall demand for the economy grows.¶ The U.S. government has taken several measures to boost American manufacturing while raising its exports. At present, the U.S. railroad industry commands less than 50% of total freight in America indicating huge opportunity to increase market share. In fact, the railroad industry is gaining market share from the trucking industry. On average, railroads are 300% more fuel efficient than the trucks. We expect fuel cost to go up in future, which may drastically shift the industry dynamics in favor of the railroads.¶ The U.S. government decided to scale back its ruling that makes it mandatory for freight rails to install new anticollision technology called “Positive Train Control.” The latest government decision will save approximately $500 million for the industry and may enable every freight rail operators to increase its respective free cash flow by around 20%-25%.¶ Freight Railroad - an Economic Growth Driver¶ Freight rail is a “derived demand” industry and rail services are tied to the demand for the products that railroads haul. Rail traffic, therefore, acts as a solid barometer for the overall health of the economy.¶ Several railroad operators have expressed their confidence that growth rate of business volume in 2012 will exceed the U.S. GDP and industrial production growth rate. Similarly, core pricing gains in 2012 will also exceed inflation.¶ In 2011, core pricing of railroads improved 4.5% - 5% year over year. This strong pricing environment was primarily driven by a significant improvement of intermodal segment pricing. We believe rail transportation companies will continue to push price increase toward their customers throughout 2012.¶ Investment by railroad operators for product and service improvement is far ahead than other transportation industries. Very few U.S. industries can match with the railroad operators with respect to high capital investment rate. Investments in capacity, innovations and use of several state-of-the-art technologies led to service improvements and enhanced reliability.¶ Greater overall freight volume across the freight railroad networks, massive surge in coal and automotive shipments, significant increase in oil deliveries from the Bakken area of North Dakota to refineries on the Gulf Coast, and a sharp rebound in many end markets are expected to fuel the future growth of the Railroad industry. Nevertheless, despite this impressive growth, some near-term concerns still persist.¶ Carload Volume Yet to Reach the Pre-Recession Level¶ Although business volume increased in the last year, this is still below the pre-recession 2008 level. The current state of volatile economy in the U.S. and abroad may keep railroad’s top-line growth under pressure in the near future, with most sectors unable to fully recover from the global economic recession. Railroads are particularly sensitive to economic conditions.¶ Coal Demand Worries¶ In September 2011, Alpha Natural Resources and Walter Energy, the two large coal mining companies forecasted a decline in coal shipments in near future. The current global volatility that affected mining activities, the sudden drop in demand from the Asian markets sighting problems over quality along with harsh weather conditions in the Pacific region have resulted in a major setback for these coal companies.¶ Lower natural gas prices and higher utility stockpile levels have also raised their concerns. This is a big blow to rail operators as they banked mostly on these coal producers for shipments to domestic as well as international markets.¶ Legal Tussles¶ For a long time, the pricing practice of the U.S. freight railroads is a major cause of tussle with captive shippers, who ship their products through railroad and do not have effective alternatives for shipping. These companies are predominantly from electric utilities, chemical, agricultural and mining sectors.¶ Congress has discussed about railroad price regulation but so far did not approve any new rules. In June 2011, the U.S. Surface Transportation Board, the federal agency that regulates railroads, discussed the issue in details. We believe if the regulators decide to scrap pricing power, the major freight rail carriers will be severely affected.¶ OPPORTUNITIES¶ The railroad industry as a whole offers a number of attributes that are difficult to ignore from the standpoint of investors.¶ Discretionary Pricing Power: The freight railroad operators function in a seller’s market enjoying pricing power since 1980 when the U.S. government adopted the Staggers Rail Act. The idea was to allow rail transporters to hike price on captive shippers like electric utilities, chemical and agricultural companies in order to improve profitability of the struggling railroad industry. As a result of the Staggers Rail Act, the railroads are hiking their freight rates on an average by nearly 5% per annum while maintaining a double digit profit margin.¶ Competitive Advantage: From the customers’ point of view, rail transport is cheaper and fuel-efficient than truck and ship transport. As a result, railroads are gaining market share from other means of transport. Several truck operators went bankrupt during the peak recessionary period that helped railroads to become default freight transporters for mid-to-long distances.

#### And be extremely suspect of the internal link from coal to trains to chemicals. At worse they can win that trains will stop operating on the routes where coal is currently carried. Basic economics says a decrease in coal shipments would make trains more cost competitive for other industries.

#### The train industry has already priced in drop in coal business and is expanding in other areas. Coal is only 25% of the industry

Qineqt 9-20 [Team of investment professionals including former hedge fund manager, trader and analyst at top tier $10 billion hedge fund. Members include investment professionals who oversaw research and trading organization of 50+.] Railroads Have Priced In The Bad News September 20, 2012 <http://seekingalpha.com/article/879011-railroads-have-priced-in-the-bad-news>

Before Norfolk Southern Corp (NSC) slashed its outlook, most railroads were trading near their 52-week highs, despite an abysmal carload performance for coal. Coal has been the main source of carloads for railroads in the past. Although a large part of increases in stock prices have been driven by productivity enhancement initiatives, oligopolistic pricing has also played an important role in the stocks' performance. Regulators have been lenient with this industry in the past, given the poor returns and the revenue declines caused by the reduction of coal carloads, mainly because of mass switching towards natural gas.¶ Railroad margins are expected to face pressure in the future due to the following factors:¶ Fuel prices are expected to rise in the future. However, this can also help the industry grow, as railroads are more fuel efficient than trucks, and therefore, they will attract a part of trucks' demand.¶ Regulators are expected to come hard at rail prices in the future, as railroads no longer have the excuse of lower returns. In this context, many believe that the elections will be a solid catalyst for the industry pricing mechanism. The Republicans are expected to be more receptive to railroads' pricing arguments.¶ It will be important to see whether pricing improvements will be able to cover rail inflation, which is expected to be 2%-4%, especially if future volumes of carload remain weak.¶ The following carloads were observed YTD:¶ Railroads are expected to experience an increase in demand from some commodities, but a decline in others. Rises are expected in the following:¶ Automotive - increasing SAAR is giving a bullish perspective to the market.¶ Intermodal - increasing fuel rates have improved truck-to-rail conversions.¶ Housing related - lumber carloads is expected to rise, as the housing recovery is around the corner. Yesterday's data, released by the National Association of Realtors, shows that house sales have risen by 7.8%, sequentially. Housing Starts also rose by 2.3% YoY.¶ Chemicals - this product range has helped to cover the losses from the shale gas boom (lower natural gas prices because of shale gas boom are responsible for coal-to-natural-gas-switch). Declining gas prices have helped plastics and industrial chemical volumes.¶ Fracking sand - another advantage of the shale gas boom; however, natural gas drills are down.¶ Potential threat to carloads:¶ Utility coal - volumes are considerably down, but headwinds are moderating.¶ Met coal - this is a big threat to railroad pricing. Due to lower demand, met coal prices are down internationally, and railroads will have to lower prices in order to attract more volumes.¶ Agricultural - the drought has hurt crop yields resulting in lower grain volumes to be transported.¶ The market is bearish on railroads, given the unfavorable pricing to follow, coupled with the potential threat to volumes.¶ Norfolk Southern Corp¶ UBS, in a report published yesterday, downgraded the whole railroad sector due to the declining coal and grain demand. NSC was downgraded to Neutral from Buy. Also, Wells Fargo downgraded NSC today.¶ Yesterday, during post market trading, NSC slashed its EPS outlook for the third quarter from $1.64 to somewhere between $1.18-to-$1.25. The revenue is expected to be $120 million lower in 3Q YoY. NSC disclosed that the earnings outlook was slashed after viewing weak demand of coal and low supplies for grains due to the drought. Also, fuel surcharge revenue is expected to be $80 million lower YoY for this quarter. The JPM analyst thinks the company will also suffer from soft growth in the automotive segment. More clarity will be gained after NSC makes its presentation in Citi's Industrial Conference tomorrow.¶ After this news, the stock is 9% down. We think that the bad news has now been priced in the stock. Therefore, we will stick to our recommendation of going long on the stock. No doubt, coal and grain remain the biggest threats to railroad stocks, but NSC's productivity plan is well on its way to improving the margins. It is interesting to note that stockpiles at NSC-served utilities have reduced to normal levels, unlike the southern utilities served by CSX Corp (CSX). Both CSX and NSC have 25% exposures in coal.¶ NSC is also working aggressively on the growth of the intermodal business. The Memphis terminal was opened on July 1, and new terminals at Birmingham and Greencastle are expected by the end of this year. Given the increasing challenges in the Trucking Industry, like expensive trucks, shortage of drivers and increased safety regulations, intermodal seems to be a long-term growth story.¶ It is interesting to note that fracking sand carloads are decreasing due to reduced rig counts at the shale gas sites. The activity has been decreased after the decline in natural gas prices. However, NSC still enjoys better access to some of the main shale gas sites, as compared to CSX.¶ Conclusion¶ UBS' downgrading has also been priced into NSC stock. Also, NSC is working on the cost part of the equation, and therefore, may not be hit by the reduction in future demand that much.¶ Valuations for NSC and CSX are quite comparable, given the proximity of exposures to different commodities. However, YTD performance for CSX is +2.5%, whereas it is -10% for NSC. Therefore, this price divergence can reverse as the market realizes NSC's better position in the railroad industry. NSC is also trading at a lower PEG.

#### Also, there is no reason why an increase in chemical transportation prices would lead to a “collapse of the industry” at worse you should assume each internal link in this scenario is just a slow down not a complete collapse.

#### None of their evidence is conclusive on the collapse of either industry.

#### No US key warrant for chemical industry—other countries fill in

#### No disease impact

Charles Arthur, "Future Tense: Is Mankind Doomed?" The Independent, 25 July 2003, accessed 11/24/09 http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-04.htm

Maybe - though plenty of experienced graduate students could already have a stab. But nature knows that infectious diseases are very hard to get right. Only HIV/Aids has 100 per cent mortality, and takes a long time to achieve it. By definition, lethal diseases kill their host. If they kill too quickly, they aren't passed on; if too slowly, we can detect them and isolate the infected. Any mutant smallpox or other handmade germ would certainly be too deadly or too mild. And even Sars killed fewer people worldwide than die on Britain's roads in a week. As scares go, this one is ideal - overblown and unrealistic.

### Pivot

#### Allied credibility is meaningless—causes dangerous adventurism which proves nothing but accelerates declines in strength—forcing allies to sort things out themselves best establishes the importance of working with us

Walt 9-11 Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Why are U.S. leaders so obsessed with credibility?” Foreign Policy, 9/11/2012, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/09/11/the\_credibility\_fetish

One could argue that credibility did matter during the Cold War. The United States did face a serious peer competitor in those days, and the Soviet Union did have impressive military capabilities. Although a direct Soviet attack on vital U.S. interests was always unlikely, one could at least imagine certain events that might have shifted the global balance of power dramatically. For example, had the Soviet Union been able to conquer Western Europe or the Persian Gulf and incorporate these assets into its larger empire, it would have had serious consequences for the United States. Accordingly, U.S. leaders worked hard to make sure that the U.S. commitment to NATO was credible, and we did similar things to bolster U.S. credibility in Asia and the Gulf. Of course, we probably overstated the importance of "credibility" even then. Sloppy analogies like the infamous "domino theory" helped convince Americans that we had to fight in places that didn't matter (e.g., Vietnam) in order to convince everyone that we'd also be willing to fight in places that did. We also managed to convince ourselves that credible nuclear deterrence depended on having a mythical ability to "prevail" in an all-out nuclear exchange, even though winning would have had little meaning once a few dozen missiles had been fired. Nonetheless, in the rigid, bipolar context of the Cold War, it made sense for the United States to pay some attention to its credibility as an alliance leader and security provider. But today, the United States faces no peer competitor, and it is hard to think of any single event that would provoke a rapid and decisive shift in the global balance of power. Instead of a clear geopolitical rival, we face a group of medium powers: some of them friendly (Germany, the UK, Japan, etc.) and some of them partly antagonistic (Russia, China). Yet Russia is economically linked to our NATO allies, and China is a major U.S. trading partner and has been a major financier of U.S. debt. This not your parents' Cold War. There are also influential regional powers such as Turkey, India, or Brazil, with whom the U.S. relationship is mixed: We agree on some issues and are at odds on others. And then there are clients who depend on U.S. protection (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Taiwan, etc.) but whose behavior often creates serious headaches for whoever is in the White House. As distinguished diplomat Chas Freeman recently commented, "the complexity and dynamism of the new order place a premium on diplomatic agility. Stolid constancy and loyalty to pre-existing alliance relationship are not the self-evident virtues they once were. We should not be surprised that erstwhile allies put their own interest ahead of ours and act accordingly. Where it is to our long-term advantage, we should do the same." What might this mean in practice? As I've noted repeatedly, it means beginning by recognizing that the United States is both very powerful and very secure, and that there's hardly anything that could happen in the international system that would alter the global balance of power overnight. The balance is shifting, to be sure, but these adjustments will take place over the course of decades. Weaker states who would like U.S. protection need it a lot more than we need them, which means our "credibility" is more their problem than ours. Which in turn means that if other states want our help, they should be willing to do a lot to convince us to provide it. Instead of obsessing about our own "credibility," in short, and bending over backwards to convince the Japanese, South Koreans, Singaporeans, Afghans, Israelis, Saudis, and others that we will do whatever it takes to protect them, we ought to be asking them what they are going to do for themselves, and also for us. And instead of spending all our time trying to scare the bejeezus out of countries like Iran (which merely reinforces their interest in getting some sort of deterrent), we ought to be reminding them over and over that we have a lot to offer and are open to better relations, even if the clerical regime remains in power and maybe even if -- horrors! -- it retains possession of the full nuclear fuel cycle (under IAEA safeguards). If nothing else, adopting a less confrontational posture is bound to complicate their own calculations. This is not an argument for Bush-style unilateralism, or for a retreat to Fortress America. Rather, it is a call for greater imagination and flexibility in how we deal with friends and foes alike. I'm not saying that we should strive for zero credibility, of course; I'm merely saying that we'd be better off if other states understood that our credibility was more conditional. In other words, allies need to be reminded that our help is conditional on their compliance with our interests (at least to some degree) and adversaries should also be reminded that our opposition is equally conditional on what they do. In both cases we also need to recognize that we are rarely going to get other states to do everything we want. Above all, it is a call to recognize that our geopolitical position, military power, and underlying economic strength give us the luxury of being agile in precisely the way that Freeman depicts. Of course, some present U.S. allies would be alarmed by the course I'm suggesting, because it would affect the sweetheart deals they've been enjoying for years. They'll tell us they are losing confidence in our leadership, and they'll threaten to go neutral, or maybe even align with our adversaries. Where possible, they will enlist Americans who are sympathetic to their plight to pressure on U.S. politicians to offer new assurances. In most cases, however, such threats don't need to be taken seriously. And we just have to patiently explain to them that we're not necessarily abandoning them, we are merely 1) making our support more conditional on their cooperation with us on things we care about, and 2) remaining open to improving relations with other countries, including some countries that some of our current allies might have doubts about. I know: It's a radical position: we are simply going to pursue the American national interest, instead of letting our allies around the world define it for us. The bottom line is that the United States is in a terrific position to play realpolitik on a global scale, precisely because it needs alliance partners less than most of its partners do. And even when allies are of considerable value to us, we still have the most leverage in nearly every case. As soon as we start obsessing about our credibility, however, we hand that leverage back to our weaker partners and we constrain our ability to pursue meaningful diplomatic solutions to existing conflicts. Fetishizing credibility, in short, is one of the reasons American diplomacy has achieved relatively little since the end of the Cold War.

#### No SCS conflict—common economic interests and legal commitments

Gupta ’11 Rukmani Gupta, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, “South China Sea Conflict? No Way,” The Diplomat, 23 October 2011, <http://the-diplomat.com/2011/10/23/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/2/>

These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. Despite the rhetoric, conflict in the South China Sea may well not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon the Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. And recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This isn’t to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated.

#### No war with China

Xuetong and Haixia ’12 Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University and the Chief Editor of The Chinese Journal of International Politics, he has his own Wikipedia page, Qi Haixia, Lecturer Ph.D in the Institute of International Studies , Tsinghua University, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5(2): 105-127, Summer 2012, 10.1093/cjip/pos007

Economic globalization created a strategic need for superficial friendship between China and the United States. While scholars disagree over exactly when economic globalization began, all agree that it sped up after the end of the Cold War. This is because the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulting in a global market. Meanwhile, the pace of information-flow increased among states, shrinking the size of the globe and leading to popularization of the expression ‘global village’. Levels of interdependence have increased along with the growing proximity of international economic relations. That a strategy of complete confrontation can no longer effectively protect national interests is now obvious. It is for this reason that certain scholars argue that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the security dilemma since end of the Cold War.35 Under the conditions of globalization, interdependence between China and the United States has continued to grow, and for the sake of economic interests, neither is willing to adopt a strategy of all-out confrontation. Economic interdependence, however, will not diffuse the political and security conflicts between the two states. Different interests in different spheres have thus created a foundation for superficial friendship between the United States and China.

#### Relations resilient—dissident crisis proves

Drezner ’12 Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, PhD in Political Science from Stanford University, “The big dogs that have not barked in the Chen Guangcheng case,” Foreign Policy, 5/4/2012, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/04/thoughts\_on\_the\_chen\_guangcheng\_case

My Big Thought: contrary to just about every headline I've seen in the past three days, I think Chen's case demonstrates the surprising resilience of the Sino-American relationship. Recall what I wrote earlier in the week: The fact that both Beijing and Washington have kept their mouths shut on Chen is a pretty surprising but positive sign about the overall stability/resilience of Sino-American relations. Bear in mind that according to the latest reports, much of the leadership in Beijing takesan increasingly conspiratorial view of the United States. As for the mood in Washington, well, let's just call it unfriendly towards China. Both sides are in the middle of big leadership decisions, making the incentive to cater to nationalist domestic interests even stronger than normal. With the rest of the Pacific Rim trying to latch themselves onto the U.S. security umbrella, this could have been the perfect match to set off a G-2 powderkeg. Despite all of these incentives for escalating the dispute, however, it hasn't happened. Kurt Campbell was dispatched to Beijing, talks are ongoing, and neither side appears to be interested in ramping up domestic audience costs. That escalation hasn't happened despite massive political incentives on both sides to let it happen suggests that, contrary to press fears about Chen blowing up the bilateral relationship, there are powerful pressures in Washington and Beijing to find a solution that saves as much face as humanly possible for both sides. Now, in the three days since I wrote that post, Chen has been released, calling every Chinese dissident, U.S. congressman and international reporter with a phone/recording device/Twitter account and is loudly and frantically describing the intimidation he and his family have experienced. The man has asked to be flown out on Hillary Clinton's plane as she departs from the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In other words, everything that has transpired in the past three days has given a black eye to both the Chinese and American governments' handling of this case. Despite the near-overwhelming incentive to ramp up bilateral tensions, however, it really hasn't happened. China's Foreign Mnistry has issued a couple of garden-variety press statements demanding a U.S. apology that won't be forthcoming. There have been no leaks or anonymous criticisms of the United States otherwise, despite the fact that this entire case is a burr in China's saddle at veery awkward moment. None of the U.S. State Department statements or press leaks have been terribly critical of the Chinese side either. Indeed, as the Washington Post observes: Neither Clinton nor her Chinese counterparts mentioned Chen in their formal remarks at the end of their two-day meeting, saying instead that U.S.-Sino differences on human rights issues must not disrupt the broader relationship between the two world powers. State Councilor Dai Bingguo, China’s top foreign policy expert, said his country and the United States still have “fundamental differences” on human rights issues. “Human rights should not be a disturbance in state-to-state relations,” Dai said. “It should not be used to interfere in another country’s internal affairs.” Clinton promised to “continue engaging with the Chinese government at the highest levels” on the “human rights and aspirations” of all people. This is pretty extraordinary. Even more extraordinary is the possiblity that despite Chen's outspokenness, he actually could be able to leave the country with his family.

### Manufacturing

#### Manufacturing’s rising rapidly

Contractor 8-12 Farok Contractor, professor of management and global business at Rutgers, “Seven Reasons to Expect US Manufacturing Resurgence” Epoch Times, 8/12/12 <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/opinion/seven-reasons-to-expect-us-manufacturing-resurgence-278304-all.html>

Seven factors converging by 2012 suggest that U.S. manufacturing could see a strong resurgence. Jobs once offshored are now returning in industries including automobiles and even unlikely areas like furniture and televisions.¶ Seven Factors¶ Wages of the bottom half of American workers have significantly declined in real terms over the past decade, as well as in comparison with other nations, while those of U.S. manufacturing rivals, including China and Japan, have risen.¶ ¶ American workers are working longer, faster, and with greater anxiety, than ever before. Because of greater automation, flexibility, domestic U.S. outsourcing, and the fear of being laid off, surviving U.S. manufacturing workers have seen little or no increases in wages in the past eight years, and their output has increased with productivity in output per employee at an all-time high.¶ Americans put in 1,800 hours per year, about the same as Japanese workers. Top is South Korea, with its corporate culture that prevents employees going home until the last boss has departed. The French and Germans, by comparison, put in 19 percent less time than Americans.¶ The dollar has weakened against several major currencies over the past decade, making imports more expensive and producing in, or exporting from, the United States more competitive, by comparison. The United States is not just the world’s biggest importer but also the second largest exporter of merchandise goods. In 2001—the year China joined the World Trade Organization—the renminbi yuan, RMB, was 8.27 per dollar. By 2012 the currency had appreciated by more than 30 percent to 6.3 RMB per dollar.¶ For many Chinese exporters, a breakeven exchange rate, when their exports to the United States are no longer competitive, is between 5.5 to 5.8 yuan per dollar. As the RMB continues to appreciate against the dollar, more Chinese firms will abandon exports and focus on their domestic market, growing at 8 percent per annum.¶ ¶ China is experiencing significant wage inflation. On the eastern seaboard, where most of China’s manufacturing takes place, several companies have experienced labor shortages and wage bills have increased by 20 percent per year.¶ Fuel prices have more than doubled. For products with significant transportation costs, the rise in energy costs can add significantly to the cost of imports. Shipping large appliances is expensive, so Haier, a leading white goods manufacturer based in China, opened a South Carolina plant where components, shipped across the Pacific Ocean, are assembled by American workers.¶ For products requiring flexibility in the face of fickle fashion changes or assembly operations that require components shipped within a few days to accommodate schedules, such pressures have driven component producers to colocate near the United States.¶ Natural disasters and disruptions in recent years have spooked global supply chains: Volcanoes in Iceland, overflowing rivers in Thailand, and tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean idled assembly plants in the United States and Europe because parts from affected regions could not be shipped. Years of cost savings at Toyota, from sourcing components from faraway locations, were wiped out by a few weeks of losses from assembly operations idled by 2011 floods in Thailand.

#### service exports compensate – manufacturing is irrelevant

Thompson 12 (Derek Thompson is a senior editor at The Atlantic, where he oversees business coverage for the website., 3/9/2012, "Trade My Brain, Please! Why We Don't Need to 'Make Something' to Export It", www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/trade-my-brain-please-why-we-dont-need-to-make-something-to-export-it/254274/)

The president is onto something. Exports matter. A good reason to fetishize manufacturing is right in the president's first line: "If we do stuff here, we can sell it there." As you might have caught on, I changed the word "make" in the president's speech to "do" in this paragraph, because we don't need to make something and put it in a box to sell it to foreigners. We can do stuff and sell it for foreign money, too. This sort of thing is called a "service exports." It means selling our work, or brains, and our resources to other countries. "Services exports" sounds like a rather silly or impossible thing -- like putting an American doctor in a small box, shipping him across the Pacific to hospital in Mumbai, and shipping him back with the rupees. In fact, services exports are much simpler than that. Simpler, even, than selling actual manufactured goods. If an Argentinian student goes to Harvard, that's an export. If a Korean uses a Kansas architect to design a building, that's an export. If Bain Capital advises a British investor getting in on a Moroccan start-up, that's an export. Perhaps service exports seem less "pure" than manufactured exports. In fact, there's a better case that the opposite is true. For any given "export dollar," service exports create a great share of what economists call "U.S. value added. That's a mouth-full, so you can call it "cold hard money in America." Think about a car shipped in a box from the United States to Spain. That's a U.S. export. But it's not a 100% U.S. product. The car parts might have come from one country, where they were fixed in Canada, taken south to be assembled in the United States, and shipped to Barcelona. The money made from the Spanish sale counts as a U.S. export, but the revenue is divided across the car's global supply chain. On the other hand, if a Barcelona family goes to Detroit for vacation, their euros stay in Detroit. "Business service exports had 95.6 percent U.S. value-added in 2004," the Brookings Metropolitan Policy program reported in a new study on exports. "Metropolitan areas specialized in services, such as Des Moines, Las Vegas, and Washington, D.C. tend to have higher shares of U.S. value-added in their exports than the rest of the largest 100 metro areas." The United States is the second or third largest total exporter, by various counts. But as a service exporter, we're the unambiguous world leader, commanding 14% of the world market, twice that of second-place Germany. In 2010, private services exports represented a third of U.S. exports, according to Brookings, and that number is going to keep growing. (As Scott Thomasson pointed out on Twitter, we even have a trade surplus with China.) An emphasis on exports is important because it keeps us competitive in a global market and brings in foreign money, which is especially useful for a slow economy. But we shouldn't just think of exports as stuff we can put into a box. We will continue to make things and put them in boxes and sell them in other countries. But 70% of the economy is employed in the services sector and there are five times more people working in professional services/education/leisure&hospitality than manufacturing today, and the ratio will probably grow in the next decade. We need to talk about those exporting industries, too. You don't need to make something to sell it "there."

#### No risk or impact to economic decline

Drezner ‘11 Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Please come down off the ledge, dear readers,” Foreign Policy, 8/12/11, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/please\_come\_down\_off\_the\_ledge\_dear\_readers

So, when we last left off this debate, things were looking grim. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression. Let's assume that the global economy persists in sputtering for a while, because that's what happens after major financial shocks. Why won't these other bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931? Let's start with the obvious -- it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes. The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger cement for the current system. In terms of [public] attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below: The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level. In contrast, support for free markets has increased in other major powers, such as Germany and China. On the whole, despite the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, public attitudes have not changed all that much. While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky or anything so [drastic]. Another big difference is that multilateral economic institutions are much more robust now than they were in 1931. On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of the World Trade Organization's corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are still working quite well. Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them. The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo. As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. That is setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that the G-20's most useful function is reassurance. Even if there are disagreements, communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse. Finally, a note about the possibility of riots and other general social unrest. The working paper cited in my previous post noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances. However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19: [I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower. Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant. As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant. This is good news!! The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931. What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the exception more than the rule. So yes, the recent economic news might seem grim. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's. And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen.

#### Economy’s turning around—employment, consumer confidence

Fletcher and Irwin 10-5 Michael A. Fletcher, and Neil Irwin, MBA from Columbia University, where he was a Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics and Business Journalism, “Unemployment rate falls to 7.8% in September,” Washington Post, 10/5/2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-plunges-to-78percent/2012/10/05/bdb6e5bc-0ee7-11e2-a310-2363842b7057\_print.html

It is a surprising improvement in a job market that had appeared listless in recent months. Although employers added a modest 114,000 jobs in September, the unemployment rate dropped sharply, from 8.1 to 7.8 percent, the government reported Friday. Unemployment is at its lowest level since President Obama took office in January 2009, offering him a political boost just days after his performance was widely judged as lackluster during a debate against GOP rival Mitt Romney. The government said hourly wages were up and employees worked more hours in September, meaning they were taking home bigger checks. Overall, the ratio of the American population with a job reached its highest level since May 2010. The drop in the unemployment rate was bolstered by revisions reflecting that employers had added 86,000 more jobs than previously known in July and August, recasting the troubling summer lull in job creation to a season of solid employment gains. Although the report offered a brightening picture of the nation’s labor market, the overall rate of job creation remains less than robust. In addition, unemployment remains far above normal levels, and many millions who have jobs are not working full time. “While the September employment report was more encouraging than the ones we have seen in recent months, the job market is still a long way from rosy, good health,” said Gary Burtless, a Brookings Institution economist. This year, employers have added only slightly more jobs per month than are needed to keep pace with normal labor-force expansion, and slightly fewer than the 153,000 average monthly gain the nation experienced in 2011. Also, the number of Americans working part-time — even though they want full-time jobs — rose sharply last month to 8.6 million. With economic growth creeping along after showing signs of more vigorous expansion last year, some economists were skeptical of the magnitude of September’s unemployment decline. A few even predicted that the jobless rate would tick up in the coming months. “This was a pretty good report, but the drop in the unemployment rate was just too good to be true and probably overstates the degree of improvement in the job market,” said Stuart G. Hoffman, chief economist for PNC Financial Services Group. Even at 7.8 percent, the joblessness rate remains high by any historical standard. And it could be years before the economy returns to full employment. But Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist for the Economic Outlook Group, said the dichotomy between the recent steep decline in the jobless rate and the slow economic growth in recent months could mean that the economy is poised to take off. Economic “growth may turn out to be stronger than most economists currently forecast,” he said. “ . . . Employers are, thus, cautiously turning more optimistic about the economy in 2013 and becoming less apprehensive about hiring.” There is evidence that consumers are feeling better about the state of the economy: The Conference Board’s consumer confidence number was up in September, as was a similar University of Michigan survey of consumer sentiment.

## 2NC

### Capitalism K

#### If communism appears dead, we should rescesitate it in an affirmation of universality—orthodox critique decimates the structural support for capitalism

Žižek ‘9 Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, Verso: London, 2009, p. p. 6-7

What the book offers is not a neutral analysis but an engaged and extremely "partial" one-for truth is partial, accessible only when one takes sides, and is no less universal for this reason. The side taken here is, of course, that of communism. Adorno begins his Three Studies on Hegel with a rebuttal of the traditional question about Hegel exemplified by the title of Benedetto Croce's book What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel? Such a question presupposes, on the part of the author, the adoption of an arrogant position as judge of the past; but when we are dealing with a truly great philosopher the real question to be raised concerns not what this philosopher may still tell us, what he may still mean to us, but rather the opposite, namely, what we are, what our contemporary situation might be, in his eyes, how our epoch would appear to his thought. And the same should apply to communism-instead of asking the obvious question "Is the idea of communism still pertinent today, can it still be used as a tool of analysis and political practise? " one should ask the opposite question: "How does our predicament today look from the perspective of the communist idea?" Therein resides the dialectic of the Old and the New: it is those who propose the constant creation of new terms ("postmodern society:' "risk society:' "informational society:' "postindustrial society:' etc. ) in order to grasp what is going on today who miss the contours of what is actually New. The only way to grasp the true novelty of the New is to analyze the world through the lenses of what was "eternal" in the Old. If communism really is an "eternal" Idea, then it works as a Hegelian "concrete universality": it is eternal not in the sense of a series of abstract-universal features that may be applied everywhere, but in the sense that it has to be re-invented in each new historical situation. In the good old days of Really Existing Socialism, a joke popular among dissidents was used to illustrate the futility of their protests. In the fifteenth century, when Russia was occupied by Mongols, a peasant and his wife were walking along a dusty country road; a Mongol warrior on a horse stopped at their side and told the peasant he would now proceed to rape his wife; he then added: "But since there is a lot of dust on the ground, you must hold my testicles while I rape your wife, so that they will not get dirty!" Once the Mongol had done the deed and ridden away, the peasant started laughing and jumping with joy. His surprised wife asked: "How can you be jumping with joy when I was just brutally raped in your presence?" The farmer answered: "But I got him! His balls are covered with dust!" This sad joke reveals the predicament of the dissidents: they thought they were dealing serious blows to the party nomenklatura, but al they were doing was slightly soiling the nomenklatura's testicles, while the ruling elite carried on raping the people . .. Is today's critical Left not in a similar position? (Among the contemporary names for ever-so-slightly smearing those in power, we could list "deconstruction;' or the "protection of individual freedoms:') In a famous confrontation at the university of Salamanca in 1936, Miguel de Unamuno quipped at the Francoists: "Vencereis, pero no convencereis" ("You will win, but you will not convince")-is this all that today's Left can say to triumphant global capitalism? Is the Left predestined to continue to play the role of those who, on the contrary, convince but nevertheless still lose (and are especially convincing in retroactively explaining the reasons for their own failure)? Our task is to discover how to go a step further. Our Thesis 11 should be: in our societies, critical Leftists have hitherto only succeeded in soiling those in power, whereas the real point is to castrate them .. . But how can we do this? We should learn here from the failures of twentieth century Leftist politics. The task is not to conduct the castration in a direct climactic confrontation, but to undermine those in power with patient ideologico-critical work, so that although they are still in power, one all of a sudden notices that the powers-that-be are afflicted with unnaturally high-pitched voices. Back in the 1960s, Lacan named the irregular short-lived periodical of his school Scilicet-the message was not the word's predominant meaning today ("namely; "to wit;' "that is to say"), but literally "it is permitted to know.' (To know what?-what the Freudian School of Paris thinks about the unconscious . . .) Today, our message should be the same: it is permitted to know and to fully engage in communism, to again act in full fidelity to the communist Idea. Liberal permissiveness is of the order of videlicet-it is permitted to see, but the very fascination with the obscenity we are allowed to observe prevents us from knowing what it is that we see.

#### Particular facts are irrelevant without totalizing historical theory—the aff makes universal what is particular to capitalism—methodological inquiry is prior to action

Lukács ’67 György Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1967, p. 7-10

Thus we perceive that there is something highly problematic in the fact that capitalist society is predisposed to harmonise with scientific method, to constitute indeed the social premises of its exactness. If the internal structure of the 'facts' of their interconnections is essentially historical, if, that is to say, they are caught up in a process of continuous transformation, then we may indeed question when the greater scientific inaccuracy occurs. It is when I conceive of the 'facts' as existing in a form and as subject to laws concerning which I have a methodological certainty (or at least probability) that they no longer apply to these facts? Or is it when I consciously take this situation into account, cast a critical eye at the 'exactitude' attainable by such a method and concentrate instead on those points where this historical aspect, this decisive fact of change really manifests itself? The historical character of the 'facts' which science seems to have grasped with such 'purity' makes itself felt in an even more devastating manner. As the products of historical evolution they are involved in continuous change. But in addition they are also precisely in their objective structure the products of a definite historical epoch, namely capitalism. Thus when 'science' maintains that the manner in which data immediately present themselves is an adequate foundation of scientific conceptualisation and that the actual form of these data is the appropriate starting point for the formation of scientific concepts, it thereby takes its stand simply and dogmatically on the basis of capitalist society. It uncritically accepts the nature of the object as it is given and the laws of that society as the unalterable foundation of 'science'. In order to progress from these 'facts' to facts in the true meaning of the word it is necessary to perceive their historical conditioning as such and to abandon the point of view that would see them as immediately given: they must themselves be subjected to a historical and dialectical examination. For as Marx says:8 "The finished pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface in their real existence and consequently in the ideas with which the agents and bearers of these relations seek to understand them, is very different from, and indeed quite the reverse of and antagonistic to their inner, essential but concealed core and the concepts corresponding to it." If the facts are to be understood, this distinction between their real existence and their inner core must be grasped clearly and precisely. This distinction is the first premise of a truly scientific study which in Marx's words, "would be superfluous if the outward appearance of things coincided with their essence" .10 Thus we must detach the phenomena from the form in which they are immediately given and discover the intervening links which connect them to their core, their essence. In so doing, we shall arrive at an understanding of their apparent form and see it as the form in which the inner core necessarily appears. It is necessary because of the historical character of the facts, because they have grown in the soil of capitalist society. This twofold character, the simultaneous recognition and transcendence of immediate appearances is precisely the dialectical nexus. In this respect, superficial readers imprisoned in the modes of thought created by capitalism, experienced the gravest difficulties in comprehending the structure of thought in Capital. For on the one hand, Marx's account pushes the capitalist nature of all economic forms to their furthest limits, he creates an intellectual milieu where they can exist in their purest form by positing a society 'corresponding to the theory', i.e. capitalist through and through, consisting of none but capitalists and proletarians. But conversely, no sooner does this strategy produce results, no sooner does this world of phenomena seem to be on the point of crystallising out into theory than it dissolves into a mere illusion, a distorted situation appears as in a distorting mirror which is, however, "only the conscious expression of an imaginary movement". Only in this context which sees the isolated facts of social life as aspects of the historical process and integrates them in a totality, can knowledge of the facts hope to become knowledge of reality. This knowledge starts from the simple (and to the capitalist world), pure, immediate, natural determinants described above. It progresses from them to the knowledge of the concrete totality, i.e. to the conceptual reproduction of reality. This concrete totality is by no means an unmediated datum for thought. "The concrete is concrete," Marx says,11 "because it is a synthesis of many particular determinants, i.e. a unity of diverse elements." Idealism succumbs here to the delusion of confusing the intellectual reproduction of reality with the actual structure of reality itself. For "in thought, reality appears as the process of synthesis, not as starting-point, but as outcome, although it is the real starting-point and hence the starting-point for perception and ideas." Conversely, the vulgar materialists, even in the modem guise donned by Bernstein and others, do not go beyond the reproduction of the immediate, simple determinants of social life. They imagine that they are being quite extraordinarily 'exact' when they simply take over these determinants without either analysing them further or welding them into a concrete totality. They take the facts in abstract isolation, explaining them only in terms of abstract laws unrelated to the concrete totality. As Marx observes: "Crudeness and conceptual nullity consist in the tendency to forge arbitrary unmediated connections between things that belong together in an organic union." 12 The crudeness and conceptual nullity of such thought lies primarily in the fact that it obscures the historical, transitory nature of capitalist society. Its determinants take on the appearance of timeless, eternal categories valid for all social formations. This could be seen at its crassest in the vulgar bourgeois economists, but the vulgar Marxists soon followed in their footsteps. The dialectical method was overthrown and with it the methodological supremacy of the totality over the individual aspects; the parts were prevented from finding their definition within the whole and, instead, the whole was dismissed as unscientific or else it degenerated into the mere 'idea' or 'sum' of the parts. With the totality out of the way, the fetishistic relations of the isolated parts appeared as a timeless law valid for every human society. Marx's dictum: "The relations of production of every society form a whole" 13 is the methodological point of departure and the key to the historical understanding of social relations. All the isolated partial categories can be thought of and treated-in isolation-as something that is always present in every society. (If it cannot be found in a given society this is put down to 'chance as the exception that proves the rule.) But the changes to which these individual aspects are subject give no clear and unambiguous picture of the real differences in the various stages of the evolution of society. These can really only be discerned in the context of the total historical process of their relation to society as a whole.

#### Efficiency measures accelerate rising consumption—Jevons’s Paradox proves

Foster et al. ’10 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, associate professor of sociology at University of Oregon, “Capitalism and the Curse of Energy Efficiency,” Monthly Review, November 2010, Vol. 62, Issue 6, pp. 1-12

But there is one aspect of Jevons’s argument—the Jevons Paradox itself—that continues to be considered one of the pioneering insights in ecological economics.8 In chapter 7 of The Coal Question, entitled “Of the Economy of Fuel,” Jevons responded to the common notion that, since “the falling supply of coal will be met by new modes of using it efficiently and economically,” there was no problem of supply, and that, indeed, “the amount of useful work got out of coal may be made to increase manifold, while the amount of coal consumed is stationary or diminishing.” In sharp opposition to this, Jevons contended that increased efficiency in the use of coal as an energy source only generated increased demand for that resource, not decreased demand, as one might expect. This was because improvement in efficiency led to further economic expansion. “It is wholly a confusion of ideas,” he wrote, “to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth. As a rule, new modes of economy will lead to an increase of consumption according to a principle recognised in many parallel instances….The same principles apply, with even greater force and distinctness, to the use of such a general agent as coal. It is the very economy of its use which leads to its extensive consumption.”9 “Nor is it difficult,” Jevons wrote, “to see how this paradox arises.” Every new technological innovation in the production of steam engines, he pointed out in a detailed description of the steam engine’s evolution, had resulted in a more thermodynamically efficient engine. And each new, improved engine had resulted in an increased use of coal. The Savery engine, one of the earlier steam engines, he pointed out, was so inefficient that “practically, the cost of working kept it from coming into use; it consumed no coal, because its rate of consumption was too high.”10 Succeeding models that were more efficient, such as Watt’s famous engine, led to higher and higher demand for coal with each successive improvement. “Every such improvement of the engine, when effected, does but accelerate anew the consumption of coal. Every branch of manufacture receives a fresh impulse—hand labour is still further replaced by mechanical labour, and greatly extended works can be undertaken which were not commercially possible by the use of the more costly steam-power.”11 Although Jevons thought that this paradox was one that applied to numerous cases, his focus in The Coal Question was entirely on coal as a “general agent” of industrialization and a spur to investment goods industries. The power of coal to stimulate economic advance, its accelerated use, despite advances in efficiency, and the severity of the effects to be expected from the decline in its availability, were all due to its dual role as the necessary fuel for the modern steam engine and as the basis for blast furnace technology. In the mid-nineteenth century, coal was the key material input for blast furnaces in the smelting of iron—the crucial industrial product and the foundation of industrial dominance.12 It was by virtue of its greater development in this area, as “the workshop of the world,” that Britain accounted for about half of world output of iron in 1870.13 Greater efficiency in the use of coal thus translated into a greater capacity to produce iron and expand industry in general, leading to spiraling demand for coal. As Jevons put it: If the quantity of coal used in a blast-furnace, for instance, be diminished in comparison with the yield, the profits of the trade will increase, new capital will be attracted, the price of pig-iron will fall, but the demand for it [will] increase; and eventually the greater number of furnaces will more than make up for the diminished consumption of each. And if such is not always the result within a single branch, it must be remembered that the progress of any branch of manufacture excites a new activity in most other branches, and leads indirectly, if not directly, to increased inroads upon our seams of coal.14 What made this argument so powerful at the time was that it seemed immediately obvious to everyone in Jevons’s day that industrial development depended on the capacity to expand iron production cheaply. This meant that a reduction in the quantity of coal needed in a blast furnace would immediately translate into an expansion of industrial production, industrial capacity, and the ability to capture more of the world market—hence more demand for coal. The tonnage of coal consumption by the iron and steel industries of Britain in 1869, 32 million tons, exceeded the combined amount used in both general manufactures, 28 million tons, and railroads, 2 million tons.15 This was the age of capital and the age of industry, in which industrial power was measured in terms of coal and pig iron production. Output of coal and iron in Britain increased basically in tandem in this period, both tripling between 1830 and 1860.16 As Jevons himself put it: “Next after coal…iron is the material basis of our power. It is the bone and sinews of our laboring system. Political writers have correctly treated the invention of the coal-blast furnace as that which has most contributed to our material wealth….The production of iron, the material of all our machinery, is the best measure of our wealth and power.”17 Hence none of Jevons’s readers could fail to perceive the multiplier effects on industry of an improvement in efficiency in the use of coal, or the “increased inroads” upon “seams of coal” that this would tend to generate. “Economy,” he concluded, “multiplies the value and efficiency of our chief material; it indefinitely increases our wealth and means of subsistence, and leads to an extension of our population, works, and commerce, which is gratifying to the present, but must lead to an earlier end.”18

#### Saying it’s a good idea to *not* question is ludicrous. Your argument is question begging—if we win your ideology is problematic then the K already implicates your framework.

Meszaros ’89 Istvan Meszaros, Chair of philosophy @ U. of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, 1989 p. 232-234

Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality – the self-proclaimed *Wertfeihert* or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically excluded (or suitably ‘bracketed out’) by the scientifically adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complication and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome. Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly *assume* that their enthusiasm for the virtues of ‘methodological neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of *possibility* – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be *self-evident* on account of its *purely methodological* character. In reality, of course, this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of *methodology* (and ‘meta-theory’) is said to be *in principle* separated from that of the *substantive* issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’. Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded from this rational discourse as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies, in the name of *methodology* itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them. This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For – far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry – the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact, to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter. Instead, the stipulated ‘common’ methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing *methodology for the sake of methodology*: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose. **6.1.2** Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’ (or by putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennes version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ to the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – inevitably always favours the established order. And it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants, on the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it ought to be fairly obvious that to consent not to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order. Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms. This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems not on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes. In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc., the conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of ‘rational discourse’ in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the *ruling ideology*. What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’? Once, though, such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to be considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions on the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constituted. This is why the allegedly ‘non-ideological’ ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying. Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that tend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated – at time completely bewildering – mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical interrelationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.

#### Ideological apologia for particular elements naturalize the system as a whole—social life shouldn’t have to survive by illusion

Cotter ’12 Jennifer Cotter, Assistant Professor of English at William Jewell College, “Bio-politics, Transspecies Love and/as Class Commons-Sense,” Red Critique, Winter/Spring 2012, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/biopoliticstransspeciesismandclasscommonssense.htm

I argue that biopolitics and transspecies posthumanism, in displacing "class" with "life," "production" with "reproduction," "labor" with "love," are affective and ultimately spiritualist understandings of material contradictions that articulate what Marx calls an "inverted world-consciousness." In "A Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction," Marx critiques religion for the way in which it articulates an inverted world consciousness because, on the one hand, it is "an expression of and protest against real suffering" and, on the other hand, it provides an "illusory happiness" for "real suffering." By "illusory happiness" Marx means that religion provides an illusory resolution of the material contradictions of exploitation in capitalism that cause the "real suffering" to which religion is both an effect and a response. In this way, rather than providing a material solution to problems of social alienation whose origin are in material relations of production, religion ends up providing a "spiritual aroma" for capitalism that helps to ideologically blur material relations of class and culturally adjust exploited workers to ruling class interests. It is on this basis that Marx argues that "The call [to workers] to abandon illusions about their condition is the call to abandon a condition which requires illusions" (131). Biopolitics and transspecies posthumanism articulate the "spiritual aroma"—the cultural imaginary—of transnational capital now. They do so by putting forward a "common share" in the "immaterial" of a new "global" culture under capitalism in place of transformation of the material relations of production in capitalism and freedom from exploitation. In doing so they serve to naturalize the material relations of exploitation and culturally adjust the contemporary workforces to the needs of capitalism now. In this respect, bio-political and transspecies posthumanist theories of love are a continuation—in a new historical form—of updating the working class into a new morality. George Sampson, in his 1921 book on British national education, English for the English, provides a telling historical example of this practice in his comments on the role of teaching "English" literature and culture to the working-class: "Deny to working-class children any common share in the immaterial, and presently they will grow into the men who demand with menaces a communism of the material" (as qtd in Eagleton 21). To put this another way, the "common share" in the "immaterial" of "culture" for all, was proposed by representatives of ruling class interests, such as Sampson, in order to ideologically smooth over severe material contradictions which were leading British workers to increasingly call into question the basis of ruling class wealth in their own exploitation. More generally, moreover, these comments are symptomatic of the fact that it is in the material interests of capital to provide "immaterial" and "spiritual" resolutions to deflect attention away from the economic and at the same time maintain the cultural cohesion of social bonds that are necessitated by social relations of production founded on exploitation.

#### Vacillation is a nuclear war DA to the perm

Herod ‘4 James Herod, World-Renowned Anarchist. Fourth Edition, January 2004. “Getting Free: A sketch of an association of democratic, autonomous neighborhoods and how to create it.” http://site.www.umb.edu/faculty/salzman\_g/Strate/GetFre/index.htm

But we must not think that the capitalist world can simply be ignored, in a live and let live attitude, while we try to build new lives elsewhere. (There is no elsewhere.) There is at least one thing, wage-slavery, that we can’t simply stop participating in (but even here there are ways we can chip away at it). Capitalism must be explicitly refused and replaced by something else. This constitutes War, but it is not a war in the traditional sense of armies and tanks, but a war fought on a daily basis, on the level of everyday life, by millions of people. It is a war nevertheless because the accumulators of capital will use coercion, brutality, and murder, as they have always done in the past, to try to block any rejection of the system. They have always had to force compliance; they will not hesitate to continue doing so. Nevertheless, there are many concrete ways that individuals, groups, and neighborhoods can gut capitalism, which I will enumerate shortly. We must always keep in mind how we became slaves; then we can see more clearly how we can cease being slaves. We were forced into wage-slavery because the ruling class slowly, systematically, and brutally destroyed our ability to live autonomously. By driving us off the land, changing the property laws, destroying community rights, destroying our tools, imposing taxes, destroying our local markets, and so forth, we were forced onto the labor market in order to survive, our only remaining option being to sell, for a wage, our ability to work. It’s quite clear then how we can overthrow slavery. We must reverse this process. We must begin to reacquire the ability to live without working for a wage or buying the products made by wage-slaves (that is, we must get free from the labor market and the way of living based on it), and embed ourselves instead in cooperative labor and cooperatively produced goods. Another clarification is needed. This strategy does not call for reforming capitalism, for changing capitalism into something else. It calls for replacing capitalism, totally, with a new civilization. This is an important distinction, because capitalism has proved impervious to reforms, as a system. We can sometimes in some places win certain concessions from it (usually only temporary ones) and win some (usually short-lived) improvements in our lives as its victims, but we cannot reform it piecemeal, as a system. Thus our strategy of gutting and eventually destroying capitalism requires at a minimum a totalizing image, an awareness that we are attacking an entire way of life and replacing it with another, and not merely reforming one way of life into something else. Many people may not be accustomed to thinking about entire systems and social orders, but everyone knows what a lifestyle is, or a way of life, and that is the way we should approach it. The thing is this: in order for capitalism to be destroyed millions and millions of people must be dissatisfied with their way of life. They must want something else and see certain existing things as obstacles to getting what they want. It is not useful to think of this as a new ideology. It is not merely a belief-system that is needed, like a religion, or like Marxism, or Anarchism. Rather it is a new prevailing vision, a dominant desire, an overriding need. What must exist is a pressing desire to live a certain way, and not to live another way. If this pressing desire were a desire to live free, to be autonomous, to live in democratically controlled communities, to participate in the self-regulating activities of a mature people, then capitalism could be destroyed. Otherwise we are doomed to perpetual slavery and possibly even to extinction.

#### Infinitely regressive and still links – accepting capitalism some of the time is exactly the kind of heterodox method that dooms the left

<this card is also in the framework section>

Tumino ‘1 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, "What is Orthodox Marxism and why it matters now more than ever," Red Critique, Spring 2001, accessed 1/3/10 http://www.redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Cap turns warming, prevents aff solvency

Bray et al. 10 [Bray, Mark, John Burgess, and David Collins. "Green Jobs, Environmental Sustainability & Industrial Relations." Indian Journal of Industrial Relations (2010): n. pag. Print.]

The key challenges facing the social partners can be summarised under six main headings. First, there is an absence of a global consensus on global action, the targets for individual countries and how a global agreement should be implemented. Without an overarching agreement there is scope for countries to delay, procrastinate, lower emission goals or wait and see what other countries do. The uncertainty and disagreements at this level flow through to other levels of decision making. Taylor commented: "many leaders are questioning whether the United Nation's negotiating process can ever deliver a result and, if not, how they can work together to hold each nation to the emission reduction pledges made so far" (Taylor 2010a). In Australia's case the failure to reach a global consensus is an excuse for inaction at the national level and for some an indication that climate change is a myth (Taylor 2010b). Second, some national governments are backing away from climate change actions and programs, in part as a response to the failure to reach a global consensus, and in part as response to national politics. "Policy discussion about how to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has gone silent, domestically and internationally (Taylor 2010 a)". In some cases such as the USA, climate change has been forgotten as the Federal Government deals with health care bills and with the crisis in the banking, finance and auto industries. In other countries, like Australia, there is no financial or auto industry crisis, however, the policy of a carbon trading system has been rejected by the Senate. The consequence has been, despite strong public support for climate change policy action and a belief in global warming, at the moment there is policy inaction. Third, employers and trade unions are not unanimous on the policy response. This applies both within and between the social partners. Industries with a strong affiliation to the brown economy, especially mining, have in the main been arguing the case for inaction wait and see, any policy will disadvantage investment, jobs and regions. This makes it difficult for the traditional social partners to present a united position but it also makes agreement between them much more difficult. In the case of business there is a strong argument that without strong international and national leadership of the issue that the degree of uncertainty militates against investment decisions. "Business will want answers from both sides of politics in order to invest with certainty. And voters will want answers because it is an issue which the vast majority of them care" (Taylor 2010a). Fourth, new actors are in part filling the void, taking decisions, but find it difficult to have any significant voice in the policy development process. The voice for climate change policies does not only include environmental and conservation groups; but also consumers, churches, investment fund managers, local councils, chambers of commerce, schools and universities, individual businesses/ workplaces, and community NGOs (Evans 2008, Grimstad 2009, Murphy 2010). Their action is often spontaneous, localised and uncoordinated. In any region there are literally hundreds of actors with different programs for addressing climate change. Local actors do not have to wait for action to be taken by international or national actors, however, because they are small, diverse, disjointed and uncoordinated they can be ignored by the national and international actors, and they find it difficult to be accorded any recognition in the process of policy development. However, despite this, local action is proceeding on many fronts and in many industries and communities (sustainable and eco tourism is one example of such local initiatives Grimstad 2009). Fifth, there is need for a supporting framework of institutions that promote trust, partnership and reconciliation. Just as markets do not operate in an institutional vacuum, also reaching a consensus on policy and action requires institutions to inform, facilitate and promote policy (Waring et al 2007). Some countries have a tradition of institutional support to encourage national, regional and local consensus between social partners. These include active industry, regional development and labour market programs that incorporate the key social partners. In other countries these traditions and supporting mechanisms are largely absent. The Varieties of Capitalism literature highlights that an absence of institutions for reaching and implementing agreements between the social partners is not conducive to enduring and sustainable policies and programs, especially between liberal market economies and co- ordinated market economies (Gough & Ogden 2008). The Anglo Saxon affliction with an emphasis on short term, market and individual actions is not conducive to developing robust and effective mechanisms and institutions for facilitating and managing structural adjustment (Gough & Ogden 2008, Waring et al 2007). Sixth, to compound the above problem is the legacy of neoliberalism, especially where policies are imposed, without consensus, and supporting institutions are either sidelined or dismantled. Once consensus forming institutions disappear, it is very difficult to re-construct these institutions and even to facilitate consensus building in a context that relied on imposition and authoritarian decision making. The 10 years of neoliberalism in Australia associated with the conservative government of 1996-2007 stripped back many of the consensus building institutions and completely bi passed trade unions in all aspects of industrial relations and policy development (Peetz 2008, Waring et al 2007). This makes it difficult to return to a situation of trust and co-operation (especially for trade unions), made more difficult since many of the institutions of partnership no longer existed. Waring et al (2008) identified a number of barriers that make it difficult for countries to move back to preneoliberal conditions and institutions. First, there are the institutional problems associated with wholesale transformation. When union presence has been diminished and collective institutions abolished it is difficult to reinstate a system where the supporting institutions have either disappeared or have been considerably diminished. Second, in Australia there was a strong neoliberal political commitment across all political parties, not only Conservative parties. There was no rush to either reinstate old institutions or to develop new effective institutions in their place (Waring et al 2007). Third, there remained in place major obstacles to change. In Australia the Conservative parties and independents retain control of the upper house (The Senate) and could therefore block reformist legislation. The lack of a binding international agreement is an impediment that applies to all countries. However, many countries are developing and implementing emission targets and implementing extensive supporting policies for a greener economy that involves the key social partners. The absence of international targets or leadership is no obstacle to developing and implementing a national policy agenda. This is more the case for those countries, like Denmark and Germany, who have a long tradition of social engagement in national policy development and it is no surprise that they are world leaders in renewable energy, especially wind and solar, and in energy efficiency systems across all industries (The Economist 2009 b). For some countries like Australia and the USA there is an absence of a national agenda, a recent history of division and not consensus building, and there is disagreement within and between the key social partners. However, even in these instances we are witnessing the spontaneous multitude of responses at the local and regional level. Once again inaction at the international, national or key social partner level is no obstacle to taking action on climate change in the home, at the supermarket, at the workplace or through the local council, chamber of commerce or trade union.

#### Overproduction—all corrective measures only aggravate eventual collapses

Wolff ‘9 Richard D. Wolff, Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and currently a Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New York, “Peak Oil and Peak Capitalism,” The Oil Drum, 3/27/2009, http://www.theoildrum.com/node/5245

The concept of peak oil may apply more generally than its friends and foes realize. As we descend into US capitalism’s second major crash in 75 years (with another dozen or so “business cycle downturns” in the interval between crashes), some signs suggest we are at peak capitalism too. Private capitalism (when productive assets are owned by private individuals and groups and when markets rather than state planning dominate the distribution of resources and products) has repeatedly demonstrated a tendency to flare out into overproduction and/or asset inflation bubbles that burst with horrific social consequences. Endless reforms, restructurings, and regulations were all justified in the name not only of extricating us from a crisis but also finally preventing future crises (as Obama repeated this week). They all failed to do that. The tendency to crisis seems unstoppable, an inherent quality of capitalism. At best, flare outs were caught before they wreaked major havoc, although usually that only postponed and aggravated that havoc. One recent case in point: the stock market crash of early 2000 was limited in its damaging social consequences (recession, etc.) by an historically unprecedented reduction of interest rates and money supply expansion by Alan Greenspan’s Federal Reserve. The resulting real estate bubble temporarily offset the effects of the stock market’s bubble bursting, but when real estate crashed a few years later, what had been deferred hit catastrophically. Repeated failure to stop its inherent crisis tendency is beginning to tell on the system. The question increasingly insinuates itself even into discourses with a long history of denying its pertinence: has capitalism, qua system, outlived its usefulness? Repeated state interventions to rescue private capitalism from its self-destructive crises or from the political movements of its victims yielded longer or shorter periods of state capitalism (when productive assets are owned or significantly controlled or regulated by state officials and when state planning dominates markets as mechanisms of resource and product distribution). Yet state capitalisms have not solved the system’s crisis tendencies either. That is why they have repeatedly given way to oscillations back to private capitalism (e.g. the Reagan “revolution” in the US, the end of the USSR, etc.) Moreover, the history of FDR’s efforts to counteract the Great Depression teaches fundamental lessons about capitalism as a system that cannot forever be deferred. Since the New Deal reforms then all stopped short of transforming the structure of corporations, they left in place the corporate boards of directors and shareholders who had both the incentives and resources to evade, undermine and abolish those reforms. Evasion was their focus until the 1970s, and abolition since. Capitalism systematically organizes its key institutions of production – the corporations – such that their boards of directors, in properly performing their assigned tasks, produce crises, then undermine anti-crisis reforms, and thereby reproduce those crises.

### 2NC—Pivot Adv

#### Rally around the flag effect is absurd

Jervis ’11 Robert Jervis, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2011, pp. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Empirics prove

Fravel ’10 M. Taylor Fravel, associate professor of political science in the MIT Security Studies Program, “The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict,” Security Studies 19:2, 2010, pp. 307-341

Yet despite two decades of renewed research, cumulative knowledge on diversion remains elusive. Quantitative studies contain mixed and often contradictory empirical results regarding the relationship between internal and external conflict. Some studies find a positive relationship between indicators of domestic dissatisfaction and threats or uses of force in analysis of u.s. behavior7 and in cross-national studies.8 By contrast, other research identifies a weak or nonexistent relationship between these same variables.9 Indeed, the gap between the intuition underlying diversion as a motive for conflict and existing quantitative research that Jack Levy noted in 1989 continues to characterize this research program today.10 Given the mixed empirical results in recent quantitative research, this article offers a different type of test of the diversionary hypothesis. In particular, I extend efforts to employ case study methods to test the hypothesis systematically and against alternative explanations in specific episodes of historical interest.11 Adopting a modified “most likely” approach to theory testing pioneered by Harry Eckstein, I examine two cases that should be easy for diversionary theory to explain: Argentina's 1982 seizure of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Turkey's 1974 invasion of Cyprus. In these episodes, high levels of domestic political unrest preceded the escalation of salient disputes that leaders could manipulate to rally public support or demonstrate their competence as statesmen. These cases should be homeruns for the diversionary hypothesis, but they are in fact quite difficult for it to explain. In these cases, the relationship between domestic political conflict and dispute escalation is weak at best, as the onset and magnitude of social unrest was only linked loosely with decisions to use force. Leaders' statements and reasoning provide little evidence for diversion as a central motivation for escalation. Instead, a standard realist model of international politics and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy offer a more compelling explanation of Argentine and Turkish decision making.12 Leaders in both states chose force in response to external threats to national interests, not internal threats to their political survival.

## 1NR

### 2NC—Growth Adv

#### Manufacturing up: reshoring, low costs

Industrial Distribution, “Rising US exports could help create 5 million jobs by 2020” 9/24/12 <http://www.inddist.com/news/2012/09/rising-us-exports-could-help-create-5-million-jobs-2020>

Manufactured exports—a bright spot of the U.S. economy in recent years—are set to surge. Combined with jobs created as a result of reshoring, higher U.S. exports could add 2.5 million to 5 million jobs by the end of the decade, as manufacturers shift production from leading European countries and Japan to take advantage of substantially lower costs in the U.S., according to new research by The Boston Consulting Group (BCG).¶ BCG projects that by around 2015, the U.S. will have an export cost advantage of 5 to 25 percent over Germany, Italy, France, the U.K., and Japan in a range of industries. Among the biggest drivers of this advantage will be the costs of labor, natural gas, and electricity. As a result, the U.S. could capture 2 to 4 percent of exports from the four European countries and 3 to 7 percent from Japan by the end of the current decade. This would translate into as much as $90 billion in additional U.S. exports per year, according to BCG’s analysis.¶ When the increase in U.S. exports to the rest of the world is included, annual gains could reach $130 billion. BCG forecasts that the biggest U.S. export gains will be in machinery, transportation equipment, electrical equipment and appliances, and chemicals.¶ “The export manufacturing sector has been the unsung hero of the U.S. economy for the past few years. But this is only the beginning,” said Harold L. Sirkin, a BCG senior partner and coauthor of the research. “The U.S. is becoming one of the lowest-cost producers of the developed world, and companies in Europe and Japan are taking notice.”¶ The analysis is part of BCG’s ongoing “Made in America, Again” series on the changing global economics that are starting to favor manufacturing in the U.S. Previous reports in this series have focused on production and jobs that are likely to be brought back to the U.S. as China’s once-formidable cost advantage erodes, but the new research delves more deeply into the competitive position of the U.S. relative to other developed economies. Together, the developed economies account for about 60 percent of global manufactured exports.

### 2NC—Grid Adv

#### Blackouts inevitable – aging equipment, growth, cyber threats

Loder 2/28/08 – staff writer [Asjylyn, “Still in dark over blackout,” St. Petersburg Times, 2/28/08, Business p. 1D]

Floridians have power, but not answers to how a small equipment malfunction in South Florida triggered a massive blackout that left millions of people as far away as the Tampa Bay area in the dark Tuesday afternoon. Florida Power & Light, Florida's largest provider of electricity and the source of the malfunction, said it might not have answers for weeks. "We're still in the middle of a major investigation to figure out why what happened happened," said Sarah Marmion, spokeswoman for the Juno Beach utility. Florida's outage spurred new concerns about the vulnerability of the electric grid. The state's utilities sought to reassure customers that all was well. But experts from around the country pointed out the system's fragility due to aging equipment, breakneck growth and ever-evolving cyber threats. "The grid has vulnerabilities that are both blessings and curses," said Eric Byres, chief technology officer for Byres Security, a Canadian firm that focuses on cyber-security for critical infrastructure. "The grid is the most complicated machine that man has ever made." The power network has two basic problems, he said. It's highly interconnected, so power can move throughout the system and customers aren't solely dependent on one power plant. But that also means that an isolated problem can quickly amplify. "The other problem with the grid is that it's old. It uses technology built largely 25 to 30 years ago," Byres said.

#### No risk of nuclear meltdowns

Beller 4 Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Nevada, Las Vegas  
(Dr. Denis E, “Atomic Time Machines: Back to the Nuclear Future,” 24 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 41, 2004)

No caveats, no explanation, not from this engineer/scientist. It’s just plain safe! All sources of electricity production result in health and safety impacts. However, at the National Press Club meeting, Energy Secretary Richardson indicated that nuclear power is safe by stating, “I’m convinced it is.”45 Every nuclear scientist and engineer should agree with that statement. Even mining, transportation, and waste from nuclear power have lower impacts because of the difference in magnitude of materials. In addition, emissions from nuclear plants are kept to near zero.46 If you ask a theoretical scientist, nuclear energy does have a potential tremendous adverse impact. However, it has had that same potential for forty years, which is why we designed and operate nuclear plants with multiple levels of containment and safety and multiple backup systems. Even the country’s most catastrophic accident, the partial meltdown at Three Mile Island in 1979, did not injure anyone.47 The fact is, Western-developed and Western-operated nuclear power is the safest major source of electricity production. Haven’t we heard enough cries of “nuclear wolf” from scared old men and “the sky is radioactive” from nuclear Chicken Littles? We have a world of data to prove the fallacy of these claims about the unsafe nature of nuclear installations. Figure 2 shows the results of an ongoing analysis of the safety impacts of energy production from several sources of energy. Of all major sources of electricity, nuclear power has produced the least impact from real accidents that have killed real people during the past 30 years, while hydroelectric has had the most severe accident impact. The same is true for environmental and health impacts.49 Of all major sources of energy, nuclear energy has the least impacts on environment and health while coal has the greatest.50 The low death rate from nuclear power accidents in the figure includes the Chernobyl accident in the Former Soviet Union.51

#### No meltdown impact – radiation is fine for you

Schulz 7 (Matthais, Der Spiegel, “Nuclear Exaggeration”, 11-22, <http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/dokument.html?titel=Is+Atomic+Radiation+as+Dangerous+as+We+Thought%3F&id=54059068&top=SPIEGEL&suchbegriff=Hiroshima&quellen=>)

The more recent meltdown at the reactor in Chernobyl in 1986 reminded the world of the dangers of the atom. The incident was referred to as "nuclear genocide," and the press wrote of "forests stained red" and of deformed insects. The public was bombarded with images of Soviet cleanup crews wearing protective suits, bald-headed children with cancer and the members of cement crews who lost their lives in an attempt to seal off the cracked reactor with a concrete plug. Fifteen years after the reactor accident, the German newsmagazine Focus concluded that Chernobyl was responsible for "500,000" deaths. AFP The Sellafield nuclear plant in England was the site of a devastating fire in 1957. Was all this just doomsday folklore? There is no doubt that large sections of the countryside were contaminated by the accident in the Ukraine. In the ensuing decades, up to 4,000 cleanup workers and residents of the more highly contaminated areas died of the long-term consequences of radiation exposure. But the six-figure death counts that opponents of nuclear power once cited are simply nonsense. In most cases, they were derived from vague "extrapolations" based on the hearsay reported by Russian dissidents. But such horror stories have remained part of the nuclear narrative to this day. In fact, contemporaries who reported on the Chernobyl incident should have known better. Even in the 1980s, radiobiologists and radiation physicists considered the media's doomsday reports to be exaggerated. And their suspicions have become a virtual certainty today. Groups of researchers have set up shop at all of the sites of nuclear accidents or major nuclear contamination. They work at Hanford (where the United States began producing plutonium in 1944), they conduct studies in the English town of Sellafield (where a contaminated cloud escaped from the chimney in 1957), and they study the fates of former East German uranium mineworkers in the states of Saxony and Thuringia. New mortality rates have now been compiled for all of these groups of individuals at risk. Surprisingly, the highest mortality rates were found among the East German mineworkers. In Hiroshima, on the other hand, radioactivity claimed surprisingly few human lives. Experts now know exactly what happened in the first hours, days and weeks after the devastating atomic explosion. Almost all of Hiroshima's 140,000 victims died quickly. Either they were crushed immediately by the shock wave, or they died within the next few days of acute burns. But the notorious radiation sickness -- a gradual ailment that leads to certain death for anyone exposed to radiation levels of 6 Gray or higher -- was rare. The reason is that Little Boy simply did not produce enough radioactivity. But what about the long-term consequences? Didn't the radiation work like a time bomb in the body? To answer these questions, the Japanese and the Americans launched a giant epidemiological study after the war. The study included all residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who had survived the atomic explosion within a 10-kilometer (6.2-mile) radius. Investigators questioned the residents to obtain their precise locations when the bomb exploded, and used this information to calculate a personal radiation dose for each resident. Data was collected for 86,572 people. Today, 60 years later, the study's results are clear. More than 700 people eventually died as a result of radiation received from the atomic attack: 87 died of leukemia; 440 died of tumors; and 250 died of radiation-induced heart attacks. In addition, 30 fetuses developed mental disabilities after they were born. Such statistics have attracted little notice so far. The numbers cited in schoolbooks are much higher. According to Wikipedia, the online encyclopedia, 105,000 people died of the "long-term consequences of radiation." DPA Miners in an East German uranium mine were heavily exposed to radon. "For commendable reasons, many critics have greatly exaggerated the health risks of radioactivity," says Albrecht Kellerer, a Munich radiation biologist. "But contrary to widespread opinion, the number of victims is by no means in the tens of thousands." Especially surprising, though, is that the stories of birth defects in newborns are also pure fantasy. The press has repeatedly embellished photos of a destroyed Hiroshima with those of deformed children, children without eyes or with three arms. In reality, there hasn't been a single study that provides evidence of an elevated rate of birth defects. A final attempt to establish a connection is currently underway in Japan. The study includes 3,600 people who were unborn fetuses in their mothers' wombs on that horrific day in August 1945. But it too has failed to furnish any evidence of elevated chromosomal abnormality. In Germany, where nuclear fears have coalesced with the fear of dying forests and mad cow disease into a general psychosis of threat, the degree of concern over nuclear radiation remains high. To this day, some are so fearful about the long-term effects of fallout from Chernobyl that they refuse to eat mushrooms from Bavaria. Even 20 years ago such behavior would not have made sense.

### Elections DA

#### Probability and magnitude—invasion escalates—multiple senior military and intel officials in the US and Israel say Iran has powerful proxy networks that cause wider conflagrations. Middle East power dynamics are shifting rapidly which risks great power intervention

Williams, Professor –Social Sciences - Indian Institute of Technology, 10 (Peril Awaits at the Strait of Hormuz, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/2557996/posts>)

The Gulf-Southwest Asia region has always been a **hyper-**flash point of **global** conflict due to the dual strategic persistence of the Arab-Israel conflict and the geo-strategic and geo-economic rivalries over oil and its supplies across the critical sea gates of Straits of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandab straits. This has resulted in the near permanent forward basing of US and allied naval and air forces in the region with dedicated theater commands along with naval air assets with prepositioned amphibious and expeditionary capabilities. In recent years, the stakes of heightened conflict has increased by vast proportions by the intertwining of the conflicts in Iraq, the nuclear and missile proliferation in Iran and the domino effect that has followed by the Arab states. Iran holds the position of a pivotal state in the Gulf Region and has been energized in its quest to seek a great power status leveraging its Shiite ideology over the vast numbers of the Sunni dominated Southwest Asian region. Iran also has a civilization complex of being the Persian civilization and its affirmed superiority over the Arabs in its geo-historical contexts. Controlling the Straits of Hormuz and the sea gates in the region that has the densest energy-laden shipping and leveraging its enormous oil and natural gas assets into a regional geo-economic and geo-strategic grand strategy matrix has been Iran’s ambitions. Contending Iran in its aggressive quest of power expansion in its geo-strategic and religious ideology has been the US-western allied Arab states and the lone free democratic state of Israel. Geo-strategic importance of the Strait: The maritime archipelagic framework of the Gulf-Southwest Asian region is characterized by the Persian Gulf (also known as “Gulf” avoiding the contending Persian and Arab nomenclature claims), Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman constituting a primary jugular of the sea way of the region. The topography of the Strait is complex with the narrowest point the Strait being 21 miles wide. The shipping lanes consist of two-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a two-mile wide buffer zone. Iran’s access to the Strait and the pivotal role as a littoral state to control shipping movements with the capability to jeopardize international shipping has been a critical sinew of strength. In terms of its power profile, Iran could marshal its economic, military and demographic power to overwhelm the fragile states of the Arabian Peninsula that includes the regional giant Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The geo-strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz would continue to increase in its criticality owing to Iranian motivations-capabilities of blocking oil shipping in the event of punitive actions against Tehran through very robust asymmetric naval capabilities of the Iranian navy and the sea-based elements of the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council). Adding to these capabilities, would be Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear or other WMD payloads that constitutes the critical gravity of threat in the region to the regional states, international shipping and for powers like China and India which have very critical hydrocarbon stakes in the region. The Iranian move to close the strait would have a very steep impact of jeopardizing the oil trade 6 External powers like France and India have increased considerable offshore access and basing presence in the region with naval support facilities for France in the United Arab Emirates where French naval special operation forces have access facilities along with forward deployment of French warships. Similarly, India has access and naval support facilities in Qatar. The Indian commitment includes a substantive naval security guarantee that would secure the offshore assets of Qatar and provides for the joint venture in production of weapons and military equipment. The maritime cooperation agreement provides India with a strategic naval base in the Gulf region. The India-Qatar maritime security initiative provides India and Qatar with a convergence of Indian naval power with Qatari naval forces to combat the variety of maritime asymmetric threats of terrorism, piracy and securing the offshore oil installations. It thus brings India into the Gulf Region with a secure access agreement. Four, the role of the Israeli Navy in the region adds to the interesting complexity and power balance in the naval theatre. Even as the Iranian clandestine nuclear weapons program races ahead, with the possible targeting of Iranian nuclear-industrial estate being contemplated by the US and allied western powers, Israel has an autonomous naval role in the region with several of its Saar-V class warships outfitted with Delilah standoff missiles with high powered microwave warheads and its German Dolphin class submarines armed with its Popeye Cruise missiles (of ranges 1500km) with a nuclear payload of 200kg have been in frequent deployment in the Gulf Region. This deployment brings to fore the increasing critical importance of nuclear tipped land attack cruise missiles in preemptive strikes against hardened Iranian targets in a prospective joint US-led strike against Iranian nuclear installations. Five, In an event of a conflagration in the Strait of Hormuz, there are increasing possibilities of an Iranian asymmetric move to use chemical or even radiation tipped warheads that could completely wreck civilian shipping with enormous primary and collateral loss and the crippling of shipping leading to an intense bottleneck preventing the entry of US-lead western allied intervention forces. The possibilities of such scenarios serve as important operational options for an Iranian leadership that is determined to stall a US-led preemptive strike. These naval operational realities cloud and condition the naval theatre of the Strait of Hormuz that is increasingly vulnerable and prone to assertive asymmetric strikes / counter strikes by Iran. Sources of Iranian Conduct and Responses: Iran’s template of operational conduct and responses is influenced by several political, economic, religious-ideological, regional rivalry and military factors. Iran is being painted as an irrational actor with an overdose obsession on brinkmanship. While the radical religious clerical leadership and the vanguard of the revolution viz: IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council) would like to ratchet and escalate the conflicts in the region by the attempt of a WMD strike in the Strait of Hormuz and even daring targeting Israel, the Iranians in their strategic calculus have always been calculated in their responses. The penchant of an Iranian overdrive by an asymmetric operational strategy either by missile strikes or by naval disruptions could be either as an initiative to subdue the militarily weaker but the oil-rich Sunni Gulf Arab states and Saudi Arabia or as an attempt to deflect US-Israeli targeting by inciting the Hezbollah-Hamas terrorist brigades which are in effect the auxiliary units of the IRGC. A second source of Iranian strategic conduct emerges from its maritime aspirations to control the Gulf and Caspian Sea. With both seas being critically important as oil and natural gas rich repositories, Iran would prefer to maintain sea-control and sea-denial capabilities employing an asymmetric operational approach of sea-based strike missiles, submarines and aggressive naval posturing that could dent the effectiveness of any naval interventionist force. The third possible source of Iranian asymmetric conduct could come from its keen interest in developing EMP weapons (Electromagnetic Pulse) that could have perilous consequences both for onshore and offshore assets. In the last eight years, Iran has tested its missiles over the Caspian Sea with a potential EMP effect. With such serious intent, an Iranian attempt either to launch a Shahab-3 missile with an EMP payload off the US coasts from an innocent looking freighter or even using the same in the approaches of the Strait of Hormuz off the Arabian Sea coast could simply paralyze all interventionist forces. Iranian responses to an offensive strike could include the intense barrage of sea-skimming supersonic anti-ship missiles. The Iranian arsenal includes anti-ship missiles like the C-802 and Kowsar (the Chinese Silkworms and the Russian Sunburns) The C-802 anti-ship missiles are missiles that originate from China. Kowsar anti-ship missiles are basically land-based anti-ship missiles (land-to-sea missiles) which can dodge electronic jamming systems. Deploying an aggressive package of supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and the employ of EMP weapons could be a deadly cocktail that would complicate intervention and set the stage for more escalation of strikes against Iran and counter strikes that would cripple the maritime oil commerce skyrocketing the oil price over US $300 per barrel or even more dealing with a decimation to the global economy.

#### Obama winning now but he’s vulnerable: swing state, national polls, 538 model

Silver 10/12 (Nate, “Oct 11: Obama’s swing state firewall has brittle foundation” <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/oct-11-obamas-swing-state-firewall-has-brittle-foundation/?gwh=62F640DF5D382CA2FF323E435793D7B2>)

President Obama’s position has been stronger in state polls than in national surveys on recent days, a streak that extended itself in Thursday’s polling.¶ Although Mr. Obama got a distinctly poor poll in Florida, which showed him seven points behind there, the rest of Thursday’s state-level data, like a series of polls by Quinnipiac University and Marist College, were reasonably good for him. In surveys of competitive states that were released over the course of the day, he held the lead with 11 polls to Mitt Romney’s 6.¶ However, four of the six national tracking polls moved toward Mr. Romney, who also led by one point in a national poll published by Monmouth University.¶ The case that Mr. Romney’s bounce is evaporating after his debate last week in Denver continues to look a bit thin. The tracking polls aren’t perfect by any means. Some are better than others, but they are a below-average group of polls on the whole. But they do provide useful information about the day-to-day trend in the race, and so far they haven’t shown the sort of reversal that Democrats might have hoped for.¶ Still, the broader group of polls was slightly more equivocal on balance than earlier in the week; the FiveThirtyEight forecast model was about ready to call the day a draw until the publication of the Florida poll, which tipped things toward Mr. Romney. His probability of winning the Electoral College advanced to 33.9 percent from 32.1 percent in Wednesday’s forecast, his highest figure since July 25.¶ Mr. Romney also gained in the FiveThirtyEight projection of the national popular vote, which is formulated from state polls along with national polls. The model now projects Mr. Obama to only about a one-point advantage in the popular vote and gives him a 62.6 percent chance of winning it, lower than his Electoral College probability of 66.1 percent.¶ But although we do perceive some advantage for Mr. Obama in the Electoral College relative to the popular vote, I would caution our readers against thinking that it’s all that robust.

#### Ignore the tendency to exaggerate the post-debate bump – poli sci proves it’s irrelevant – this race will be tight

Klein 10/10 (Ezra, B.A., Political Science from UCLA, writer at the Washington Post, "In excitable pundits vs. political scientists, I’ll take political scientists every time," [www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/10/10/in-excitable-pundits-vs-political-scientists-ill-take-political-scientists-every-time/])

For the record, I’ll take political scientists looking at thousands of polls over multiple elections over pundits freaking out after the first few polls following the first presidential debate. This, in my view, is exactly what political science does well: Reminds you to calm down, to take the long view, and to ask yourself whether you think this election will break from historical precedent, and if so, why. Frum doesn’t actually link to any political scientists saying “debates don’t matter,” and to my knowledge, none have said that. What they have said is, in the words of George Washington University’s John Sides, “when it comes to shifting enough votes to decide the outcome of the election, presidential debates have rarely, if ever, mattered.” Note that if this election proves to be the rare instance in which the debates really did decide the election, that doesn’t make the political scientists wrong. The fact that something only happens rarely doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen. The fact that something hasn’t happened before doesn’t mean it can’t happen in the future. The past is a guide, not a promise. Perhaps last Wednesday’s presidential debate will decide this election. According to Gallup, which has also thrown cold water on the idea that debates routinely decide elections, Romney’s victory in the debate was more lopsided than any other debate victory in the history of their polling. So maybe this really is a game-changer. But then again, maybe not. When political scientists say debates don’t tend to decide elections, note that they use the plural. They’re looking at the change in polls from the beginning of the debates to the end, not the change in polls from the beginning of the debates to the end of the first debate. There’s a difference between a post-debate “bounce” that fades after a couple of days and a post-debate “bump” that persists until the next debate. Erikson and Wlezien, for instance, use the polls taken 8 to 14 days after the first debate in order to separate signal from noise. There’s an even bigger difference between a post-debate bounce that fades within a few days and a post-debate bump that persists through all of the debates. We just don’t know which Romney has as of yet. Romney took home a big win in the first debate. But there’s going to be a second debate between him and Obama. And a third. And there’s going to be a debate between Joe Biden and Paul Ryan. It’s possible that Romney and Ryan will dominate each and every one of these encounters, but given the unusual rout we saw in the first debate, I think it’s likelier that we’ll see some mean reversion: Obama will perform better than he did in his first outing, and make up a bit of the ground that he lost. But perhaps not. Typically — and this is something I only learned after playing around with Erikson and Wlezien’s data for a while — the change in the polls after the first debate is smaller than the change in the polls after all the debates. That might imply that Romney’s lead will grow rather than shrink. Note that the change after the final debate is typically larger than the change after the first debate. (Data: Erikson and Wlezien) But another way to read this data — the way Erikson and Wlezien read it — is that elections tend to tighten in the homestretch. How that will interact with a first debate that may have flipped the polls, at least temporarily, is anyone’s guess. Perhaps it means Romney will increase his margins. Perhaps it means that the tightening now will come from Romney’s newfound support, putting Obama back in the lead. We’ll need to wait for more data to see. I would say that the last week has been an object lesson in why it’s worth paying attention to the evidence gathered by political scientists and tuning out some of the more excitable pundits. Pundits have every incentive to make sweeping pronouncements based off incomplete data. The work political scientists have done gives us some body of past evidence against which we can check those sweeping pronouncements. It’s too early to say how much this debate mattered, but the wild reaction it’s generated among political pundits has convinced me, more than ever, that political science matters.

#### Even conservatives oppose restricting EPA emissions regulations

Geman ’11 Ben Geman, writer for The Hill’s energy and environment blog, “Poll: Upton’s war against EPA climate rules unpopular at home,” The Hill, 5/19/2011, http://thehill.com/blogs/e2-wire/e2-wire/162087-poll-uptons-war-against-epa-climate-rules-unpopular-at-home

A poll commissioned by environmentalists shows that House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Fred Upton’s (R-Mich.) bid to scuttle climate change regulations is unpopular among constituents and could weaken his support at the ballot box. The late-April polling for the NRDC Action Fund finds that 54 percent of his constituents oppose Upton’s proposal to block the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from limiting greenhouse gases, while 32 percent support it. The survey of 611 people – conducted by the Democratic firm Public Policy Polling – finds that 49 percent said Upton’s effort makes them less likely to support him in the next election, while 29 percent were more likely to back him and 22 percent were unsure. Upton is leading a GOP charge to strip EPA’s power under the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from sources such as power plants, refineries and factories. His legislation passed the House in early April with 19 Democrats joining Republicans in support. The same plan fell short in the Senate, but Upton has repeatedly vowed continued efforts in this Congress to thwart EPA rules. Upton, who was first elected in 1986, was easily reelected in 2010 with 62 percent of the vote. The nonpartisan Cook Political Report lists his southwest Michigan seat in the “Solid Republican” camp – Cook’s designation for the safest seats – heading into 2012. But the polling memo obtained by The Hill shows that 48 percent believe Upton’s vote to “alter the Clean Air Act” shows that he is more concerned with special interests, while 31 percent say he is more concerned for his constituents.

#### Turnout key – not swing voters

Abramowitz, 12 (Alan, Senior Columnist, Center For Politics.org, Prof Poli Sci @ Emory, 5/31, <http://www.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/buying-a-presidential-election-its-not-as-easy-as-you-think/>

The airwaves in the eight or 10 states that will decide the outcome of the 2012 presidential election will soon be saturated with ads supporting and opposing Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, all aimed at persuading a small group of undecided voters — less than 10%, according to most recent polls. These undecided voters are much less interested in the presidential election than those who have already chosen sides. When the ads come on, they generally ignore them. Moreover, undecided voters are not stupid, and they’re generally skeptical about the messages that they see on TV. As a result, the net impact of all of this advertising is likely to be minimal. Research by political scientists and evidence from 2012 polls in the battleground states suggests that the parties and candidates would do better to focus their efforts in these states on mobilizing their supporters rather than trying to persuade uncommitted voters. But I’ll have more to say about that in my next article.

#### Swing Voters like alternative energy – hate non-clean energy

Josh Freed and Matt Bennett, Third Way; Al Quinlan and Andrew Baumann, Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research. February 2012. “Moving Clean Energy to the Center: Insights from Swing Voters in the Midwest and South” <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/486/Third_Way_Report_-_Moving_Clean_Energy_to_the_Center_-_Insights_from_Swing_Voters_in_the_Midwest_and_South.pdf>

Even swing voters in traditional energy states want to get America running on clean energy. Over the past decade, policymakers from the coasts and a handful of other tech-friendly states have been the main forces behind national clean energy policies. Many of these policies died because of the perception that there is no public support for clean energy in conventional energy-reliant Midwestern and Southern states. That may well have been the case with massive, economy-wide policy changes like cap-and-trade. Our focus groups, however, found strong support for clean energy among swing voters in the industrial Midwest (Ohio) and the South (North Carolina). These voters want to get America running on clean energy because they see it as a necessary step for a successful, modern country. To accomplish this, these reactions point to a focus on how clean energy will: Drive long-term economic growth. The voters’ time frame here is critical. They believed clean energy would reduce energy prices and the country’s reliance on expensive, foreign oil, and create jobs—but that it would take 10 to 15 years.Help the U.S. win the economic competition with China. Voters believed clean energy was one of the key sectors in this competition, and they thought the Chinese government was helping its companies win this race. They wanted the U.S. government to act with the same national interest, but they said that is not happening now because of ineptitude and corrupt special interests. • Reduce air and water pollution that threatens their health and the health of their children. Voters equated a successful country with modern energy and a healthy environment. To them, coal plants—and the pollution they produced—was emblematic of a country that was stuck in the past or failing to compete in the 21st century. In addition to the gains they thought would come from clean energy, participants were motivated by their fears of what America would lose—the economic competition with China—if we fail to act. They see a country today where their interests are being held back by a broken system. They want the private sector to act, with government serving as the catalyst.

# Rd 4 vs Fresno GR

## 1NC

### T-Restriction

#### Energy production means extraction and conversion of energy into power

Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency of Australia ‘11 [“Energy Production and Consumption,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/national-greenhouse-energy-reporting/publications/supplementary-guidelines/energy-production-consumption.aspx]

Production of energy: in relation to a facility, means the:

1. extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility
2. manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility, or for use other than in the operation of the facility (regulation 2.23(3) NGER Regulations).

#### Restrictions are regulations limiting production

American Heritage Dictionary, Cited by Dave Arnett and Andrea Reed in “Reduce Restrictions and Increase Incentives Mechanism Wording Paper” which came exceedingly close to the final resolution.

re·stric·tion (r-strkshn)

n.

1.

a. The act of restricting.

b. The state of being restricted.

2. Something that restricts; a regulation or limitation.

#### Violation—codifying sovereignty isn’t a reduction in restriction

#### Voting issue

#### Limits—“energy-related activities” means literally any activity—decimates neg ability to generate specific offense

EIA, no date [Glossary, “E”, http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=E, accessed 5-20-12, AFB] Cited by Adrienne Brovero [Debate Coach at University of Mary Washington] in Generic Terms-Energy Committee Report-6-1-12

Energy: The capacity for doing work as measured by the capability of doing work (potential energy) or the conversion of this capability to motion (kinetic energy). Energy has several forms, some of which are easily convertible and can be changed to another form useful for work. Most of the world's convertible energy comes from fossil fuels that are burned to produce heat that is then used as a transfer medium to mechanical or other means in order to accomplish tasks. Electrical energy is usually measured in kilowatthours, while heat energy is usually measured in British thermal units (Btu).

#### Extra topicality—change in sovereignty is outside the topic—lets the aff claim unpredictable native advantages and swamp neg ground—destroys fairness and focused education—topical version of the aff solves their offense

#### Bidirectionality—they authorize tribes to increase tax restrictions—lets them spike DA and CP links

### Tribes PIC

#### The United States Federal Government should amend both the Internal Revenue Code and 25 U.S.C.3501-3506 to include provisions for first peoples renewable-energy tax-credit transferability for a period of four years and declare that first peoples maintain sovereign authority to implement tribal regulations and taxes over all energy related activities conducted within reservation borders permanently.

#### The word “tribes” is a racist, European term designed to subjugate Native Americans under the rule of Western superiority. Using ‘first peoples’ solves

Churchill 94 [Ward (Creek/Cherokee Metis), Coordinator for AIM-Colorado Chapter, VP of the Anerican Indian Anti-Defamation Council, Naf1 Spokesperson for the Leonard Peltier Defense Committee & Assoc. Prof. of American Indian Studies and Communication ~ Univ. of Colorado a; Boulder, INDIANS ARE US? CULTURE AND GENOCIDE IN NATIVE NORTH AMERICA, p. 296-298)

This may explain why no native language in ' North America-and surely language must be taken as a key indicator of traditional concepts-contains a word which translates accurately as "tribe." The literal translation of most American Indian people's names for themselves was, traditionally, exactly that: "people." The consistency with which what is at best a mistranslation has been substituted for more accurate terminology cannot be dismissed as something either benign or inadvertent. Consider the relevant portion of Webster's definition of most native groups' own self-descriptor: Peo'ple...l. A body of persons united by a com­mon character, culture, or sentiment; the indi­viduals collectively of any characteristic group, conceived apart from the unity of the group as subject to common government (that is, as a state) or as issued from a common stock (that is, as a race or tribe). 2. A race, tribe, or nation; as, the peoples of Europe [emphases in the original).The OED amplifies this, defining a people as being:A body of persons composing a community, tribe, race, or nation; = FOLK ...Sometimes viewed as a unity, sometimes as a collective of number ...The persons belonging to a place or occupying a par­ticular concourse, congregation, company, or class ...Those to whom any one belongs; the mem­bers of one's tribe, clan, family, community, asso­ciation, church, etc., collectively ...The common people, the commonality ...The whole body of enfranchised or qualified citizens, considered as the source of power; esp. in a democratic state, the electorate... Men or women indefinitely; men and women; persons, folk.Plainly, there is nothing positive which can be said to be intrinsic to the meaning of "tribe" and not immediately encompassed within the much more broadly delineated term "people." The significance of the Euroamerican's continuing insistence upon referring to native societies as tribes rather than as peoples can thus be located primarily-though not necessarily exclusively, as will be explained below­ in the expressly animalistic emphasis embodied in the former, a matter readily contrasted to the fact that the latter relates, as the OED puts it, specifical­ly and "emphatically [to] Human beings" (emphasis in the original). It follows that, when indigenous peoples are passed off as tribes, and conditioned to view themselves in this way, they are effectively cast as being subhuman. The upshot is unmistakable. Designation of Indians as tribes provides a near­ perfect psychic rationalization/justification of the perpetual, "natural," and "inevitable" subordination of native ("tribal" and therefore "lower," "lesser," or "inferior") societies to their purported European/ Euroamerican "betters" ("non-tribal," and therefore, by definition, "superior"). From the imposition of such linguistic subordination, it is but the easiest of steps, both psychologically and physically, to what has always been Eurosupremacism's business-as­-usual: the wholesale and systematic expropriation of American Indian assets.

### Foucault K

#### Environmental managerialism is a flawed starting point – the plan’s short-term corrective allows the transformation of Nature into ecological capital, sustaining neoliberalism

Luke 97 (Timothy W., Department of Poli Sci @ Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Ph.D. in Political Science from Washington University, “The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism?,” Mar, jam)

All of these environmentalizing initiatives reveal different aspects of Nature's infrastructuralization in the disorganized and incomplete transnational campaigns of environmentalized capital's terraforming programs. The actions of the Worldwatch Institute, the Nature Conservancy, or the World Wildlife Fund, or the Sierra Club are frameworks within which a new habitus with its own environmentalized social relations of production and consumption can come alive by guarding habitat as the supremely perfect site of habitus. As Baudrillard observes, "the great signified, the great referent Nature is dead, replaced by environment, which simultaneously designates and designs its death and the restoration of nature as simulation model....we enter a social environment of synthesis in which a total abstract communication and an immanent manipulation no longer leave any point exterior to the system."115 Rendering wildlife, air, water, habitat, or Nature into complex new systems of rare goods in the name of environmental protection, and then regulating the social consumption of them through ecological activism shows how mainstream environmentalists are serving as agents of social control or factors in political economy to reintegrate the intractable equations of (un)wise (ab)use along consummational rather than consumptive lines. Putting earth first only establishes ecological capital as the ultimate basis of life. Infrastructuralizing Nature renders everything on Earth, or "humanity's home," into capital--land, labor, animals, plants, air, water, genes, ecosystems. And, mainstream environmentalism often becomes a very special kind of "home eco nomics" to manage humanity's indoors and outdoors household accounts. Household consumption is always home consumption, because human economics rests upon terrestrial ecologics. Here the roots of ecology and economics intertwine through "sustainable development," revealing its truest double significance: sustainably managing the planet is the same thing as reproducing terrestrial stocks of infrastructorialized green capital. Whether or not environmentalists prevent the unwise abuse or promote wise use of natural resources is immaterial; everything they do optimizes the sign value of green goods and serves to reproduce global capital as environmentalized sites, stocks or spaces--an outcome that every Worldwatch Institute State of the World report or Club Sierra ecotour easily confirms. Likewise, the scarcity measures of Nature Conservancy or World Wildlife Fund scare campaigns show how everything now has a price, including wildlife preservation or ecological degradation, which global markets will mark and meet in their (un)wise (ab)use of environmentalized resources. Newer ecological discourses about total cost accounting, lifecycle management, or environmental justice may simply articulate more refined efforts to sustainably develop these bigger global processes of universal capitalization by accepting small correctives against particular capitalist interests. Admitting that poor people have been treated unjustly in siting decisions for environmental bads lets rich people redistribute these ecological costs across more sites so that they might benefit from the material and symbolic goods created by being just so environmental. Environmental justice movements perhaps are not so much about attaining environmental justice as they are about moving injustices more freely around in the environment, assuring the birth of new consumerisms for increased efficiency at risk management and broader participation ecological degradation in our terraformed Nature. In conclusion, Foucault is correct about the network of governmentality arrangements in the modern state. State power is not "an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence," because its power/knowledge has indeed evolved "as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns."116 Producing discourses of ecological living, articulating designs of sustainable development, and propagating definitions of environmental literary for contemporary individuals simply adds new twists to the "very specific patterns" by which the state formation constitutes "a modern matrix of individualization."117 The emergent regime of ecologized bio-powers, in turn, operates through ethical systems of identity as much as it does in the policy machinations of governmental bureaux within any discretely bordered territory. Ecology merely echoes the effects from "one of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century," namely, "the emergence of 'population' as an economic and political problem."118 Once demography emerges as a science of statist administration, it is statistical attitudes can diffuse into the numerical surveillance of Nature, or Earth and its nonhuman inhabitants, as well as the study of culture, or society and its human members, giving us ecographies written by the Worldwatchers steering effects exerted from their astropanopticons through every technoscientific space.119 Government, and now, most importantly, superpowered statist ecology, preoccupies itself with "the conduct of conduct," particularly in consumerism's "buying of buying" or "purchasing of purchasing." Habitus is habitat, as any good product semanticist or psychodemographer knows all too well. The ethical concerns of family, community and nation previously might have guided how conduct was to be conducted; yet, at this juncture, "the environment" serves increasingly as the most decisive ground for normalizing each individual's behavior. Environments are spaces under police supervision, expert management, risk avoidance, or technocratic control. By bringing environmentalistic agendas into the heart of corporate and government policy, one finds the ultimate meaning of a police state fulfilled. If police, as they bound and observed space, were empowered to watch over religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, liberal arts, trade, factories, labor supplies, and the poor, then why not add ecology--or the totality of all interactions between organisms and their surroundings--to the police zones of the state? The conduct of any person's environmental conduct becomes the initial limit on other's ecological enjoyments, so too does the conduct of the social body's conduct necessitate that the state always be an effective "environmental protection agency." The ecological domain is the ultimate domain of unifying together all of the most critical forms of life that states must now produce, protect, and police in eliciting bio-power: it is the center of their enviro-discipline, eco-knowledge, geo-power.120 Few sites in the system of objects unify these forces as thoroughly as the purchase of objects from the system of purchases. Mobilizing biological power, then, accelerates exponentially after 1970 along with global fast capitalism. Ecology becomes one more formalized disciplinary mode of paying systematic "attention to the processes of life....to invest life through and through"121 in order to transform all living things into biological populations to develop transnational commerce. The tremendous explosion of global economic prosperity, albeit in highly skewed spatial distributions, after the 1973/1974 energy crises would not have been possible without ecology to guide "the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes."122 An anantamo-politics for all of Earth's plants and animals now emerges out of ecology as strategic plans for terraformative management through which environmentalizing resource managerialists acquire "the methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern."123 To move another step past Foucault's vision of human biopower, these adjustments in the resourcing of Nature as environmentalized plants and animals to that of transnational capital are helpful to check chaotic systems of unsustainable growth. In becoming an essential subassembly for transnational economic development, ecological discourses of power/knowledge rationalize conjoining "the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit" inasmuch as population ecology, environmental science, and range management are now, in part, "the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application."124 Indeed, a postmodern condition perhaps is reached when the life of all species are wagered in each one of humanity's market-centered economic and political strategies. Ecology, which did emerge out of the traditional life sciences, now circulates within "the space for movement thus conquered, and broadening and organizing that space, methods of power and knowledge" as green disciplinary interventions, because the state has "assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and modify them."125 In the end, terraforming tendencies suggest that we cannot adequately understand the mobilization of geo-economic and geopolitical discourses in present-day regimes, like the United States of America, without seeing how many of their tactics and institutions assume "environmentalized" modes of operation as part and parcel of ordinary practices of governance. Strategic Environmental Initiatives, despite Vice-President Gore's protests, already are standard operating procedures. To preserve the political economy of high-technology production, many offices of the American state and all transnational firms must function as "environmental protection agencies" inasmuch as they fuse a 48 green geo-politics of national security with a grey geo-economics of continual growth to sustain existing industrial ecologies of mass consumption with a wise use of Nature exercised through private property rights. Habitus is habitat, but habitat now also defines or directs habitus. Conservationist ethics, resource managerialism, and green rhetorics, then, congeal as an unusually cohesive power/knowledge formation, whose (un)wise (ab)usefulness becomes an integral element of this fascinating new regime's order of social normalization.

#### Identifying zones of land as sites for sovereign struggle and competition converts land into militaristic terrain—this supports and extends the violence essential to modern statecraft

Stuart Elden, Durham University, “Land, terrain, territory,” Progress in Human Geography 34 (6), 2010, p. 799-817

The conflict over land indicated by Anderson is significant. Property is important as an indicator, but conflict over land is twofold: both over its possession and conducted on its terrain. Land is both the site and stake of struggle. In this it differs from conflict over other resources. Strategic-military reasons thus become significant. As well as seeking to maximize the possession of land as a scarce resource, feudal lords and nascent states were also concerned with security, management and administration. Defensible borders, homogeneity and the promotion of territorial cohesion offer a range of examples – examples that straddle the strategic issues and link closely to the development of a range of techniques of state practice. France, for example, following the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659, began a process of mapping and surveying its land, employing technical specialists both to map and to reinforce its so-called ‘natural frontiers’. A related term to that of land is therefore ‘terrain’. This is land that has a strategic, political, military sense. The English ‘territory’, the French territoire and related terms in other languages derive from quite a specific sense of the Latin territorium. Territorium is an extremely rare term in classical Latin that becomes common in the Middle Ages. The standard definition is the land belonging to a town or another entity such as a religious order. It is used, for instance, by Cicero (1858: volume IV, 522) for the agricultural lands of a colony, and in phrases such as that describing the birthplace of the Venerable Bede in his Ecclesiastical history. Bede (Colgrave and Mynors, 1969: v, 24) is described as being born ‘in territorio eiusdem monasterii’, ‘in lands belonging to the monastery’. This monastery was Jarrow in northeast England. In Alfred the Great’s Anglo-Saxon translation, Bede was born ‘on sundorlonde of the monastery’, outlying lands, lands sundered from the estate itself, but under its possession, and thus it has been claimed that this is the basis for the name of the town Sunderland, although it is not clear that it was this sundorlonde (Brown, 1855: 277, 280; Colgrave, 1969: xix). As a number of writers have discussed, the etymology of territorium is disputed, with the meaning of the place around a town supplemented by that of a place from which people are warned or frightened (see, for example, Connolly, 1995; Neocleous, 2003; Hindess, 2006). The Latin terrere is to frighten, deriving from the Greek trein meaning to flee from fear, to be afraid, and the Sanskrit, trasati, meaning he trembles, is afraid. This means that the term territory has an association with fear and violence, an association that is more compelling in history than etymology. As argued elsewhere, ‘creating a bounded space is already a violent act of exclusion and inclusion; maintaining it as such requires constant vigilance and the mobilization of threat; and challenging it necessarily entails a transgression’ (Elden, 2009: xxx). Terrain is of course a term used by physical geographers and geologists. Yet all too often the term terrain is used in a very vague sense. Evans (1998: 119), for instance, notes that ‘to some of us, ‘‘terrain analysis’’ means, especially, quantitative analysis of terrain’, thus seeing a greater need to qualify the mode, rather than object, of analysis. Terrain is seen as land form, rather than process (Lane et al., 1998; see also Lawrence et al., 1993; Wilson and Gallant, 2000). It is also a term used by military strategists. Yet there is a relation as well as a separation, with knowledge of battlefield terrain essential to military success. There are a number of important studies of different military campaigns and the question of terrain, but little conceptual precision (see, for example, Parry, 1984; Winters, 1998; Rose and Nathanail, 2000; Doyle and Bennett, 2002a).10 For Doyle and Bennett (2002b: 1), terrain ‘encompasses both the physical aspects of earth’s surface, as well as the human interaction with them’. At times terrain seems to be landscape devoid of life, as it is when targeting of cities is discussed without reference to those living within it, or it is reduced from a concrete materiality to a level of virtuality. Max Weber’s analysis of the historical development of the state, and Michael Mann’s study of the changing dynamics of power (Mann, 1986; 1993), where they do discuss territory, could be seen to be operating in a way that sees territory as terrain, a political-strategic relation. In his interview with the geographers of the H´ erodote journal, Foucault deflects their inquiry about his use of spatial categories, suggesting that they are not primarily geographical, but instead shot through with power. As he declares, ‘territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it’s first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power’ (Foucault, 2007: 176). As his interviewers respond, ‘certain spatial metaphors are equally geographical and strategic, which is only natural since geography grew up in the shadow of the military’ (p. 177). They make the explicit linkage between the region of geographers and the commanded region, fromregere; the conquered territory of a province, from vincere; and the field as battlefield. Foucault then notes how ‘the politico-strategic term is an indication of how the military and administration actually come to inscribe themselves both on a material soil and within forms of discourse’ (p. 177). Lefebvre offers further concrete and compelling discussion of this relation (see also Lefebvre, 1974: 133; 1991: 122; 2009; Brenner and Elden, 2009): Sovereignty implies ‘space’, and what is more it implies a space against which violence, whether latent or overt, is directed – a space established and constituted by violence . . . Every state is born of violence, and state power endures only by virtue of violence directed towards a space . . . At the same time, too, violence enthroned a specific rationality, that of accumulation, that of the bureaucracy and the army – a unitary, logistical, operational and quantifying rationality which would make economic growth possible and draw strength from that growth for its own expansion to a point where it would take possession of the entire planet. A founding violence, and continuous creation by violence (by fire and blood, in Bismarck’s phrase) – such are the hallmarks of the state. (Lefebvre, 1974: 322–33; 1991: 280) What is central in Lefebvre’s reading is the relation between accumulation, violence and the ‘unitary, logistical, operational and quantifying rationality’. For Lefebvre this highlights the limitations of a political-economic reading of territory as land: ‘Neither Marx and Engels nor Hegel clearly perceived the violence at the core of the accumulation process . . . and thus its role in the production of a politico-economic space. This space was of course the birthplace and cradle of the modern state (Lefebvre, 1974: 322; 1991: 279; see also pp. 413/358).

#### Discursively aligning wind power with the figure of the ‘native’ reinforces essentialist preconceptions about modernity’s relation to nature and redeems historical injustice

Bosworth ‘10 Kai A. Bosworth, Graduate student, U. of Minnesota, B.A. in Environmental Studies from Macalester College, "Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development", http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/envi\_honors/7

Chapter 5 has examined the loop of public representations of indigenous people and wind power. Each of these texts is part of the network that helped assemble concepts, ideas, and desire for wind power. They do not determine. The power of these texts comes not from persuasiveness or accuracy. It is unlikely that the poster, the video, or the guide, by itself, will convince anyone that wind power is totally indigenous, economic, or environmental. Rather, these texts show that the messages and materials that are made to “make sense” are often – but not only - the ones that attempt to neatly fit Native American wind power within new discourses of environmentalism and those that ignore colonialism and history. These discourses reproduce broader social ideas about race and simultaneously help inform and change race to fit new material situations. That invoking wind power and Native Americans results in legible and predictable essentialisms of indigeneity demonstrates that this historical, racial discourse of popular media, science, capital, and state can be adapted to fit any situation that involves both “nature” and “native.” What Latour’s loop of public representation fails to adequately explain on its own is that different actors and institutions (besides the sciences) are privileged in their access to creative power. The long networks of government and industry have a greater ability to promote, enforce, and circulate images (Anderson 2002). But these networks are not closed or immutable; at every stage, they are affected by “local” productions and reproductions of discourses. Through the engagement of the Rosebud Sioux wind projects in the longer network of Wind Powering America, different articulations of wind power and sovereignty were made available.

#### The dark side of power over life is the ability to put entire populations to death in the name of ‘the greater good’

Foucault ’78 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, 1978, p. 136-137

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death -and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits -now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

#### Our alternative is to vote negative. This performs a criticism of the limitations implicit in the 1AC’s representation which undermines the stability of static epistemological claims and enables alternative visions of politics and social relations to appear.

Julia H. Chryssostalis, lecturer at the Westminster school of law, “The Critical Instance ‘After’ The Critique of the Subject,” Law and Critique 16, 2005, pg. 16-21

So far, we have looked at some of the ways in which the question of the question is being re-situated in a philosophical terrain that has been radically \_re-marked’ by the critical discourses associated with the deconstruction of subjectivity in French contemporary thought. However, the critical instance involves not only questioning but also judgment as one of its basic tropes. How? To begin with, judgment is found intimately implicated in the semantic economy of the critical: critique, criticism, criterion, critic; they all derive from krisis, the Greek word for judgment; yet, in addition, and more importantly, the very operation of the critical instance seems dominated by judgmental figures, grammars and logics.78 After all, is not the figure of the Tribunal of Reason at the centre of Kant’s critical project?79 And is not the role of critique therein precisely \_that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known [connaıˆtre], what must be done, and what may be hoped’?80 Moreover, from the Enlightenment onwards, is not the critical practised \_in the search for formal structures with universal value’81 that would firmly ground our knowledge, action, and aspirations, and provide the criteria for the evaluation of all claims to authority?82 And does not the critical instance, in this respect, necessarily turn around a \_quaestio juris, the juridical question, [which asks] with what right one possesses this concept and uses it’?83 Finally, does not the critical moment itself – whether found operating in terms of fault-finding (epi-krisis),84 of drawing distinctions (dia-krisis),85 or of drawing comparisons (syn-krisis) – seem always to rely on the basic \_logic’ of judgement: namely, the operation through which the particular is subsumed (and thus also thought and known) under the rule of an already constituted category?86 What is interesting to note about these judgemental grammars and logics organising the operation of the critical instance,87 is that the subjective forms they deploy involve two well-known \_types’ of the figure of the judge. On the one hand, there is the \_judge’ as a sovereign figure whose capacity to pass judgements on our received wisdom, draw distinctions in the field of our knowledge, and set the limits of what can be known, means the capacity to invest the world with a meaning drawn from a more profound knowledge. On the other hand, there is the \_judge’ as a normalising, technocratic figure, a mere functionary of the criteria, which regulate and organise the conceptual gestures of our thought and knowledge. These two \_types’ can be easily seen as antithetical. On the one hand, the figure of the critic in all its dignity, autonomy and sovereignty; on the other, the figure of the critic in, what Adorno calls, the \_thing like form of the object’.88 However, what should not be missed is how much both rely on the philosophemes that organise the \_classical’ configuration of the subject: rationality, mastery, self-presence, identity, consciousness, intentionality, autonomy, the radical difference between subject and object. For does not critical judgement involve in this instance an operation of thinking, where an already given subject takes the initiative of applying an already established category to, say, an object, a text, an event? Is not this \_initiative’ marked not only by the distance between the \_judge’ and the \_judged’, but also by the instrumentality of a masterful, rational and rationalising subject? Moreover, is not the submission of the functionary compensated by the mastery s/he has over the material under his/her authority? And does not the very form of subsumption, with its reliance on already established categories, involve a technique, which assimilates and neutralises the singularity of the particular and forecloses the possibility of thinking something new?89 To return to our initial question, if the critical instance is ruled by judgemental grammars and logics, which in turn rely on \_classical’ configurations of subjectivity, what happens to the critical when reinscribed and re-situated in a philosophical terrain which has been \_re-marked’ by the critique or deconstruction of subjectivity, a philosophical terrain without transcendental guarantees? Following what was said earlier in connection with the question of the question, the critical is also being re-thought and re-worked. Three gestures mark this re-thinking: first, an abandonment of judgemental grammars and logics; second, a re-casting of the critical in terms of the question of the limit; and third, the emergence of an ethic of encounter (with the limit). Let us briefly consider what is involved in the last two gestures. One of the clearest statements of what is at stake in the re-casting of the critical in terms of the question of the limit, the limit as a question, is to be found in Foucault’s two essays, \_What Is Critique?’ 90 and \_What is Enlightenment?’91 Without going into the detail of the argument developed there, I want to focus at a point in the Enlightenment essay, which I think is crucial. This is a point where, to begin with, Foucault affirms that \_[c]riticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits’, thus seemingly locating himself within the basic parameters of the Kantian formulation of the critical. Then, though, he continues: But if the Kantian question was that of knowing [savoir] what limits knowledge [connaissance] must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point in brief is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing over [franchissment].92 In other words, Foucault’s re-working of the critical involves a notion of the limit not as necessary limitation, as in the Kantian critical project, but as a point of \_a possible crossing over’. For posing the question of the limits of our knowledge, or \_showing the limits of the constitution of objectivity’,93 involves also a dimension of opening up, of transformation and becoming. As such the type of \_work done at the limits of ourselves must’, according to Foucault, \_on the one hand, open up a realm of historical inquiry, and on the other, put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take.’94 In other words, the critical instance rethought in terms of the limit as question does not merely involve a negative moment of transgression. For at the point of this work on the limits (of ourselves), the ethico-political promise/possibility of transformation opens up – which is also why, at this point, the critical instance, for Foucault, becomes intimately linked with virtue.95 Let us now turn to the last gesture involved in the re-thinking of the critical: namely, the displacement of judgemental logics and the emergence of an ethics of encounter – that is to say, an encounter with the question of the limit. Let us move with caution, though. To begin with, it is important to understand that one does not drive to the limits for a thrill experience, or because limits are dangerous and sexy, or because it brings us into tintillating proximity with evil. One asks about the limits of knowing because one has already run up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives. The categories by which social life is ordered produce a certain incoherence or entire realm of unspeakability. And it is from this condition, the tear in the fabric of our epistemological field, that the practice of critique emerges, with the awareness that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses have produced an impasse.96 Which is to say that the critical instance, as the exposure of the \_limits of the constitution of objectivity’, also involves the experience of the dislocation of our sedimented positivities, in other words, the experience of crisis. Such a recognition is important here because it reinscribes crisis, which is actually another meaning of the Greek word krisis, into the critical, which is thus re-connected with the notion of negativity – negativity in the ontological sense. This negativity, as Stavrakakis notes, has both a disruptive dimension that \_refers to the horizon of impossibility and unrepresentability, which punctuates the life of linguistic creatures’,97 and at the same time a productive one: \_[b]y inscribing a lack in our dislocated positivities, it fuels the desire for new social and political constructions.’98 As such, this negativity is \_neither an object nor its negation: it is the condition of possibility/ impossibility of objects’,99 of objectivity more generally, indeed of all transformative action.100 And it is precisely here that an ethics of the encounter with the limit is located in that such an encounter is a moment, which ought to be acknowledged rather than covered over by quickly \_patching the cracks’ of our universe. It is a moment which should not be foreclosed or assimilated: For at stake in this encounter with the limit, \_is a matter of showing how the space of the possible is larger than the one we are assigned – that something else is possible, but not that everything is possible.’101 And it is precisely here, at the moment when the site of the pre-thetic and the pre-judicative is glimpsed, that the thrust and the promise of a \_re-marked’ critical instance is to be found.

### Elections DA

#### Obama narrowly up but needs a strong October to win: swing states, electoral math, economy, incumbency

Silver 10/12 (Nate Romney Debate gains show staying power <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/oct-12-romney-debate-gains-show-staying-power/?gwh=EB0A7A5046CCC852A922C7B507944540>)

But the FiveThirtyEight forecast of Mr. Romney’s chances — 38.9 percent — is nearly identical to the one at the betting market Intrade, which put them at 38.5 percent as of early Friday evening.¶ Other prediction markets and bookmakers give Mr. Romney slightly lower chances, in the range of 30 or 35 percent.¶ Were there any bright spots at all for President Obama in Friday’s data? He did gain ground in two national tracking polls, from Ipsos and Investor’s Business Daily, although he lost ground in two others, from Gallup and Rasmussen Reports.¶ The Ipsos poll is interesting in that it was the only one to include a substantive number of interviews after the vice-presidential debate on Thursday night. (Ipsos conducts some of its online sampling late in the evening and early the next morning.) That poll showed Mr. Romney’s national lead narrowing to one point from three.¶ Still, the clear majority of its interviews preceded the vice-presidential debate. It will take a couple of days to determine whether it had any impact on the polls.¶ The only really good news for Democrats is that Mr. Obama had built up a large enough cushion that he could withstand a lot of damage without becoming the underdog. The forecast model still has him clinging to narrow leads in Ohio, Iowa, Wisconsin and Nevada, states that in some combination would give him 270 electoral votes.¶ Mr. Obama may also be just slightly underperforming the fundamentals in the election. His approval ratings remain near 50 percent, which would ordinarily predict a narrow re-election victory.¶ Some of the more visible economic numbers, like monthly and weekly jobs reports and consumer confidence figures, have also been stronger lately.¶ None of this is to say that a rebound is certain. It is late enough in the race that the polls need to be taken more at face value.¶ The forecast model adjusts Mr. Obama’s numbers up slightly based on its economic index and his incumbency status, but only by about 0.4 percentage points.

#### No public support for PTC extension—backlash against green subsidies

Styles 8-2 Geoffrey Styles, Managing Director of GSW Strategy Group, LLC, an energy and environmental strategy consulting firm, “Last Hurrah for the Wind Power Tax Credit?” The Energy Collective, 8/2/2012, http://theenergycollective.com/node/99336

As the Reuters article makes clear, there will be other opportunities for the PTC to be reinserted in the extenders bill or other legislation. However, by persistently arguing for extending the existing credit without modification, the wind industry and its supporters may be misreading the public's appetite for such generous subsidies in a period of protracted economic weakness, notwithstanding the recent Iowa poll. Despite its rapid recent growth wind still contributes less than 4% of the nation's electricity and just 1% of our total energy consumption, and the green jobs angle is wearing thin. Last year's expiration of the ethanol blenders credit set a precedent for ending another large, generous subsidy before its beneficiaries agreed they were done with it. If congressional Republicans line up behind their party's standard beareron this issue, the wind industry will have missed its opportunity for a graduated, multi-year phaseout of the PTC, instead of stepping off a cliff in 2013.

#### Romney win causes Iran strikes—causes escalating conflict

Hussain 9-12 Murtaza Hussain, Toronto-based writer and analyst focused on issues related to Middle Eastern politics, “Why war with Iran would spell disaster,” Al-Jazeera, 9/12/2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html

Leading members of the House and Congress from both parties as well as the closest advisers to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney have called for attacking Iran, with some high-ranking GOP advisers even suggesting that the time is now for a Congressional resolution formally declaring war on the country. Romney and many other leading Republican figures have called for pre-emptive war against Iran, and have continually upped the ante in terms of threats of military action throughout the election campaign. This alarming and potentially highly consequential rhetoric is occurring in a context where the American people are still recovering from the disastrous war in Iraq and winding down the US occupation of Afghanistan, while at the same time coping with the worst economic drought since the Great Depression. Public statements claiming that the extent of the conflict would be limited to targeted airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities are utterly disingenuous, ignoring the escalating cycle of retribution that such "limited" conflicts necessarily breed. As did the war in Libya start off with calls only for a benign "no-fly zone" to protect civilians and seamlessly turned into an all-out aerial campaign to topple Muammar Gaddafi, any crossing of the military threshold with Iran would also likely result in a far bigger conflagration than the public has been prepared for by their leaders. War with Iran would be no quick and clean affair, as many senior political and military figures have pointed out it would make the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which cost trillions of dollars and the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians, seem like "a cakewalk". The fact that it is becoming increasingly likely, inevitable in the eyes of many, and that it is high on the agenda of so many leading political figures warrants exploration of what such a conflict would really entail. Conflict on an unprecedented scale Not a war of weeks or months, but a "generations-long war" is how no less a figure than former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy describes the consequences of open conflict with Iran. In comparison with Iraq and Afghanistan, both countries with relatively small populations which were already in a state of relative powerlessness before they were invaded, Iran commands the eighth largest active duty military in the world, as well as highly trained special forces and guerilla organisations which operate in countries throughout the region and beyond. Retired US General John Abizaid has previously described the Iranian military as "the most powerful in the Middle East" (exempting Israel), and its highly sophisticated and battle-hardened proxies in Lebanon and Iraq have twice succeeded in defeating far stronger and better funded Western military forces. Any attack on Iran would assuredly lead to the activation of these proxies in neighbouring countries to attack American interests and would create a situation of borderless war unprecedented in any past US conflicts in the Middle East. None of this is to suggest that the United States would not "win" a war with Iran, but given the incredibly painful costs of Iraq and Afghanistan; wars fought again weak, poorly organised enemies lacking broad influence, politicians campaigning for war with Iran are leading the American people into a battle which will be guaranteed to make the past decade of fighting look tame in comparison. A recent study has shown that an initial US aerial assault on Iran would require hundreds of planes, ships and missiles in order to be completed; a military undertaking itself unprecedented since the first Gulf War and representative of only the first phase of what would likely be a long drawn-out war of attrition. For a country already nursing the wounds from the casualties of far less intense conflicts and still reeling from their economic costs, the sheer battle fatigue inherent in a large-scale war with Iran would stand to greatly exacerbate these issues. Oil shocks and the American economy The fragile American economic recovery would be completely upended were Iran to target global energy supplies in the event of war, an act which would be both catastrophic and highly likely if US Iran hawks get their way. Not only does the country itself sit atop some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves on the planet, its close proximity to the shipping routes and oil resources of its neighbours means that in the event of war, its first response would likely be to choke off the global supply of crude; a tactic for which its military defences have in fact been specifically designed. The Strait of Hormuz, located in the Persian Gulf is the shipping point for more than 20 per cent of the world's petroleum. Iran is known to have advanced Silkworm missile batteries buried at strategic points around the strait to make it impassable in the event of war, and has developed "swarming" naval tactics to neutralise larger, less mobile ships such as those used by the US Navy. While Iran could never win in straightforward combat, it has developed tactics of asymmetrical warfare that can effectively inflict losses on a far stronger enemy and render the strait effectively closed to naval traffic. The price of oil would immediately skyrocket, by some estimates upwards several hundred dollars a barrel, shattering the already tenuous steps the US and other Western economies are taking towards recovery. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has said a war with Iran could drag out years and would have economic consequences "devastating for the average American"; but these facts are conspicuously absent in public discussion of the war. Every conflict has blowback, but if US politicians are attempting to maneouver the country into a conflict of such potentially devastating magnitude, potentially sacrificing ordinary Americans' economic well-being for years to come, it would behoove them to speak frankly about these costs and not attempt to obfuscate or downplay them in order to make their case. Conflict across borders Finally, a war with Iran would be not be like conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya where the fighting was constrained to the borders of the country in question. Despite widespread resentment towards the country due to the perception of it as a regionally imperialist power as well sectarian animosity towards it as Shia Muslim theocracy, Iran maintains deep links throughout the Middle East and South Asia and can count on both popular support as well as assistance from its network of armed proxies in various countries. In a report for Haaretz, Ahmed Rashid noted that an attack on Iran would likely inflame anti-American sentiment throughout the region, across both Shia and Sunni Muslim communities. Despite Iran's poor human rights record and bellicose leadership, polls have consistently shown that Iranian and Iranian-backed leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah remain among the most popular figures throughout the Arab and Muslim world. This popularity comes not necessarily out of respect for Iranian ideology, but from a perception that Iran is the only assertive power in the region and is the target of aggression from the United States and its allies. In Rashid's analysis, both the Middle East and South Asia would become unsafe for American citizens and their interests for years to come; popular anger would reach a level which would render these area effectively off-limits and would cause grave and immediate danger to both American businesses and troops based in the region. Again, this would be a situation quite different from the other wars of the past decade, fought against isolated regimes without the ability to call upon large and often well-funded numbers of regional sympathisers; a fact also rarely mentioned by war advocates. Not a political game Going to war with Iran would be an elective decision for the United States, but it is for too grave and consequential a choice to be left up to the whims of politicians seeking to win the approval of lobby groups and one-up each other to appeal to influential campaign donors who would like to see a war with Iran. Make no mistake, the possibility of war is very real and has become eminently more so in recent months. Many of the same politicians and political advisers responsible for engineering the Iraq War have returned to public life and are at the forefront of pushing a new American conflict with Iran. Mitt Romney's closest foreign policy advisers include leading hawks from the war with Iraq, including John Bolton, Eliot Cohen and Dan Senor. Many of them have enthusiastically and publicly expressed their desire to engineer a US military confrontation with Iran and have already begun to tout the inevitability of this action in a Romney presidency.

#### Goes nuclear

Primakov ’10 Yevgeny Primakov, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and member of the editorial board of Russia in Global Affairs, “The Fundamental Conflict,” New Eastern Outlook, 1/2/2010, http://www.journal-neo.com/?q=node/102

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched *Yevgeny Primakov* 1 3 2 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 7 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER• 2009 by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

### Case

#### Cultural survival is impossible and irrelevant.

Michael Blake 2k, Professor of political philosophy and philosophy at Harvard University, August/September 2000, Civilization, p. 51-53

One frequently hears that endangered cultural groups have a right to preservation, and indeed to outside aid and legal sanctions toward that end. Anthropologists and activists have made such claims on the grounds that the survival of these groups has inherent value. Some advocacy groups have even gone so far as to equate the absence of such special rights with genocide. There is no great moral distinction, such rhetoric seems to suggest, between allowing a culture to assimilate into the wider surrounding society and actually going out and killing its members en masse. This vague moral equation has turned up of late in the discussion of issues as varied as affirmative action, Southern regionalism, Quebecois nationalism, and the moral status of such culturally overwhelming institutions as Wal-Mart and McDonald’s. If we take these arguments at face value, cultural survival is something very close to a moral absolute; to refuse to endorse it is to sign up on the side of cultural atrocity and numbing global conformity This is a shame, because it is surprisingly difficult to figure out exactly what is morally relevant about cultural survival in itself. The first challenge is pinning down just what the term might mean. It cannot simply mean the continued existence of the individuals comprising the endangered culture, since their survival is entirely compatible with their complete assimilation and hence with the destruction of their culture. Nor however, can it mean the preservation of all existing aspects of a culture, for some degree of cultural change and adaptation is normal, indeed inevitable. Cultural stasis is not a plausible ideal, let alone a worthy guide to policy. The messy reality of cultural survival, then, lies somewhere between disintegration and the deep freeze. The most plausible meaning of the slogan as a political goal might be simply the preservation of difference: the desire that whatever cultures now exist not lose their distinctiveness and blend into surrounding society; and that they continue to serve as means by which some people make sense of their place in the world, however much the content of their cultures may change over time. The key idea here is that the number of cultures now present not be reduced, however much the lifeways and customs comprising each individual culture might change over time. But what reason have we, then, to think that cultural survival is valuable in itself? One argument draws an analogy between cultures and other threatened aspects of the social and natural world: We ought to preserve cultures because to do otherwise is to allow something unique and irreplaceable to leave the world. Refusing to act against assimilation might thus be thought roughly akin to, say; shooting the last of a particularly beautiful species of condor. This argument, though, claims too much, for we feel an equivalent sense of loss when we face not the destruction of a culture but merely its reworking from the inside—and, thereby the destruction of specific elements within it. For example, during Quebec’s Quiet Revolution— the tumultuous postwar period during which French Canada cast off clerical authority and conservatism and fashioned itself into a modem secular society—much of the culture was completely remade and many traditional norms and practices abandoned. We might easily sympathize with the feeling that there was a loss to the world in what was thereby abandoned. We do have reason to regret the fact that current ways by which the world is understood— our own ways included—will eventually disappear. But our justifiable sadness does not give us good reason to declare that what is now endangered ought to be preserved forever, or to forbid ourselves from altering inherited cultural norms—abandoning some, amending others, and embracing foreign ways and customs as our own. One could even say that this sadness is the inevitable price we pay for freedom: If we had no choice about what norms to adopt, and knew that our children would live as our ancestors lived before us, the world would lose one source of woe but gain many more. This approach to defending cultural survival, then, has some serious defects. Another line of argument harnesses the value of cultural survival to the more kindred value of cultural diversity gaining support from the undoubted attractiveness of the latter. On reflection, however, the ideal of cultural diversity seems scarcely less mysterious and ambiguous than the notion of cultural survival itself. The ambiguity in valuing diversity lies, on one level, in whether it means valuing people of distinct backgrounds or valuing the diversity of backgrounds itself. The first notion—that people ought to be respected as equals regardless of their ethnicity race, gender, and other distinguishing traits—is today a part of any plausible political philosophy But it hardly follows that we must value and preserve diversity itself, in the abstract; we have, I think, no reason to regret that the world does not contain twice as many cultures as it does. We might try to defend cultural diversity in the abstract by pointing out how much we benefit by its concrete existence. But this raises in turn another deep ambiguity—that between diversity of cultures and diversity within cultures. Exposure to a wide variety of lifeways is clearly of great moral value; it enables people to flourish in ways that conformity and sameness instead suppress. But there is no necessary link between the desirability of diversity within cultures and the demand that there be a wide variety of cultures themselves. More to the point, the latter demand can actually work against diversity. Political measures designed to foster a culture’s survival must perforce ascribe a negative value to assimilation; they therefore end up penalizing those individuals within it who seek, for example, to borrow or adapt from other cultures. In so doing, advocates of cultural survival often provoke a stilling insistence on cultural purity and conformity; one need only think of the recurrent French crusades for linguistic purity to realize how quickly a drive for cultural preservation can begin to resemble a paternalistic—and, if imposed from outside, patronizing—intolerance. It is one of the sharpest ironies of the cultural survival movement that defending a diversity of cultures tends to repress the possibilities for diversity within cultures.

#### Cultural destruction is inevitable – Part of American culture is not acknowledging other cultures.

Richard 03, founder of Action Cadienne (volunteer organization dedicated to the promotion of the Cadien language and culture,) 2003 [Zachary, 11-5-2003, http://www.zacharyrichard.com/monthlyReport2003.html]

What strikes me about all of this is that in France there exists the political will to support minority languages. The argument is simple: since France promotes cultural diversity in the world, it is only logical to do so at home. “These languages are the expression of the diversity of culture which is the pride of our country”, explains the Cultural Minister. I can only regret that this point of view is inconceivable in my own country. In the good ole US of A, the openness associated with cultural diversity is impossible to imagine. Unfortunately (for us Americans) the political climate is characterized by the opposite: a mistrust of other cultures and a close minded attitude bordering on the xenophobic. American culture refuses to acknowledge the value of any other linguistic culture other than anglo-American, even in the case of a linguistic culture which is part of the American experience, such as Cadien French. This chauvinistic vision of culture has resulted in our isolation from the rest of the world.

#### Some degree of the sort of sovereignty your impact ev talks about is inevitable – tribes can still make determinations about the way they want to govern themselves – the U.S. not subsidizing their efforts won’t be the end of sovereignty

#### No internal link to your Friedberg impact evidence – it’s about the systemic loss of cultural diversity and genocide – even if that’s happening to tribes now, renewable subsidies and sovereignty don’t solve and

#### Consequentialism is key – absolutism destroys political responsibility

Isaac ‘2 Jeffrey Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring 2002

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness. WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies. Most striking about the campus left's response to September 11 was its refusal to ask these questions. Its appeals to "international law" were naive. It exaggerated the likely negative consequences of a military response, but failed to consider the consequences of failing to act decisively against terrorism. In the best of all imaginable worlds, it might be possible to defeat al-Qaeda without using force and without dealing with corrupt regimes and political forces like the Northern Alliance. But in this world it is not possible. And this, alas, is the only world that exists. To be politically responsible is to engage this world and to consider the choices that it presents. To refuse to do this is to evade responsibility. Such a stance may indicate a sincere refusal of unsavory choices. But it should never be mistaken for a serious political commitment.

#### You’re responsible for catastrophic consequences – if we win our impact, you’re directly culpable because you could have prevented it

Shafer-Landau ’97 Russ Shafer-Landau, University of Kansas Ethics, July 1997 v107 n4 p584(28)

Even Nozick, a staunch absolutist, allows that cases of "catastrophic moral horror" may require suspension of absolute side constraints.(18) Attention to the dire consequences that may be brought about by allegiance to absolute rules needn't move us to the consequentialist camp--it didn't incline Ross or Nozick in that direction, for instance. But it does create a presumptive case against absolutism. Absolutist responses to the argument standardly take one of two forms. The first is to reject premise (1) and deny that absolutism generates tragic consequences, by arguing that a set of suitably narrowed absolutist rules will not require behavior that results in "catastrophic moral horror." The second response is to reject premise (2) and defend the moral necessity of obedience even if tragic consequences ensue. Rejecting Premise (1) Consider the first strategy. This is tantamount to a specificationist program that begins by admitting that the standard candidates--don't kill, lie, cheat, commit adultery--cannot plausibly be construed as absolute rules. Just as we had to narrow their scope if we were to show them universally relevant, so too we need to narrow the scope of such properties to show them universally determinative. The question, though, is how far, and in what way, this added concreteness is to be pursued. The double dangers that the absolutist must avoid at this juncture are those of drawing the grounding properties too broadly, or too narrowly. Rules drawn too narrowly will incorporate concrete details of cases in the description of the grounding properties, yielding a theory that is particularist in all but name. The opposite problem is realized when we allow the grounding properties to be drawn broadly enough as to be repeatably instantiated, but at the cost of allowing the emerging rules to conflict. Some middle ground must be secured. How could we frame an absolute rule that enjoined just the actions we want, while offering an escape clause for tragic cases? There seems to be no way to do this other than by appending a proviso to the rule, to the effect that it binds except where such obedience will lead to catastrophic consequences, very serious harm, horrific results. Because of the great variety of ways in which such results can occur, there doesn't seem to be any more precise way to specify the exceptive clause without reducing it to an indefinitely long string of too-finely described scenarios. Is this problematic? Consider an analogous case. Someone wants to lose weight and wants to know how long to maintain a new diet. A dietician offers the following advice: "Cut twenty percent of your caloric intake; this will make you thinner, but also weaker. If you reach a point where you've gotten too thin and weak, increase your calories." The dietician's advice is flawed because it doesn't give, by itself, enough information to the person trying to follow it. It's too general. The qualified moral rule is similarly uninformative. If abiding by the rule will occasion harmful results, one wants to know how harmful they have to be to qualify as too harmful. The rule doesn't really say--`catastrophic' is just a synonym for `too harmful'. Such a rule is crucially underspecific, and this undermines efforts to apply it as a major premise in deductive moral argument. This lack of specificity results from an absence of necessary and sufficient conditions that could determine the extension of the concept "catastrophic consequences."(19) Efforts to remove this underspecificity by providing a set of definitional criteria typically serve only to falsify the resulting ethical assessments; imagine the futility of trying to precisely set out in advance what is to count as catastrophic consequences. Rendering the notion of "catastrophic" more precise seems bound to yield a rule that omits warranted exceptions. Or it may cover all such exceptions, but at the cost of making the exceptive clause so fine-grained that it will be nothing less than an indefinitely long disjunction of descriptions of actual cases that represent exceptions to the general rule. Neither option should leave us very sanguine about the prospects of specifying absolute rules so as to ensure that such rules can be obeyed without occasioning catastrophic consequences. Rejecting Premise (2) The alternative for the absolutist is to stand fast and allow that morality requires adherence to rules that will sometimes yield catastrophic horrors. There is no inconsistency in taking such a stand. But the ethic that requires conduct that is tantamount to failure to prevent catastrophe is surely suspect. Preventing catastrophe is presumptively obligatory. The obligation might be defeasible, but absolutists have yet to tell the convincing story that would override the presumption. Imagine that you are a sharpshooter in a position to kill a terrorist who is credibly threatening to detonate a bomb that will kill thousands. If you merely wound him, he will be able to trigger the firing mechanism. You must kill him to save the innocents. Suppose that in obedience to an absolutist ethic you refrain from shooting. The terrorist detonates the bomb. Thousands die. Something must be said about the agent whose obedience to absolute rules occasions catastrophe. It is possible that an absolutist ethic will blame you for doing your duty. Possible, but unlikely. Absolutists who allow that obedience to their favored rules may occasion catastrophe typically seek ways to exculpate those whose obedience yields tragic results. The standard strategy is to endorse some version of the doctrine of double effect, or the doctrine of doing and allowing. The former says that harms brought about by indirect intention may be permissible even though similar harms brought about by direct intention are forbidden. The latter says that bringing about harm through omission or inaction may be permissible even though similar harms brought about by positive action are forbidden. The motivating spirit behind both doctrines is to legitimate certain kinds of harmful conduct, to exculpate certain harm doers, and to forestall the possibility that absolute rules might conflict. The truth of either doctrine would ensure that agents always have a permissible option to pursue--namely, obedience to an absolute moral rule.(20) Quite apart from the fact that these doctrines have yet to be adequately defended,(21) their adequate defense would still leave us short of a justification of the absolute rules that are to complement them. Neither of these doctrines is itself a defense of absolutism; rather, they are really "helping doctrines," whose truth would undermine the inevitability of conflict among absolute rules. We may always have a permissible option in cases where we must choose between killing and letting die, intending death or merely foreseeing it, but this by itself is no argument for thinking that the prohibition on intentionally killing innocents is absolute.

#### absolute morality substitutes mechanical for critical thinking. This erodes the only firewall against atrocities.

Villa ’98 Dana R. Villa, Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellow at the University Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Political Theory, April 1998 v26 n2 p147(26)

Arendt sees the categorical imperative as an absolute in the Platonic/authoritarian sense, standing above men and the realm of human affairs, measuring them without any concern for context, specificity, or the "fundamental relativity" of the "interhuman realm."(30) Arendt emphasizes this inheritance of Platonism because she sees it as inculcating a habit of mechanical, unthinking judgment. The more judgment is identified with the application of a rule or an unvarying standard, the more our powers of judgment atrophy, and the less we are able to "stop and think" in the Socratic sense. Moreover, the insistence that judgment is dependent on such standards leads to a "crisis in judgment" when these standards are revealed to be without effective power. This, according to Arendt, is what happens in the course of the modern age, as new and unprecedented moral and political phenomena reveal the hollowness and inadequacy of the "reliable universal rules" the tradition had offered. This process--call it the crisis in authority or, to use Nietzsche's symbolic formulation, the "death of God"--comes to its conclusion with the advent of the evils of totalitarianism, evils so unprecedented that they "have clearly exploded our categories of political thought and our standards for moral judgment."(31) The failure of the inherited wisdom of the past, the fact of a radical break in our tradition, throws us back upon our own resources. Potentially, Arendt notes, the crisis is liberating, as it frees the faculty of judgment from its subservience to objectivist regimes such as Plato's ideas or Kant's categorical imperative. As Arendt puts it in "Understanding and Politics": Even though we have lost yardsticks by which to measure, and rules under which to subsume the particular, a being whose essence is beginning may have enough of origin within himself to understand without preconceived categories and to judge without the set of customary rules which is morality.(32) The hope that the "crisis in authority" will lead to the rebirth of a genuinely autonomous faculty of judgment runs up against Arendt's own deeply ingrained sense that ordinary individuals will find it difficult indeed to wean themselves from pregiven categories and rules. Minus the presence of Socrates (who, like an electric ray, paralyzes his partners in dialogue, forcing them to stop and think), the likely result of such a crisis is thankfulness for anything that props up the old set of standards or provides the semblance of a new one. Responding to Hans Jonas's call for a renewed inquiry into ultimate, metaphysical grounds for judgment at a conference on her work in 1972, Arendt declared her pessimism that "a new god will appear," and went on to observe: If you go through such a situation [as totalitarianism] the first thing you know is the following: you never know how somebody will act. You have the surprise of your life! This goes throughout all layers of society, and it goes throughout various distinctions between men. And if you want to make a generalization, then you could say that those who were still very firmly convinced of the so-called old values were the first to be ready to change their old values for a new set of values, provided they were given one. And I am afraid of this, because I think that the moment you give anybody a new set of values--or this famous "bannister"--you can immediately exchange it. And the only thing the guy gets used to is having a "bannister" and a set of values, no matter.(33) Arendt thought that the natural tendency of the ordinary person, when faced with the destruction of one set of authoritative rules, would not be Socratic examination and perplexity (which only further dissolves the customary), but rather a grasping for a new code, a new "bannister." Thinking, especially Socratic thinking, dissolves grounds, it does not stabilize them. It is, as Arendt says, a "dangerous and resultless enterprise," one that can just as easily lead to cynicism and nihilism as to independent judgment and a deepened moral integrity.(34) Arendt agrees with the analysis Kant gives in "What Is Enlightenment?": most people would simply prefer not to make the effort that independent judgment demands, let alone risk the taken-for-granted moral presuppositions of their existence. Yet however real this aversion to thinking or "paralysis" is, Arendt holds onto the Socratic possibility that ordinary individuals will remain open to the "winds of thought." She profoundly agrees with Socrates that it is only through such examination that the individual is likely to avoid complicity with the moral horrors perpetrated by popular political regimes. Socratic thinking--which, in its relentless negativity, is the very opposite of all foundational or professional philosophical thinking--liberates the faculty of judgment from the tyranny of rules and custom. In this way, it prevents the individual from being "swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in."(35) Independent judgment is, according to Arendt, the "by-product" of this liberating effect of thinking; it "realizes" thinking "in the world of appearances."(36) Thinking may not be able to "make friends" of citizens as Socrates had hoped, but it can "prevent catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare moments when the chips are down."(37)

#### Cultural diversity doesn’t encourage the acknowledgement and appreciation of cultures, only existence.

Brinkmann 99, Prof. of Philosophy @ BU, 1999 [Klaus, “Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy,” Boston University, 12-20-1999, http://www.bu.edu/wcp/IntroV1.htm]

One of the most pressing issues in contemporary ethics is the need for developing a convincing response to moral relativism. The increased awareness of the fact that different cultures live by different value systems has put the universalistic positions in normative ethics on the spot, so to speak. Indeed, both the emergence of non-universalistic positions such as particularism and the call for a moral philosophy beyond traditional normative ethics can be viewed as a reaction to this challenge. One strategy for salvaging universalistic claims has been to limit the unconditionally normative values or moral principles to a minimum. However, in this approach cultural diversity is lost, not preserved. In "Moral Pluralism without Moral Relativism" Alasdair MacIntyre sketches a novel response to the dilemma between moral universalism and moral relativism. The danger of relativism, he points out, is precisely that it encourages us to ignore, rather than begin to appreciate and learn from, the different value systems which form part of the identity of other cultures. If we do not want to lose the possibility for enriching our own understanding of human existence, we must acknowledge that diverse value systems give expression to a particular conception of human nature and the role morality ought to play in our lives. These diverse conceptions of human nature are inherently normative and universalistic, MacIntyre argues. They therefore contain within themselves a commitment to truth which transcends any particular morality. It is this commitment to truth as a universal good which can underwrite what MacIntyre calls an "ethics of inquiry" on the basis of which a fruitful exchange between different moral orientations may take place, an exchange which may even lead to a critical questioning of our own moral culture and thus prevent us from remaining "imprisoned within our own standpoint." One may want to compare this proposal with Hyung-Yul So's suggestion, in his "Pluralism and the Moral Mind," that the moral systems of different cultures should be viewed as expressions of different types of rationality which nonetheless together constitute the unity of human reason. So in fact undertakes a detailed hermeneutical study of how different styles of rationality (deductive, inductive, abductive, dialectical, analogical, and pragmatic) inform the moral outlook and the fundamental moral attitudes of some of the major world cultures. As an aside, it is interesting to note that So's approach bypasses the appeal to religion in order to explain the ethical diversity of different cultures.

## 2NC

### Topicality

#### Lack of tribal sovereignty isn’t a restriction on production—extend American Heritage dictionary—restrictions are regulations ON energy production—this is most contextually accurate

Heritage Foundation 12 <http://www.askheritage.org/what-should-the-government-do-to-create-jobs/> Cited by Dave Arnett and Andrea Reed in “Reduce Restrictions and Increase Incentives Mechanism Wording Paper” which came exceedingly close to the final resolution.

Congress should instead promote entrepreneurship and investment with policies that would create jobs without adding to the deficit. Congress can do this through a combination of explicit actions and by eliminating specific, Washington-based threats to the economy: Freezing all proposed tax hikes and costly regulations at least until unemployment falls below 7 percent, including health care and energy taxes; Freezing spending and rescinding unspent stimulus funds; Reforming regulations to reduce unnecessary business costs, such as repealing Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Reforming the tort system to lower costs and uncertainty facing businesses; Removing federal law and regulations that restrict domestic energy production; Suspending the job-killing Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) that requires federal construction contractors to pay prevailing wage rates that average 22 percent above market rates; Passing pending free-trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama, which nearly all economists agree will help the economy; and Reducing taxes on companies’ foreign earnings so they will transfer that money back into Americas economy. Congress must recognize that a strong recovery and new hiring depends on the confidence businesses have in the future. Uncertainty is a fact of life for all businesses, but when Washington adds materially to that uncertainty, businesses invest less and hire less. This is especially true following a deep recession, with so many producers still struggling with excess capacity. The most powerful, no-cost strategy Congress can adopt is to stop threatening those in a position to hire–no more taxes, no cap-and-trade legislation, no government takeover of private health care, and no more massive increases in the public debt.

#### Prefer the most direct and specific limiting interp—anything can indirectly affect production including tons of bidirectional solvency mechanisms—only direct incentives and restrictions predicated on production are predictable

EIA ’92 Office of Energy Markets and End Use, Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy, “Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect Interventions in Energy Markets,” 1992, ftp://tonto.eia.doe.gov/service/emeu9202.pdf

In some sense, most Federal policies have the potential to affect energy markets. Policies supporting economic stability or economic growth have energy market consequences; so also do Government policies supporting highway development or affordable housing. The interaction between any of these policies and energy market outcomes may be worthy of study. However, energy impacts of such policies would be incidental to their primary purpose and are not examined here. Instead, this report focuses on Government actions whose prima facie purpose is to affect energy market outcomes, whether through financial incentives, regulation, public enterprise, or research and development.

#### Infinite possible inputs to increasing energy production—strict limitations key

Tacoa-Vielma ‘3 Jasmin Tacoa-Vielma, COunsellor in the Trade in Services Division of the World Trade Organization, “DEFINING ENERGY SERVICES FOR THE GATS: AN ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION,” Energy and Environmental Services: Negotiating Objectives and Development Priorities, UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2003, http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditctncd20033\_en.pdf

Another perceived deficiency relates to the fact that a variety of other services that intervene in the energy value-added chain (from production to sale to final consumers) are found in the whole range of services sectors on the list, e.g. research and development, engineering, construction, management consultancy, environmental, financial and distribution services. These services could be termed "energy-related services" because of their relevance, but not exclusivity, to the energy industry. It has been argued that such dispersion of “energy-related services” makes it difficult to determine existing commitments and to negotiate the totality of the services necessary for the energy industry; that would make sense from an economic viewpoint. However, this situation is not unique to the energy industry, as most economic activities or industries require a variety of services inputs that in many cases are designed or adapted for different end-uses. For example, there are engineering, financial or construction services especially tailored for the energy industry as well as for the telecom industry.4 Having an all-encompassing definition of the energy services sector would certainly facilitate considering the totality of services involved in the industry; however, that should not be equated to a guarantee of complete coverage by GATS commitments.

### Foucault

#### As academics, how we discursively position indigeneity matters—K is a prior question to evaluating the plan

Bosworth ‘10 Kai A. Bosworth, Graduate student, U. of Minnesota, B.A. in Environmental Studies from Macalester College, "Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development", http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/envi\_honors/7

Academic writing is a critical node in knowledge production, and thus I am cognizant of the worlds, narratives, and objects further enacted in the performance of this paper. As John Law notes, “methods, their rules, and even more methods’ practices, not only describe but also help to produce the reality that they understand” (2004, 5). There is no singular world to be solely “discovered” or “understood.” There are only multiple worlds enacted and performed. I have a responsibility to the communities which I describe and discuss. For Donna Haraway, response-ability is “a relationship crafted in intra-action through which entities, subjects and objects, come into being...Responders are themselves co-constituted in the responding” (2008, 71; see also Barad 2007). In responding to the various humans and non-humans in my story, I am constituted as subject and author. Therefore, I additionally deploy a method for response-able enactment, in order that this paper can help create space for new and diverse possibilities.

#### Wind power, energy production, market incentives, and native sovereignty are not neutral concepts—they are bound within power relations which themselves are productive of certain social practices—effective analysis locates itself in the realm of immanent power relations

Foucault ’78 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, 1978, p. 92-93

Hence the objective is to analyze a certain form of knowledge regarding sex, not in terms of repression or law, but in terms of power. But the word power is apt to lead to a number of misunderstandings-misunderstandings with respect to its nature, its form, and its unity. By power, I do not mean "Power" as a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I do not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are given at the outset; rather, these are only the terminal forms power takes. It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. Power's condition of possibility, or in any case the viewpoint which permits one to understand its exercise, even in its more "peripheral" effects, and which also makes it possible to use its mechanisms as a grid of intelligibility of the social order, must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate;

it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. And "Power," insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement. One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society. Should we turn the expression around, then, and say that politics is war pursued by other means? If we still wish to maintain a separation between war and politics, perhaps we should postulate rather that this multiplicity of force relations can be coded-in part but never totally-either in the form of "war," or in the form of "politics"; this would imply two different strategies (but the one always liable to switch into the other) for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense force relations.

## 1NR

Went for Tribes and case or something

# Rd 5 vs Wyoming FP

## 1NC

### T-Incentives

#### Energy production means extraction and conversion of energy into power

DCEE of Australia ‘11 [“Energy Production and Consumption,” http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/national-greenhouse-energy-reporting/publications/supplementary-guidelines/energy-production-consumption.aspx]

Production of energy: in relation to a facility, means the:

1. extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility
2. manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for final consumption by or from the operation of the facility, or for use other than in the operation of the facility (regulation 2.23(3) NGER Regulations).

#### “Incentives for energy production” is performance-based—excludes investment cost incentives

Rosner & Goldberg 11 (Robert, William E. Wrather Distinguished Service Professor, Departments of Astronomy and Astrophysics, and Physics, and the College at the U of Chicago, and Stephen, Energy Policy Institute at Chicago, The Harris School of Public Policy Studies, "Small Modular Reactors - Key to Future Nuclear Power Generation in the U.S.," November 2011, [https://epic.sites.uchicago.edu/sites/epic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/EPICSMRWhitePaperFinalcopy.pdf], jam)

Capital Cost Incentive: A capital cost incentive would reduce the effective overnight capital cost through either direct government cost sharing or through an investment tax credit. 41 There are policy precedents for both. DOE provides direct cost sharing for demonstration projects involving FOAK coal generation technology under the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI). Congress provided a capital cost incentive for renewable energy projects in the form of an Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which currently can be converted to an upfront cash grant. 42 Capital cost incentives help “buy down” the initial capital cost of SMR deployments, thus reducing the capital recovery requirements that would otherwise be reflected in the LCOE. A direct buy-down of the capital cost protects project sponsors against construction risk for SMRs by shifting a portion of that risk to the government. It also shifts performance risk from the project sponsor to the federal government, i.e., the federal government pays the capital cost incentive regardless of whether the project performs as planned or not. In the case of SMRs, shifting a portion of performance risk from the SMR community to the government also may adversely impact the risk-reward structure guiding the learning process. For example, a capital cost incentive for SMRs would be fixed, regardless of whether the investment achieved the estimated learning performance. Consequently, capital cost incentives were not incorporated into the business case analysis for SMRs. x Production Cost Incentive: A production cost incentive is a performance-based incentive. With a production cost incentive, the government incentive would be triggered only when the project successfully operates. The project sponsors would assume full responsibility for the upfront capital cost and would assume the full risk for project construction. The production cost incentive would establish a target price, a so-called “market-based benchmark.” Any savings in energy generation costs over the target price would accrue to the generator. Thus, a production cost incentive would provide a strong motivation for cost control and learning improvements, since any gains greater than target levels would enhance project net cash flow. Initial SMR deployments, without the benefits of learning, will have significantly higher costs than fully commercialized SMR plants and thus would benefit from production cost incentives. Because any production cost differential would decline rapidly due to the combined effect of module manufacturing rates and learning experience, the financial incentive could be set at a declining rate, and the level would be determined on a plant-by-plant basis, based on the achievement of cost reduction targets. 43 The key design parameters for the incentive include the following: 1. The magnitude of the deployment incentive should decline with the number of SMR modules and should phase out after the fleet of LEAD and FOAK plants has been deployed. 2. The incentive should be market-based rather than cost-based; the incentive should take into account not only the cost of SMRs but also the cost of competing technologies and be set accordingly. 3. The deployment incentive could take several forms, including a direct payment to offset a portion of production costs or a production tax credit.

#### Restriction means a limitation

American Heritage Dictionary, Cited by Dave Arnett and Andrea Reed in “Reduce Restrictions and Increase Incentives Mechanism Wording Paper” which came exceedingly close to the final resolution.

re·stric·tion (r-strkshn)

n.

1.

a. The act of restricting.

b. The state of being restricted.

2. Something that restricts; a regulation or limitation.

#### Restrictions are ON production

Dictionary.com no date on. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged. Retrieved September 26, 2012, from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/on

16. (used to indicate a source or a person or thing that serves as a source or agent): a duty on imported goods; She depends on her friends for encouragement.

#### MLPs make investment easier—not production—that’s a voting issue

#### Limits—modifying tax structures explodes research base—deprives us of generic spending links and CPs and lets them claim unpredictable advantages—lowering Warren Buffet’s taxes would be a topical aff

#### Education—distracts from core comparative debates about mechanism effectiveness like incentives vs mandates

#### Competing interps is best—most fair and objective

### Foucault K

#### Ecological risk scenarios are biopolitical constructions designed to annex the environment into the state’s toolbox of social management

Rutherford ’99 Paul Rutherford, professor of environmental politics in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Sydney, Australia, 1999, Discourses of the Environment, p. 55-56

The sorts of extensive, transnational research programmes on eco­logical issues mentioned above came increasingly to characterize scientific and political discourse on the environment throughout the 1960s and 1970s. From the end of the 1960s, through the establishment of a wide range of environmental legislation and enforcement agencies, the advanced industrialized countries ex­perienced a rapid growth in state intervention directed at environ­mental regulation and planning. Ecological and environmental research in the 1970s thus laid the foundation for public policies of significant economic and political impact, particularly in terms of the regulatory intervention in the activities of industry. In fin­ancial terms alone these are important — for example, the direct cost of complying with US pollution control regulations is estimated to be in excess of US$100 billion per year (Jasanoff 1992: 195). However, of more general importance, the period since the early 1970s has seen the significant institutionalization of new forms of ecological governmentality. Two important aspects of this have been the growth of regulatory science and the international spread of procedures for environmental impact assessment (EIA). The notion of regulatory science refers to the widespread reli­ance by the state on extensive systems of scientific advisory struc­tures which have become an integral feature of environmental (and health) policy making in industrialized societies (Beck 1992a; Jasanoff 1990). These expert advisory groups serve not only a role of political legitimation, but more importantly a role of epistemic policing, both by framing the definition of ecological risks and by certifying what is to count as scientifically acceptable knowledge of the natural world. The complexities thrown up by attempts to define environmental-societal interrelationships in terms of a global systems ecology produces a high level of ‘technical’ uncertainty and potential social conflict. The rapid expansion of social regulation associated with the growth of the discourse on ecological problems from the 1970s produced a whole new domain for the biopolitical administration of life. The population became the target for a new form of eco­logical security and welfare, in which environmental agencies and the professional disciplines required by them set about the task of protecting the public against hazardous and environmentally damaging technologies, demanding ‘ever more complex predictive analyses of the risks and benefits of regulation’ (Jasanoff 1990: 3). As Brian Wynne has noted, the regulatory ‘turn to science’, as an attempt to provide greater stability and legitimacy in environmental policy, ‘also in important respects. . . defined society, by tacitly defining the scope and nature of social intervention in public policy risk decisions’ (Wynne 1992: 746—8). The increasing importance of regulatory ecological science is therefore a particularly signific­ant articulation of the biopolitical character of modern govern­mental rationality. It is clearly linked to the growth of big science. Indeed, a notable feature of regulatory science is the role of the state and industrial interests (especially transnational corporations) in the manufacture, negotiation and certification of knowledge: that is, the central role these institutions play in the normative con­stitution of ecological knowledge (ibid. 754). Regulatory ecolo­gical science does not so much describe the environment as both actively constitute it as an object of knowledge and, through various modes of positive intervention, manage and police it.

#### The dark side of power over life is the ability to put entire populations to death in the name of ‘the greater good’

Foucault ’78 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, 1978, p. 136-137

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of death -and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits -now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.

#### Alt: Vote negative to critically question 1AC discourse.

#### Discursive analysis is a prior question to the aff’s green governmentality

Bäckstrand and Lövbrand ‘6 Karin Bäckstrand, Wallenberg Research Fellow at the Department of Political Science at Lund University, and Eva Lövbrand, Department of Environmental Science at Kalmar University, 2006, Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality and Civic Environmentalism, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 6 No. 1, pg 50-75. //uo-tjs

Discourses of Environmental Governance Discourse analysis has gained ground and proliferated in the analysis of global environmental change in sociology, political ecology and policy studies. A central insight of this disparate work is to identify power relationships associated with dominant narratives surrounding "environment" and "sustainable development." Four dimensions of discourse analysis that are prominent in the literature and relevant for our study are highlighted. First, discourses are conceived of as a shared meaning of phenomena. Global environmental change in general and the role of terrestrial carbon sinks in particular are permeated by a struggle over meaning and symbolic representation. In line with Hajer we understand discourses as "specific ensembles of ideas, concepts and categorization that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices." Secondly, the exercise of power is closely tied to the production of knowledge, [End Page 51] which in turn can sustain a discourse. Hence, discourses are embedded in power relations, "as historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth--what is possible to speak at a given moment." Discourses as "knowledge regimes" bring us squarely to the role of science. In expert-driven global environmental change research especially, modern scientific knowledge, techniques, practices and institutions enable the production and maintenance of discourses. Thirdly, in line with argumentative discourse analysis, we subscribe to a conception of discourse that bridges the gap between the linguistic aspects and institutional dimensions of policy-making. In this vein discourse analysis can be brought to the forefront of the analysis of power and policy. Policies are not neutral tools but rather a product of discursive struggles. Accordingly, policy discourses favor certain descriptions of reality, empower certain actors while marginalizing others. The concept of discourse institutionalization is useful as it refers to the transformation of discourse into institutional phenomena. Fourthly, we align ourselves with a discourse analysis that includes a notion of agency. Recent studies have advanced concepts such as "discourse coalition" and "knowledge broker" to highlight how agents are embedded in discourses. In this perspective, discourses are inconceivable without discoursing subjects or agents that interpret, articulate and reproduce storylines congruent with certain discourses. We use the concept of discursive agent and argue that political power stems from the ability to articulate and set the term for the discourse. To conclude, we employ a discourse-analytic framework that sheds light on how discourses are deeply embedded in scientific practices and techniques, institutionalized in global policy arenas and articulated by agents spanning the public-private and local-global divide. In the sections below we present each of the three discourses that arguably underpin policy practice and academic debates of environmental governance. They provide rough maps for understanding the discursive framing of contemporary global environmental politics. However, as will be demonstrated, each discourse is heterogeneous and thus in a constant change and redefinition. Consequently, there are overlaps and conflicts between the discourses when making sense of environmental governance.

### States CP

#### The fifty states, relevant territories, and the District of Columbia should substantially increase financial incentives for wind power production.

#### State incentives efficiently increase production

Engineering 12 (Wire, Lexis, <http://www.power-eng.com/news/2012/08/06/united-states-new-massachusetts-law-boosts-wind-and-solar-energy.html> 8/6/12) CJQ

On August 3, 2012, Massachusetts Governor Patrick signed new energy legislation that, among other things, expands the incentives and opportunities for developing wind, solar, hydro and other forms of renewable power generation to serve the state's electricity consumers. This law, Senate Bill 2395, An Act relative to competitively priced electricity in the Commonwealth (the "Act"), also includes provisions that aim to manage some of the drivers of energy cost increases. In regard to renewable energy, the Act: more than doubles the amount of power supply that electric distribution companies must purchase from renewable generators under long term contracts,increases the opportunities for owners of distributed renewable energy facilities to sell their excess power at favorable rates, and increases the size of hydroelectric projects eligible for financial incentives under the state's Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). ML Strategies and Mintz Levin have been actively engaged with the Legislature and the Patrick Administration in the development of the Act. We welcome the opportunity to advise interested companies on the details and implications of the Act as well as on the development of regulations to implement it. In this alert, we summarize the provisions in the Act that will significantly expand the opportunities and incentives for renewable energy development. More Long-Term Contracts for Renewable Power The Act increases the overall percentage of electricity supply that electric distribution companies may purchase from renewable generating facilities under long-term contracts to 7%. The Green Communities Act (GCA) of 2008 previously required distribution companies to obtain up to 3% of their total annual supply from long-term contracts for renewable energy with terms of 10 to 15 years. The Act adds a new long-term contracting provision, Section 83A, to the GCA, that requires distribution companies to solicit proposals from renewable energy developers for long-term contracts with terms of 10 to 20 years for up to 4% of their annual load.1 By December 2016, electric distribution companies must conduct two rounds of joint solicitations for the new 10 to 20 year contracts. Achieving the overall 7% will require renewable energy developers to construct hundreds of megawatts of new renewable generation facilities. Wind farms are likely to be the form of generation that delivers the power to meet this additional demand for renewable generation, which RPS rules allow be built in any of the New England states, New York or nearby Canadian provinces. In another important modification of the GCA, the new Section 83A added by the Act requires distribution companies to develop the new round of contracts only though a competitive bidding process. By contrast, the existing Section 83 of the GCA allows distribution companies to develop contracts through individual negotiations with renewable energy developers. This provision, for example, allowed for the individual negotiations that led to the development of the power purchase agreements for the Cape Wind project. The new legislation also contains a provision that requires each distribution company to enter into long-term power purchase contracts with "newly developed, small, emerging or diverse renewable energy distributed generation facilities" located in its service territory. Of the additional 4% of electricity supply that must be procured from renewable generating facilities under Section 83A, 10% of that amount (0.4% of total supply) must be purchased from these small generators. To qualify, such generators must have a maximum capacity no greater than 6 megawatts and not be net metering facilities.

### Elections DA

#### Obama narrowly up but needs a strong October to win

Silver 10/12 (Nate Romney Debate gains show staying power <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/oct-12-romney-debate-gains-show-staying-power/?gwh=EB0A7A5046CCC852A922C7B507944540>)

But the FiveThirtyEight forecast of Mr. Romney’s chances — 38.9 percent — is nearly identical to the one at the betting market Intrade, which put them at 38.5 percent as of early Friday evening.¶ Other prediction markets and bookmakers give Mr. Romney slightly lower chances, in the range of 30 or 35 percent.¶ Were there any bright spots at all for President Obama in Friday’s data? He did gain ground in two national tracking polls, from Ipsos and Investor’s Business Daily, although he lost ground in two others, from Gallup and Rasmussen Reports.¶ The Ipsos poll is interesting in that it was the only one to include a substantive number of interviews after the vice-presidential debate on Thursday night. (Ipsos conducts some of its online sampling late in the evening and early the next morning.) That poll showed Mr. Romney’s national lead narrowing to one point from three.¶ Still, the clear majority of its interviews preceded the vice-presidential debate. It will take a couple of days to determine whether it had any impact on the polls.¶ The only really good news for Democrats is that Mr. Obama had built up a large enough cushion that he could withstand a lot of damage without becoming the underdog. The forecast model still has him clinging to narrow leads in Ohio, Iowa, Wisconsin and Nevada, states that in some combination would give him 270 electoral votes.¶ Mr. Obama may also be just slightly underperforming the fundamentals in the election. His approval ratings remain near 50 percent, which would ordinarily predict a narrow re-election victory.¶ Some of the more visible economic numbers, like monthly and weekly jobs reports and consumer confidence figures, have also been stronger lately.¶ None of this is to say that a rebound is certain. It is late enough in the race that the polls need to be taken more at face value.¶ The forecast model adjusts Mr. Obama’s numbers up slightly based on its economic index and his incumbency status, but only by about 0.4 percentage points.

People hate wind

Takahashi 12 Patrick is Director Emeritus of the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute at the University of Hawaii and co-founder of the Pacific International Center for High Technology Research. 6.6.12 “WHY IS WINDPOWER SUDDENLY UNPOPULAR?” <http://planetearthandhumanity.blogspot.com/2012/06/why-is-windpower-suddenly-unpopular.html>

In Hawaii, [across the nation](http://www.wind-watch.org/affiliates.php) and [throughout the world](http://www.epaw.org/), it seems like wind energy conversion systems have suddenly become an issue on the level of new coal and nuclear facilities. In the [50th State, "Big Wind"](http://www.npr.org/2011/02/01/133384379/hawaiis-big-wind-power-project-stirs-up-fans-foes) is roundly being criticized and even [Donald Trump](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9209832/Donald-Trump-warns-MSPs-against-wind-farm-suicide.html) is warning about the evils of windpower, as related to China, tourism and Scotland. There were protesters about him being a windbag. Hey, give him a break, as he's having other more important problems, like with Miss Pennsylvania at his Miss USA pageant. Worse, the [U.S. Congress](http://grist.org/wind-power/congress-toys-with-the-future-of-wind-energy/), as broken as it is, seems currently negative on the production tax credit, the one piece of legislation that will make or break this technology. So what is really happening? Nothing much new. For one, when the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute advocated this form of renewable electricity a third of a century ago, we were criticized by the Audubon Society[(incidentally, they've since gotten smarter about this](http://policy.audubon.org/wind-power-frequently-asked-questions)) for killing birds, resorts (in Kahuku) spoke against this option at hearings for fear their investment would suffer from image problems, noise protesters were always present, more than a few felt that these ugly machines would affect their aesthetics and a few more depicted at the left protest ([this was in Canada in April](http://www.thestar.com/business/article/1156097--wind-power-crosswinds-blast-mcguinty-government)).

MLPs specifically are highly politicized – lets GOP bludgeon Obama

Rampton 6/7 (Roberta, Reuters, Chicago Tribune business reporter, 2012, [articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-07/business/sns-rt-us-usa-energy-taxationbre856054-20120606\_1\_green-energy-energy-incentives-tax-code], jam)

Coons' two-page bill is landing when government support for energy has become highly politicized heading into the November 6 elections. Democrats have railed against tax breaks for big oil companies, which they argue are unnecessary given high gasoline prices and record profits. Existing government tax breaks designed to help commercialize renewable power are expiring, and face an uphill political battle for renewal. Republicans have campaigned against green energy incentives championed by President Barack Obama, such as the $535 million loan guarantee for Solyndra, a bankrupt solar manufacturer. "What I heard time and time again from the Republicans on the (Senate Energy) committee and on the floor was the criticism that we were, as they put it, picking winners and losers," Coons said. Coons argued his bill cut out the politics by having the policy apply to all forms of energy, not just renewables. He has won support from Republican Senator Jerry Moran of Kansas, who co-sponsored the bill along with five Democratic senators. Others have expressed support for the idea but have told Coons he may need to wait until Congress begins to tackle a broad overhaul of the tax code next year. In the past, MLPs have been eyed as a special-interest loophole that could face elimination under tax reforms. "This is a proposal that turns that argument on its head and says, 'Well if it works, why not do more of it?'" said Christine Tezak, an energy policy analyst at Robert W. Baird & Co.

Romney win causes Iran strikes—causes escalating conflict

Hussain 9-12 Murtaza Hussain, Toronto-based writer and analyst focused on issues related to Middle Eastern politics, “Why war with Iran would spell disaster,” Al-Jazeera, 9/12/2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/09/201291194236970294.html

Leading members of the House and Congress from both parties as well as the closest advisers to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney have called for attacking Iran, with some high-ranking GOP advisers even suggesting that the time is now for a Congressional resolution formally declaring war on the country. Romney and many other leading Republican figures have called for pre-emptive war against Iran, and have continually upped the ante in terms of threats of military action throughout the election campaign. This alarming and potentially highly consequential rhetoric is occurring in a context where the American people are still recovering from the disastrous war in Iraq and winding down the US occupation of Afghanistan, while at the same time coping with the worst economic drought since the Great Depression. Public statements claiming that the extent of the conflict would be limited to targeted airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities are utterly disingenuous, ignoring the escalating cycle of retribution that such "limited" conflicts necessarily breed. As did the war in Libya start off with calls only for a benign "no-fly zone" to protect civilians and seamlessly turned into an all-out aerial campaign to topple Muammar Gaddafi, any crossing of the military threshold with Iran would also likely result in a far bigger conflagration than the public has been prepared for by their leaders. War with Iran would be no quick and clean affair, as many senior political and military figures have pointed out it would make the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which cost trillions of dollars and the lives of thousands of soldiers and civilians, seem like "a cakewalk". The fact that it is becoming increasingly likely, inevitable in the eyes of many, and that it is high on the agenda of so many leading political figures warrants exploration of what such a conflict would really entail. Conflict on an unprecedented scale Not a war of weeks or months, but a "generations-long war" is how no less a figure than former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy describes the consequences of open conflict with Iran. In comparison with Iraq and Afghanistan, both countries with relatively small populations which were already in a state of relative powerlessness before they were invaded, Iran commands the eighth largest active duty military in the world, as well as highly trained special forces and guerilla organisations which operate in countries throughout the region and beyond. Retired US General John Abizaid has previously described the Iranian military as "the most powerful in the Middle East" (exempting Israel), and its highly sophisticated and battle-hardened proxies in Lebanon and Iraq have twice succeeded in defeating far stronger and better funded Western military forces. Any attack on Iran would assuredly lead to the activation of these proxies in neighbouring countries to attack American interests and would create a situation of borderless war unprecedented in any past US conflicts in the Middle East. None of this is to suggest that the United States would not "win" a war with Iran, but given the incredibly painful costs of Iraq and Afghanistan; wars fought again weak, poorly organised enemies lacking broad influence, politicians campaigning for war with Iran are leading the American people into a battle which will be guaranteed to make the past decade of fighting look tame in comparison. A recent study has shown that an initial US aerial assault on Iran would require hundreds of planes, ships and missiles in order to be completed; a military undertaking itself unprecedented since the first Gulf War and representative of only the first phase of what would likely be a long drawn-out war of attrition. For a country already nursing the wounds from the casualties of far less intense conflicts and still reeling from their economic costs, the sheer battle fatigue inherent in a large-scale war with Iran would stand to greatly exacerbate these issues. Oil shocks and the American economy The fragile American economic recovery would be completely upended were Iran to target global energy supplies in the event of war, an act which would be both catastrophic and highly likely if US Iran hawks get their way. Not only does the country itself sit atop some of the largest oil and natural gas reserves on the planet, its close proximity to the shipping routes and oil resources of its neighbours means that in the event of war, its first response would likely be to choke off the global supply of crude; a tactic for which its military defences have in fact been specifically designed. The Strait of Hormuz, located in the Persian Gulf is the shipping point for more than 20 per cent of the world's petroleum. Iran is known to have advanced Silkworm missile batteries buried at strategic points around the strait to make it impassable in the event of war, and has developed "swarming" naval tactics to neutralise larger, less mobile ships such as those used by the US Navy. While Iran could never win in straightforward combat, it has developed tactics of asymmetrical warfare that can effectively inflict losses on a far stronger enemy and render the strait effectively closed to naval traffic. The price of oil would immediately skyrocket, by some estimates upwards several hundred dollars a barrel, shattering the already tenuous steps the US and other Western economies are taking towards recovery. Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has said a war with Iran could drag out years and would have economic consequences "devastating for the average American"; but these facts are conspicuously absent in public discussion of the war. Every conflict has blowback, but if US politicians are attempting to maneouver the country into a conflict of such potentially devastating magnitude, potentially sacrificing ordinary Americans' economic well-being for years to come, it would behoove them to speak frankly about these costs and not attempt to obfuscate or downplay them in order to make their case. Conflict across borders Finally, a war with Iran would be not be like conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya where the fighting was constrained to the borders of the country in question. Despite widespread resentment towards the country due to the perception of it as a regionally imperialist power as well sectarian animosity towards it as Shia Muslim theocracy, Iran maintains deep links throughout the Middle East and South Asia and can count on both popular support as well as assistance from its network of armed proxies in various countries. In a report for Haaretz, Ahmed Rashid noted that an attack on Iran would likely inflame anti-American sentiment throughout the region, across both Shia and Sunni Muslim communities. Despite Iran's poor human rights record and bellicose leadership, polls have consistently shown that Iranian and Iranian-backed leaders such as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah remain among the most popular figures throughout the Arab and Muslim world. This popularity comes not necessarily out of respect for Iranian ideology, but from a perception that Iran is the only assertive power in the region and is the target of aggression from the United States and its allies. In Rashid's analysis, both the Middle East and South Asia would become unsafe for American citizens and their interests for years to come; popular anger would reach a level which would render these area effectively off-limits and would cause grave and immediate danger to both American businesses and troops based in the region. Again, this would be a situation quite different from the other wars of the past decade, fought against isolated regimes without the ability to call upon large and often well-funded numbers of regional sympathisers; a fact also rarely mentioned by war advocates. Not a political game Going to war with Iran would be an elective decision for the United States, but it is for too grave and consequential a choice to be left up to the whims of politicians seeking to win the approval of lobby groups and one-up each other to appeal to influential campaign donors who would like to see a war with Iran. Make no mistake, the possibility of war is very real and has become eminently more so in recent months. Many of the same politicians and political advisers responsible for engineering the Iraq War have returned to public life and are at the forefront of pushing a new American conflict with Iran. Mitt Romney's closest foreign policy advisers include leading hawks from the war with Iraq, including John Bolton, Eliot Cohen and Dan Senor. Many of them have enthusiastically and publicly expressed their desire to engineer a US military confrontation with Iran and have already begun to tout the inevitability of this action in a Romney presidency.

Goes nuclear

Primakov ’10 Yevgeny Primakov, President of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and member of the editorial board of Russia in Global Affairs, “The Fundamental Conflict,” New Eastern Outlook, 1/2/2010, http://www.journal-neo.com/?q=node/102

The Middle East conflict is unparalleled in terms of its potential for spreading globally. During the Cold War, amid which the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved, the two opposing superpowers directly supported the conflicting parties: the Soviet Union supported Arab countries, while the United States supported Israel. On the one hand, the bipolar world order which existed at that time objectively played in favor of the escalation of the Middle East conflict into a global confrontation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and the United States were not interested in such developments and they managed to keep the situation under control. The behavior of both superpowers in the course of all the wars in the Middle East proves that. In 1956, during the Anglo-French-Israeli military invasion of Egypt (which followed Cairo’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company) the United States – contrary to the widespread belief in various countries, including Russia – not only refrained from supporting its allies but insistently pressed – along with the Soviet Union – for the cessation of the armed action. Washington feared that the tripartite aggression would undermine the positions of the West in the Arab world and would result in a direct clash with the Soviet Union. Fears that hostilities in the Middle East might acquire a global dimension could materialize also during the Six-Day War of 1967. On its eve, Moscow and Washington urged each other to cool down their “clients.” When the war began, both superpowers assured each other that they did not intend to get involved in the crisis militarily and that that they would make efforts at the United Nations to negotiate terms for a ceasefire. On July 5, the Chairman of the Soviet Government, Alexei Kosygin, who was authorized by the Politburo to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Soviet leadership, for the first time ever used a hot line for this purpose. After the USS *Liberty* was attacked by Israeli forces, which later claimed the attack was a case of mistaken identity, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson immediately notified Kosygin that the movement of the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was only intended to help the crew of the attacked ship and to investigate the incident. The situation repeated itself during the hostilities of October 1973. Russian publications of those years argued that it was the Soviet Union that prevented U.S. military involvement in those events. In contrast, many U.S. authors claimed that a U.S. reaction thwarted Soviet plans to send troops to the Middle East. Neither statement is true. The atmosphere was really quite tense. Sentiments both in Washington and Moscow were in favor of interference, yet both capitals were far from taking real action. When U.S. troops were put on high alert, Henry Kissinger assured Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that this was done largely for domestic considerations and should not be seen by Moscow as a hostile act. In a private conversation with Dobrynin, President Richard Nixon said the same, adding that he might have overreacted but that this had been done amidst a hostile campaign against him over Watergate. Meanwhile, Kosygin and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at a Politburo meeting in Moscow strongly rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to “demonstrate” Soviet military presence in Egypt in response to Israel’s refusal to comply with a UN Security Council resolution. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev took the side of Kosygin and Gromyko, saying that he was against any Soviet involvement in the conflict. The above suggests an unequivocal conclusion that control by the superpowers in the bipolar world did not allow the Middle East conflict to escalate into a global confrontation. After the end of the Cold War, some scholars and political observers concluded that a real threat of the Arab-Israeli conflict going beyond regional frameworks ceased to exist. However, in the 21st century this conclusion no longer conforms to the reality. The U.S. military operation in Iraq has changed the balance of forces in the Middle East. The disappearance of the Iraqi counterbalance has brought Iran to the fore as a regional power claiming a direct role in various Middle East processes. I do not belong to those who believe that the Iranian leadership has already made a political decision to create nuclear weapons of its own. Yet Tehran seems to have set itself the goal of achieving a technological level that would let it make such a decision (the “Japanese model”) under unfavorable circumstances. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. In such circumstances, the absence of a Middle East settlement opens a dangerous prospect of a nuclear collision in the region, which would have catastrophic consequences for the whole world. The transition to a multipolar world has objectively strengthened the role of states and organizations that are directly involved in regional conflicts, which increases the latter’s danger and reduces the possibility of controlling them. This refers, above all, to the Middle East conflict. The coming of Barack Obama to the presidency has allayed fears that the United States could deliver a preventive strike against Iran (under George W. Bush, it was one of the most discussed topics in the United States). However, fears have increased that such a strike can be launched *Yevgeny Primakov* 1 3 2 RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 7 • No. 3 • JULY – SEPTEMBER• 2009 by Israel, which would have unpredictable consequences for the region and beyond. It seems that President Obama’s position does not completely rule out such a possibility.

### Warming Adv

#### Warming impacts overstated—new data

Taylor ’11 James Taylor, senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism,” Forbes, 7/27/2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted. The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict. When objective NASA satellite data, reported in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, show a “huge discrepancy” between alarmist climate models and real-world facts, climate scientists, the media and our elected officials would be wise to take notice. Whether or not they do so will tell us a great deal about how honest the purveyors of global warming alarmism truly are.

#### Catastrophic warming inevitable

Hamilton ’10 Clive Hamilton, Professor of Public Ethics in Australia, Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change, 2010, p. 27-28

The conclusion that, even if we act promptly and resolutely, the world is on a path to reach 650 ppm is almost too frightening to accept. That level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will be associated with warming of about 4°C by the end of the century, well above the temperature associated with tipping points that would trigger further warming.58 So it seems that even with the most optimistic set of assumptions—the ending of deforestation, a halving of emissions associated with food production, global emissions peaking in 2020 and then falling by 3 per cent a year for a few decades—we have no chance of preventing emissions rising well above a number of critical tipping points that will spark uncontrollable climate change. The Earth's climate would enter a chaotic era lasting thousands of years before natural processes eventually establish some sort of equilibrium. Whether human beings would still be a force on the planet, or even survive, is a moot point. One thing seems certain: there will be far fewer of us. These conclusions arc alarming, co say the least, but they are not alarmist. Rather than choosing or interpreting numbers to make the situation appear worse than it could be, following Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows I have chosen numbers that err on the conservative side, which is to say numbers that reflect a more buoyant assessment of the possibilities. A more neutral assessment of how the global community is likely to respond would give an even bleaker assessment of our future. For example, the analysis excludes non-CO2, emissions from aviation and shipping. Including them makes the task significantly harder, particularly as aviation emissions have been growing rapidly and are expected to continue to do so as there is no foreseeable alternative to severely restricting the number of flights. And any realistic assessment of the prospects for international agreement would have global emissions peaking closer to 2030 rather than 2020. The last chance to reverse the trajectory of global emissions by 2020 was forfeited at the Copenhagen climate conference in December 2009. As a consequence, a global response proportionate to the problem was deferred for several years.

#### Expanded international agreements are key but every major party faces massive political roadblocks to increased involvement

Schreurs ’12 Miranda A. Schreurs, Director of the Environmental Policy Research Centre, Free University of Berlin, “Breaking the impasse in the international climate negotiations: The potential of green technologies,” Energy Policy 48, September 2012, pp. 5-12, Elsevier

The Durban outcome has kept the international negotiation process alive, but does not reﬂect the urgency of the problem at hand. That no post-Kyoto agreement is expected to enter into force until 2020 and the content of the agreement still needs to be developed also raises the question of whether the international community will be able to put a break on rising greenhouse gas emissions, let alone reduce them on the order that will be necessary to stay within the 1.5 to 2.0 degree Centrigrade temperature goal. The general scientiﬁc consensus is that if the rise in greenhouse gases is not halted by 2020 and then reduced on the order of 50% below 1990 levels by 2050, then it will be next to impossible to maintain the rise in greenhouse gases to within the 2 degrees Centigrade range. One very major challenge to the future agreement is the domestic political situation in the United States, which makes passage of national climate legislation, let alone ratiﬁcation of a global climate agreement highly unlikely in the near future. Already in Cancun, Japan made it clear that it opposes a second phase for the Kyoto Protocol. Yoshito Sengoku, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, announced that Japan would ‘‘sternly oppose debate for extending the Kyoto Protocol into a second phase which is unfair and ineffective.’’ (United Press International (UPI), 2010; MOFA, 2010). With its rapidly rising greenhouse gas emissions tied to the extraction of oil from tar sands in Alberta, Canada has pulled out of the agreement. Also problematic is the resistance of many developing countries to the establishment of binding emission reduction targets and timetables. India strongly pushed the perspective of per capita equity arguing that it should not be held captive by a problem largely caused by other countries. With its low per capita greenhouse gas emission levels as a result of high levels of poverty, India will be reluctant to accept commitments that could affect its economic growth perspectives.

#### Entrenched political forces prevent broad climate reform in the US

Schreurs ’12 Miranda A. Schreurs, Director of the Environmental Policy Research Centre, Free University of Berlin, “Breaking the impasse in the international climate negotiations: The potential of green technologies,” Energy Policy 48, September 2012, pp. 5-12, Elsevier

The Obama administration’s efforts were directed at framing climate change as a serious threat and linking policy action to the development of a cleaner, greener energy infrastructure that would make the U.S. more energy independent and sustainable. Green energy policy change has been portrayed by the Obama White House as an economic opportunity, and a possible way out of the ﬁnancial crisis ailing the country in terms of creating new jobs and securing the states’ economies. Still, Obama’s efforts to win over climate skeptics has proven difﬁcult, and conservative forces continue to challenge his environmental agenda. Politicians from states with large coal, oil, manufacturing, and/or agricultural industries, regardless of party afﬁliation, have been inclined to vote against climate legislation because they see it as a threat to their state’s economy and jobs. They have even taken steps to curb the federal government’s ability to conduct climate change programs.

#### Reduced consumption lowers coal prices—that’s offset with increased exports to China—turns solvency

Plumer ’12 Brad Plumer, “How the U.S. could influence China’s coal habits—with exports,” Washington Post, 5/1/2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/can-the-united-states-influence-chinas-coal-habits/2012/05/01/gIQAgqUpuT\_blog.html

Still, as a recent and fascinating report (pdf) from the Carnegie Endowment explains, Chinese coal imports are likely to grow enormously in the coming years. For one, Chinese coal use has been growing at a rate of nearly 6 percent each year. And China’s domestic production can’t keep pace, thanks to railroad and shipping bottlenecks from mining centers in Shanxi, Shaanxi and Inner Mongolia provinces. What’s more, the Carnegie report notes, the Chinese government is becoming increasingly sensitive to the ecological damage wrought by domestic coal mining — as well as to the growing number of protests over unsafe mining conditions. According to official statistics, 6,027 Chinese miners died in 2004, though the real number is probably higher. There are real costs to ramping up production in China. As a result, China will likely try to import a growing share of its coal in the coming years. Much of that will likely come from Indonesia and Australia, since China’s import infrastructure is geared toward those two regions. But many analysts expect the United States to play an increasingly crucial role in coming years. (To date, the U.S. has been supplying China with just small amounts of coking coal, which is used for iron and steel production and which is less readily available in China.) And if American coal starts pouring into China, that will help keep prices down. If that happens, Chinese power plants and factories will burn even more coal and use the stuff less efficiently than they otherwise would. Grist’s David Roberts points to a recent paper (pdf) by Thomas M. Power, a former economics professor at the University of Montana, finding that Chinese coal habits are highly sensitive to prices: Opening the Asian import market to dramatic increases in U.S. coal will drive down coal prices in that market. Several empirical studies of energy in China have demonstrated that coal consumption is highly sensitive to cost. One recent study found that a 10 percent reduction in coal cost would result in a 12 percent increase in coal consumption. Another found that over half of the gain in China’s “energy intensity” improvement during the 1990s was a response to prices. In other words, coal exports will mean cheaper coal in Asia, and cheaper coal means more coal will be burned than would otherwise be the case.

#### Renewable energy means Saudi Arabia floods the oil market to maintain dominance

IBT ‘11 (International Business Times, “Why lower Saudi oil prices kill alternative energy”, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/154524/20110530/saudi-arabia-oil.htm, May 30, 2011)

Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal seems to understand this. In a CNN interview, he admitted Saudi Arabia wants lower oil prices because it doesn’t “want the West to go and find alternatives.” Alternative energy hasn’t taken off in the US because its development largely depends on the private sector. Currently, it’s simply cheaper buy oil from countries like Saudi Arabia, so not many private companies bother to develop alternative sources. For example, if Saudi oil average $80 per barrel in the long-term, why bother extracting oil from oil sands and oil shale if doing so cost $85 per barrel? Why turn to electric cars if the whole ordeal – the research, electric cars, and electric grid – cost more than filling up convention cars with imported fossil fuel? On the other hand, if oil skyrockets to $200 per barrel, it would make absolutely sense to develop oil sands, oil shale, and electric cars.

#### Turns solvency

Al-Saleh et al. ‘8 Yasser Al-Saleh, Paul Upham and Khaleel Malik, “Renewable Energy Scenarios for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” October 2008, http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/sites/default/files/wp125.pdf

In a world of abundant oil reserves, Saudi Arabia - as a major oil-producer with the greatest spare production capacity - could choose to maximise its oil production and perhaps further expand its operations in the Far East in order to achieve a maximum market share and ultimately become the world’s unsurpassed supplier. As a result of the adoption of a sustained ‘market flooding’ strategy, oil prices could gradually drop down to as low as $10 per barrel. This low price may, however, guarantee the maintenance of reasonable revenue to Saudi Arabia, whose production costs are very low (according to some unofficial estimates perhaps as low as $1.5 per barrel at present). Such an aggressive approach - although regarded by a few panellists as being somewhat technically difficult - would result in driving other ‘high-cost’ oil-producers (including many OPEC members) from the market, as well as demolishing much of the global interest and research into alternative energy means (including renewables).

#### Water conflict doesn’t escalate—too many limiting factors

Jacques Leslie, Harper's Magazine, July 1, 2000

Yet such wars haven't quite happened. Aaron Wolf, an Oregon State University specialist in water conflicts, maintains that the last war over water was fought between the Mesopotamian city states of Lagash and Umma 4,500 years ago. Wolf has found that during the twentieth century only 7 minor skirmishes were fought over water while 145 water-related treaties were signed. He argues that one reason is strategic: in a conflict involving river water, the aggressor would have to be both downstream (since the upstream nation enjoys unhampered access to the river) and militarily superior. As Wolf puts it, "An upstream riparian would have no cause to launch an attack, and a weaker state would be foolhardy to do so." And if a powerful downstream nation retaliates against a water diversion by, say, destroying its weak upstream neighbor's dam, it still risks the consequences, in the form of flood or pollution or poison from upstream. So, until now, water conflicts have simmered but rarely boiled, perhaps because of the universality of the need for water. Almost two fifths of the world's people live in the 214 river basins shared by two or more countries; the Nile links ten countries, whose leaders are profoundly aware of one another's hydrologic behavior. Countries usually manage to cooperate about Water, even in unlikely circumstances. In 1957, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam formed the Mekong Committee, which exchanged information throughout the Vietnam War. Through the 1980s and into the 1990s, Israeli and Jordanian officials secretly met once or twice a year at a picnic table on the banks of the Yarmuk River to allocate the river's water supply; these so-called picnic-table summits occurred while the two nations disavowed formal diplomatic contact. Jerome Delli Priscoli, editor of a thoughtful trade journal called Water Policy and a social scientist at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, believes the whole notion of water conflict is overemphasized: "Water irrigation helped build early communities and bring those communities together in larger functional arrangements. Such community networking was a primary impetus to the growth of civilization. Indeed, water may actually be one of humanity's great learning grounds for building community.... The thirst for water may be more persuasive than the impulse toward conflict."

#### Deterrence blocks

Kim GhattasInter Press Service,8/5, 1999

Economic and military might play a role too. Poor and arid countries such as Jordan or the Palestinian territories, no matter how desperate, cannot afford to launch a war against powerful neighbors, who, in turn, use their control of water sources into bargaining weapons. Around 90 percent of the water from the West Bank is consumed by Israel, yet the Israeli government demands Palestinians to cut back on their consumption and cuts agreed supplies to Jordan.

#### No connection between food prices and social conflict—stats prove—their ev is biased

Barrett and Bellemare ’11 Christopher B. Barrett, distinguished professor of economics at Cornell, and Marc Bellemare, assistant professor of public policy at Duke, “Why food price volatility doesn't matter,” CNN, 7/13/2011, http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/13/why-food-price-volatility-doesnt-matter/

Since volatile food prices do not necessarily harm poor consumers, it does not make sense to blame volatility for increased poverty or political unrest. In a recent statistical analysis, the FAO food price index and an indicator of political unrest were positively correlated. But a measure of food price volatility and political unrest had a strong negative correlation. Although the food price spikes that occurred in the late spring and early summer of 2008, at the end of 2010, and at the beginning of 2011 coincided with political unrest, increases in food price volatility more commonly occurs after, not before, patches of political unrest. So, although commentators and politicians frequently blame food price volatility for human suffering and political unrest, they are either misunderstanding or misrepresenting the problem. Perhaps not coincidentally, their emphasis on tempering price volatility favors the same large farmers who already enjoy tremendous financial support from G-20 governments.

#### Trade solves consequences of food price spikes

Hansch ’8 Steve Hansch, Senior Associate, Center for the study of migration, "FOOD, NUTRITION AND LIVELIHOOD PREPAREDNESS FOR A PANDEMIC INFLUENZA DISASTER GUIDANCE FOR LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES," Food Security Working Group1 6/15/2008 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/PNADU257.pdf-http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\_docs/PNADU257.pdf

The major reason food shortages have become less lethal in modern history is the ability of global food supplies to buffer any individual region, that is, food has become fluid enough that a rise in food prices anywhere is met by increased supply from the outside. A pandemic will de-couple that connection. Food price rises in urban areas will be balanced by food price declines in nearby rural areas; they will not equilibrate.

### Growth Adv

#### Economy’s turning around—employment, consumer confidence

Fletcher and Irwin 10-5 Michael A. Fletcher, and Neil Irwin, MBA from Columbia University, where he was a Knight-Bagehot Fellow in Economics and Business Journalism, “Unemployment rate falls to 7.8% in September,” Washington Post, 10/5/2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/unemployment-rate-plunges-to-78percent/2012/10/05/bdb6e5bc-0ee7-11e2-a310-2363842b7057\_print.html

It is a surprising improvement in a job market that had appeared listless in recent months. Although employers added a modest 114,000 jobs in September, the unemployment rate dropped sharply, from 8.1 to 7.8 percent, the government reported Friday. Unemployment is at its lowest level since President Obama took office in January 2009, offering him a political boost just days after his performance was widely judged as lackluster during a debate against GOP rival Mitt Romney. The government said hourly wages were up and employees worked more hours in September, meaning they were taking home bigger checks. Overall, the ratio of the American population with a job reached its highest level since May 2010. The drop in the unemployment rate was bolstered by revisions reflecting that employers had added 86,000 more jobs than previously known in July and August, recasting the troubling summer lull in job creation to a season of solid employment gains. Although the report offered a brightening picture of the nation’s labor market, the overall rate of job creation remains less than robust. In addition, unemployment remains far above normal levels, and many millions who have jobs are not working full time. “While the September employment report was more encouraging than the ones we have seen in recent months, the job market is still a long way from rosy, good health,” said Gary Burtless, a Brookings Institution economist. This year, employers have added only slightly more jobs per month than are needed to keep pace with normal labor-force expansion, and slightly fewer than the 153,000 average monthly gain the nation experienced in 2011. Also, the number of Americans working part-time — even though they want full-time jobs — rose sharply last month to 8.6 million. With economic growth creeping along after showing signs of more vigorous expansion last year, some economists were skeptical of the magnitude of September’s unemployment decline. A few even predicted that the jobless rate would tick up in the coming months. “This was a pretty good report, but the drop in the unemployment rate was just too good to be true and probably overstates the degree of improvement in the job market,” said Stuart G. Hoffman, chief economist for PNC Financial Services Group. Even at 7.8 percent, the joblessness rate remains high by any historical standard. And it could be years before the economy returns to full employment. But Bernard Baumohl, chief global economist for the Economic Outlook Group, said the dichotomy between the recent steep decline in the jobless rate and the slow economic growth in recent months could mean that the economy is poised to take off. Economic “growth may turn out to be stronger than most economists currently forecast,” he said. “ . . . Employers are, thus, cautiously turning more optimistic about the economy in 2013 and becoming less apprehensive about hiring.” There is evidence that consumers are feeling better about the state of the economy: The Conference Board’s consumer confidence number was up in September, as was a similar University of Michigan survey of consumer sentiment.

#### Their DiMugno evidence says the plan generates 560 million in investment per year over the next 10 years—to put this in perspective, that’s only 4% of annual US investment

DOE ’12 “Energy Report: U.S. Wind Energy Production and Manufacturing Surges, Supporting Jobs and Diversifying U.S. Energy Economy,” U.S. Department of Energy, 8/14/2012, http://energy.gov/articles/energy-report-us-wind-energy-production-and-manufacturing-surges-supporting-jobs-and

WASHINGTON – The Energy Department released a new report today highlighting strong growth in the U.S. wind energy market in 2011, increasing the U.S. share of clean energy and supporting tens of thousands of jobs, and underscoring the importance of continued policy support and clean energy tax credits to ensure that the manufacturing and jobs associated with this booming global industry remain in America According to the 2011 Wind Technologies Market Report, the United States remained one of the world’s largest and fastest growing wind markets in 2011, with wind power representing a remarkable 32 percent of all new electric capacity additions in the United States last year and accounting for $14 billion in new investment. According the report, the percentage of wind equipment made in America also increased dramatically. Nearly seventy percent of the equipment installed at U.S. wind farms last year – including wind turbines and components like towers, blades, gears, and generators - is now from domestic manufacturers, doubling from 35 percent in 2005. President Obama has made clear that clean, renewable wind energy is a critical part of an all-of-the-above energy strategy that aims to develop more secure, domestic energy sources, while strengthening American manufacturing.

#### Or 1% of global investment

IRENA ’12 International Renewable Energy Agency, intergovernmental organization including 158 states, dedicated to renewable energy, “Wind Power,” Renewable Energy Technologies: Cost Analysis Series, Vol. 1, Iss. 5, June 2012, http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/RE\_Technologies\_Cost\_Analysis-WIND\_POWER.pdf

The global wind power market was essentially flat in 2009 and 2010, but in 2011 capacity added was 40.6 GW up from 38.8 in 2010 (Figure 3.3). This represents an investment in new capacity in 2011 of USD 68 billion (EUR 50 billion) (GWEC, 2012). Onshore wind accounted for 97% of all new capacity additions in 2010.

#### Manufacturing’s rising rapidly

Contractor 8-12 Farok Contractor, professor of management and global business at Rutgers, “Seven Reasons to Expect US Manufacturing Resurgence” Epoch Times, 8/12/12 <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/opinion/seven-reasons-to-expect-us-manufacturing-resurgence-278304-all.html>

Seven factors converging by 2012 suggest that U.S. manufacturing could see a strong resurgence. Jobs once offshored are now returning in industries including automobiles and even unlikely areas like furniture and televisions.¶ Seven Factors¶ Wages of the bottom half of American workers have significantly declined in real terms over the past decade, as well as in comparison with other nations, while those of U.S. manufacturing rivals, including China and Japan, have risen.¶ ¶ American workers are working longer, faster, and with greater anxiety, than ever before. Because of greater automation, flexibility, domestic U.S. outsourcing, and the fear of being laid off, surviving U.S. manufacturing workers have seen little or no increases in wages in the past eight years, and their output has increased with productivity in output per employee at an all-time high.¶ Americans put in 1,800 hours per year, about the same as Japanese workers. Top is South Korea, with its corporate culture that prevents employees going home until the last boss has departed. The French and Germans, by comparison, put in 19 percent less time than Americans.¶ The dollar has weakened against several major currencies over the past decade, making imports more expensive and producing in, or exporting from, the United States more competitive, by comparison. The United States is not just the world’s biggest importer but also the second largest exporter of merchandise goods. In 2001—the year China joined the World Trade Organization—the renminbi yuan, RMB, was 8.27 per dollar. By 2012 the currency had appreciated by more than 30 percent to 6.3 RMB per dollar.¶ For many Chinese exporters, a breakeven exchange rate, when their exports to the United States are no longer competitive, is between 5.5 to 5.8 yuan per dollar. As the RMB continues to appreciate against the dollar, more Chinese firms will abandon exports and focus on their domestic market, growing at 8 percent per annum.¶ ¶ China is experiencing significant wage inflation. On the eastern seaboard, where most of China’s manufacturing takes place, several companies have experienced labor shortages and wage bills have increased by 20 percent per year.¶ Fuel prices have more than doubled. For products with significant transportation costs, the rise in energy costs can add significantly to the cost of imports. Shipping large appliances is expensive, so Haier, a leading white goods manufacturer based in China, opened a South Carolina plant where components, shipped across the Pacific Ocean, are assembled by American workers.¶ For products requiring flexibility in the face of fickle fashion changes or assembly operations that require components shipped within a few days to accommodate schedules, such pressures have driven component producers to colocate near the United States.¶ Natural disasters and disruptions in recent years have spooked global supply chains: Volcanoes in Iceland, overflowing rivers in Thailand, and tsunamis in the Pacific Ocean idled assembly plants in the United States and Europe because parts from affected regions could not be shipped. Years of cost savings at Toyota, from sourcing components from faraway locations, were wiped out by a few weeks of losses from assembly operations idled by 2011 floods in Thailand.

#### No risk or impact to economic decline

Drezner ‘11 Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Please come down off the ledge, dear readers,” Foreign Policy, 8/12/11, http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/12/please\_come\_down\_off\_the\_ledge\_dear\_readers

So, when we last left off this debate, things were looking grim. My concern in the last post was that the persistence of hard times would cause governments to take actions that would lead to a collapse of the open global economy, a spike in general riots and disturbances, and eerie echoes of the Great Depression. Let's assume that the global economy persists in sputtering for a while, because that's what happens after major financial shocks. Why won't these other bad things happen? Why isn't it 1931? Let's start with the obvious -- it's not gonna be 1931 because there's some passing familiarity with how 1931 played out. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve has devoted much of his academic career to studying the Great Depression. I'm gonna go out on a limb therefore and assert that if the world plunges into a another severe downturn, it's not gonna be because central bank heads replay the same set of mistakes. The legacy of the Great Depression has also affected public attitudes and institutions that provide much stronger cement for the current system. In terms of [public] attitudes, compare the results of this mid-2007 poll with this mid-2010 poll about which economic system is best. I'll just reproduce the key charts below: The headline of the 2010 results is that there's eroding U.S. support for the global economy, but a few other things stand out. U.S. support has declined, but it's declined from a very high level. In contrast, support for free markets has increased in other major powers, such as Germany and China. On the whole, despite the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression, public attitudes have not changed all that much. While there might be populist demands to "do something," that something is not a return to autarky or anything so [drastic]. Another big difference is that multilateral economic institutions are much more robust now than they were in 1931. On trade matters, even if the Doha round is dead, the rest of the World Trade Organization's corpus of trade-liberalizing measures are still working quite well. Even beyond the WTO, the complaint about trade is not the deficit of free-trade agreements but the surfeit of them. The IMF's resources have been strengthened as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already promulgated a plan to strengthen capital requirements for banks. True, it's a slow, weak-assed plan, but it would be an improvement over the status quo. As for the G-20, I've been pretty skeptical about that group's abilities to collectively address serious macroeconomic problems. That is setting the bar rather high, however. One could argue that the G-20's most useful function is reassurance. Even if there are disagreements, communication can prevent them from growing into anything worse. Finally, a note about the possibility of riots and other general social unrest. The working paper cited in my previous post noted the links between austerity measures and increases in disturbances. However, that paper contains the following important paragraph on page 19: [I]n countries with better institutions, the responsiveness of unrest to budget cuts is generally lower. Where constraints on the executive are minimal, the coefficient on expenditure changes is strongly negative -- more spending buys a lot of social peace. In countries with Polity-2 scores above zero, the coefficient is about half in size, and less significant. As we limit the sample to ever more democratic countries, the size of the coefficient declines. For full democracies with a complete range of civil rights, the coefficient is still negative, but no longer significant. This is good news!! The world has a hell of a lot more democratic governments now than it did in 1931. What happened in London, in other words, might prove to be the exception more than the rule. So yes, the recent economic news might seem grim. Unless political institutions and public attitudes buckle, however, we're unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the 1930's. And, based on the data we've got, that's not going to happen.

#### Green jobs are a myth

Zycher ’12 Benjamin Zycher, president of Benjamin Zycher Economics Associates Inc., a senior fellow at the Pacific Research Institute, and an adjunct professor of Economics and Business at the Martin V. Smith School of Business and Economics, California State University, Channel Islands, associate in the Intelligence Community Associates Program of the Office of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, served as a senior staff economist for the President's Council of Economic Advisers from July 1981 to July 1983, “Renewable Energy Subsidies Should Be Abandoned,” Statement before the Senate Finance Committee Subcommittee on Energy, Natural Resources, and Infrastructure, 3/27/2012, http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Zycher%20Senate%20Finance%20renewables%20incentives%20testimony%203-27-12.pdf

There is the further matter that an expansion of the renewable electricity sector must mean a decline in some other sector(s), with an attendant reduction in resource use there; after all resources in the aggregate are finite. If there exists substantial unemployment, and if labor demand in renewables is not highly specialized, a short-run increase in total employment might result. But in the long run---not necessarily a long period of time---such industrial policies cannot “create” employment; they can only shift it among economic sectors. In short, an expanding renewables sector must be accompanied by a decline in other sectors, whether relative or absolute, and creation of “green jobs” must be accompanied by a destruction of jobs elsewhere. Even if an expanding renewables sector is more labor-intensive (per unit of output) than the sectors that would decline as a result, it remains the case that the employment expansion would be a cost for the economy as a whole, and the aggregate result would be an economy smaller than otherwise would be the case.28 There is no particular reason to believe that the employment gained as a result of the (hypothetically) greater labor intensiveness of renewables systematically would be greater than the employment lost because of the decline of other sectors combined with the adverse employment effect of the smaller economy in the aggregate. There is in addition the adverse employment effect of the explicit or implicit taxes that must be imposed to finance the expansion of renewable power.

#### Natty filling in for jobs now

Industrial Distribution, 9/24/12, “Rising US exports could help create 5 million jobs by 2020” <http://www.inddist.com/news/2012/09/rising-us-exports-could-help-create-5-million-jobs-2020>

BCG estimates that average manufacturing costs in 2015 will be 8 percent lower in the U.S. than in the U.K., 15 percent lower than in both Germany and France, 21 percent lower than in Japan, and 23 percent lower than in Italy. Average manufacturing costs in China will still be 7 percent lower than those of the U.S. in 2015. But those costs do not include transportation, duties, and other expenses. And it is less than half of the advantage that China enjoyed a decade ago.¶ As explained in a previous BCG report, when the many risks and hidden costs of managing extended global supply chains are taken into account, it will be just as economical to manufacture many products in the U.S. if those goods are sold in the U.S.¶ Labor and energy costs will be especially important sources of U.S. competitive advantage in manufacturing. Adjusted for differences in worker productivity, which is considerably higher in the U.S., average labor costs of the other large developed economies will be 20 to 45 percent higher than those of the U.S. Only a decade ago, the same U.S. worker cost only 12 percent less than the average factory worker in Europe.¶ Inexpensive natural gas will also boost U.S. competitiveness. For the foreseeable future, thanks to the recovery of vast U.S. underground gas deposits of shale, natural gas is likely to remain 50 to 70 percent cheaper in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan, BCG predicts. “That will translate into significantly lower costs for electricity generation, for fuel used to power industrial plants, and for feedstock used across many industrial processes,” said Justin Rose, a BCG principal and coauthor.

## 2NC

### Foucault K

#### Theory is action. Our critique of power is the first step in its reversal and in the initiation of new struggles for more equitable and free social circumstances. Reform merely increases asymmetrical distributions of power.

Deleuze and Foucault ’72 Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, “Intellectuals and Power,” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, recorded March 4, 1972, <http://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-power-a-conversation-between-michel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze>

DELEUZE: Precisely. A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician himself (who then ceases to be a theoretician), then the theory is worthless or the moment is inappropriate. We don't revise a theory, but construct new ones; we have no choice but to make others. It is strange that it was Proust, an author thought to be a pure intellectual, who said it so clearly: treat my book as a pair of glasses directed to the outside; if they don't suit you, find another pair; I leave it to you to find your own instrument, which is necessarily an investment for combat. A theory does not totalise; it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself. It is in the nature of power to totalise and it is your position, and one I fully agree with, that theory is by nature opposed to power. As soon as a theory is enmeshed in a particular point, we realise that it will never possess the slightest practical importance unless it can erupt in a totally different area. This is why the notion of reform is so stupid and hypocritical. Either reforms are designed by people who claim to be representative, who make a profession of speaking for others, and they lead to a division of power, to a distribution of this new power which is consequently increased by a double repression; or they arise from the complaints and demands of those concerned. This latter instance is no longer a reform but revolutionary action that questions (expressing the full force of its partiality) the totality of power and the hierarchy that maintains it. This is surely evident in prisons: the smallest and most insignificant of the prisoners' demands can puncture Pleven's pseudoreform (5). If the protests of children were heard in kindergarten, if their questions were attended to, it would be enough to explode the entire educational system. There is no denying that our social system is totally without tolerance; this accounts for its extreme fragility in all its aspects and also its need for a global form of repression. In my opinion, you were the first-in your books and in the practical sphere-to teach us something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others. We ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences of this "theoretical" conversion-to appreciate the theoretical fact that only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf. DELEUZE: Yes, and the reverse is equally true. Not only are prisoners treated like children, but children are treated like prisoners. Children are submitted to an infantilisation which is alien to them. On this basis, it is undeniable that schools resemble prisons and that factories are its closest approximation. Look at the entrance to a Renault plant, or anywhere else for that matter: three tickets to get into the washroom during the day. You found an eighteenth-century text by Jeremy Bentham proposing prison reforms; in the name of this exalted reform, he establishes a circular system where the renovated prison serves as a model and where the individual passes imperceptibly from school to the factory, from the factory to prison and vice versa. This is the essence of the reforming impulse, of reformed representation. On the contrary, when people begin to speak and act on their own behalf, they do not oppose their representation (even as its reversal) to another; they do not oppose a new representativity to the false representativity of power. For example, I remember your saying that there is no popular justice against justice; the reckoning takes place at another level. FOUCAULT: I think that it is not simply the idea of better and more equitable forms of justice that underlies the people's hatred of the judicial system, of judges, courts, and prisons, but-aside from this and before anything else-the singular perception that power is always exercised at the expense of the people. The anti-judicial struggle is a struggle against power and I don't think that it is a struggle against injustice, against the injustice of the judicial system, or a struggle for improving the efficiency of its institutions. It is particularly striking that in outbreaks of rioting and revolt or in seditious movements the judicial system has been as compelling a target as the financial structure, the army, and other forms of power. My hypothesis -but it is merely an hypothesis- is that popular courts, such as those found in the Revolution, were a means for the lower middle class, who were allied with the masses, to salvage and recapture the initiative in the struggle against the judicial system. To achieve this, they proposed a court system based on the possibility of equitable justice, where a judge might render a just verdict. The identifiable form of the court of law belongs to the bourgeois ideology of justice. DELEUZE: On the basis of our actual situation, power emphatically develops a total or global vision. That is, all the current forms of repression (the racist repression of immigrant workers, repression in the factories, in the educational system, and the general repression of youth) are easily totalised from the point of view of power. We should not only seek the unity of these forms in the reaction to May '68, but more appropriately, in the concerted preparation and organisation of the near future, French capitalism now relies on a "margin" of unemployment and has abandoned the liberal and paternal mask that promised full employment. In this perspective, we begin to see the unity of the forms of repression: restrictions on immigration, once it is acknowledged that the most difficult and thankless jobs go to immigrant workers-repression in the factories, because the French must reacquire the "taste" for increasingly harder work; the struggle against youth and the repression of the educational system, because police repression is more active when there is less need for young people in the work force. A wide range of professionals (teachers, psychiatrists, educators of all kinds, etc.) will be called upon to exercise functions that have traditionally belonged to the police. This is something you predicted long ago, and it was thought impossible at the time: the reinforcement of all the structures of confinement. Against this global policy of power, we initiate localised counter-responses, skirmishes, active and occasionally preventive defences. We have no need to totalise that which is invariably totalised on the side of power; if we were to move in this direction, it would mean restoring the representative forms of centralism and a hierarchical structure. We must set up lateral affiliations and an entire system of net- works and popular bases; and this is especially difficult. In any case, we no longer define reality as a continuation of politics in the traditional sense of competition and the distribution of power, through the so-called representative agencies of the Communist Party or the General Workers Union(6). Reality is what actually happens in factories, in schools, in barracks, in prisons, in police stations. And this action carries a type of information which is altogether different from that found in newspapers (this explains the kind of information carried by the Agence de Press Liberation (7).' FOUCAULT: Isn't this difficulty of finding adequate forms of struggle a result of the fact that we continue to ignore the problem of power? After all, we had to wait until the nineteenth century before we began to understand the nature of exploitation, and to this day, we have yet to fully comprehend the nature of power. It may be that Marx and Freud cannot satisfy our desire for understanding this enigmatic thing which we call power, which is at once visible and invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous. Theories of government and the traditional analyses of their mechanisms certainly don't exhaust the field where power is exercised and where it functions. The question of power re- mains a total enigma. Who exercises power? And in what sphere? We now know with reasonable certainty who exploits others, who receives the profits, which people are involved, and we know how these funds are reinvested. But as for power . . . We know that it is not in the hands of those who govern. But, of course, the idea of the "ruling class" has never received an adequate formulation, and neither have other terms, such as "to dominate ... .. to rule ... .. to govern," etc. These notions are far too fluid and require analysis. We should also investigate the limits imposed on the exercise of power-the relays through which it operates and the extent of its influence on the often insignificant aspects of the hierarchy and the forms of control, surveillance, prohibition, and constraint. Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised. No one, strictly speaking, has an official right to power; and yet it is always excited in a particular direction, with some people on one side and some on the other. It is often difficult to say who holds power in a precise sense, but it is easy to see who lacks power. If the reading of your books (from Nietzsche to what I anticipate in Capitalism and Schisophrenia (8) has been essential for me, it is because they seem to go very far in exploring this problem: under the ancient theme of meaning, of the signifier and the signified, etc., you have developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles. Each struggle develops around a particular source of power (any of the countless, tiny sources- a small-time boss, the manager of "H.L.M.,"' a prison warden, a judge, a union representative, the editor-in-chief of a newspaper). And if pointing out these sources-denouncing and speaking out-is to be a part of the struggle, it is not because they were previously unknown. Rather, it is because to speak on this subject, to force the institutionalised networks of information to listen, to produce names, to point the finger of accusation, to find targets, is the first step in the reversal of power and the initiation of new struggles against existing forms of power. If the discourse of inmates or prison doctors constitutes a form of struggle, it is because they confiscate, at least temporarily, the power to speak on prison conditions-at present, the exclusive property of prison administrators and their cronies in reform groups. The discourse of struggle is not opposed to the unconscious, but to the secretive. It may not seem like much; but what if it turned out to be more than we expected? A whole series of misunderstandings relates to things that are "bidden," "repressed," and "unsaid"; and they permit the cheap "psychoanalysis" of the proper objects of struggle. It is perhaps more difficult to unearth a secret than the unconscious. The two themes frequently encountered in the recent past, that "writing gives rise to repressed elements" and that "writing is necessarily a subversive activity," seem to betray a number of operations that deserve to be severely denounced. DELEUZE: With respect to the problem you posed: it is clear who exploits, who profits, and who governs, but power nevertheless remains something more diffuse. I would venture the following hypothesis: the thrust of Marxism was to define the problem essentially in terms of interests (power is held by a ruling class defined by its interests). The question immediately arises: how is it that people whose interests are not being served can strictly support the existing power structure by demanding a piece of the action? Perhaps, this is because in terms of investments, whether economic or unconscious, interest is not the final answer; there are investments of desire that function in a more profound and diffuse manner than our interests dictate. But of course, we never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it. We cannot shut out the scream of Reich: the masses were not deceived; at a particular time, they actually wanted a fascist regime! There are investments of desire that mould and distribute power, that make it the property of the policeman as much as of the prime minister; in this context, there is no qualitative difference between the power wielded by the policeman and the prime minister. The nature of these investments of desire in a social group explains why political parties or unions, which might have or should have revolutionary investments in the name of class interests, are so often reform oriented or absolutely reactionary on the level of desire.

#### Only critical engagement which places terms of spacial production is capable of achieving a responsible politics—the perm is maintenance for rigid concepts of identity and security

Dalby ‘5 Simon Dalby, Carleton University, Ottowa, “Political Space: Autonomy, Liberalism, and Empire,” Alternatives 30 (2005), 415-441, ebsco

Starting from the assumptions of stability and the fixity of political spaces in a world where they are so novel suggests great conceptual confusion, or at least considerable ethnocentrism and "presentism," in the so-called social sciences. It forces reflection on the social role of such discourses as statements of political aspiration quite as much as analysis of how things actually are. Legitimation practices premised on an unreflective cartography of at least relatively autonomous spaces offer an extension of the geopolitics of liberalism, of local autonomy as the mode of administration of a political economy that exceeds those spaces repeatedly. Then again, might we social scientists not simply understand ourselves as Wilsonian liberals dedicated to the triumph of modern affluence administered within autonomous territorial, albeit it not obviously "national" spaces? Ironically the events of the last few years, and in particular the actions of the Bush administration since September 11, 2001, make all this much easier to see. In a world of supposedly sovereign states with formal political equality, the conditions of the global covenant, at least the US state under the Bush administration has no problem arrogating to itself the right to intervene when and where it sees fit to preempt any threats to its preeminence. The nonintervention clauses of the UN Charter are notably fraying, but still the return of the Bush administration to the United Nations, in the months after its invasion in March 2003, to ask for help in pacifying Iraq suggests that even the prerogatives of empire do not allow that state to evade its political obligations to claim legitimacy on the basis of more than brute force. In this sense, there remains a global "political space," albeit one that seems to have an impossible Newtonian cartography. The converse of this argument is that political struggles that oppose the cavalier use of military force to ensure the flows of resources from the periphery to fuel, literally in this case, the economies of the metropole, are also implicated in a politics that transcends claims to sovereignty. Precisely the invocation of the rights to nonintervention on the part of activists in many places rely on a nonterritorial strategies of publicity, internet "sites," and coordinated protests in many places, to invoke the "rights" to territorial nonintervention. This is not to disparage the undoubted uses of territorial strategies in defence of many things; but it is to make clear that this is what is going on. It is also to insist on the utility of raising explicitly the questions of who precisely writes cosmopolitan texts with many of the assumptions of the "right" of mobility, travel, and transit anywhere on the planet.^^ In addition, the argument that the current occupation of Iraq is about a war for the US way of life, and gas-guzzling SUVs in particular, makes it clear that this violence is a form of "shadow globalization" cast over the peripheries of the world economy.^^ Progressive politics cannot now be about the extension of these fossil-fueled urban liberties. It can be about solidarities, which do not have an implicit spatiality to them, although these sometimes also use spatial metaphors to express "horizontal" linkages. Above all else, this engagement with the political-space debate reinforces the argument that the cartographies of modern administrative spaces are no longer an adequate basis on which to build either social sciences or some form of progressive politics. To think differently is to try to think about politics as connection, as link, as network. As Walker has repeatedly pointed out, this is immensely difficult to do given the constraints of the spatial languages that we have inherited from modern thinkers.^^ Obligations across boundaries and the possibilities of politics not constrained to geographical invocations of a we that does politics are the questions for the moment. These questions are not well served by unreflective languages of political "space" or geographical "scale" with assumptions of autonomy as their ontological starting point. Politics is a lot more complicated. The inclusion of so much of the world directly into the circuits of the global economy has made the necessity of thinking much more carefully about the spatial metaphors of politics unavoidable.

### Warming Adv

#### We’re locked in to cross key thresholds

Alleyne ‘9 Richard Alleyne, Telegraph science correspondent, “World Unlikely to Stop Global Warming Reaching Critical Levels,” The Telegraph (UK), 29 March 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/5244246/World-unlikely-to-stop-global-warming-reaching-critical-levels.html

Two studies on climate change have concluded that rises in global temperatures are unlikely to remain below a critical threshold deemed by the world's governments to be safe. Policy-makers have adopted a goal of keeping the average global rise in surface temperatures to no more than 3.6F (2C) above pre-industrial revolution levels. This will mean stabilising CO2 emissions immediately and then substantially after 2015 to avoid the kind of levels in the atmosphere which will accelerate global warming. But two studies from Oxford University and Potsdam Institute for Climate Impacts Research, published in Nature, claim that current levels of carbon emission – actually increasing at three per cent a year – will mean the temperature rise will be exceeded. There is now only a 50 per cent chance of avoiding it even if drastic measures are taken. Rises above 3.6F (2C) are expected to lead to deforestation, flooding and droughts across the world. Dr Vicky Pope, Head of Climate Change Advice at the Met Office, said: "Even with drastic cuts in emissions in the next 10 years, our results project that there will only be around a 50 per cent chance of keeping global temperatures rises below 3.6F (2 C). "This idealised emissions scenario is based on emissions peaking in 2015 and quickly changing from an increase of 2–3 per cent per year to a decrease of 3 per cent per year. For every 10 years we delay action another 0.9F (0.5C) will be added to the most likely temperature rise." Meanwhile a separate study by the UK Energy Research Centre found meeting the target to cut greenhouse emissions by 80 per cent by 2050 will cost around £17 billion a year, or around £700 on the average electricity bill by 2050.

#### No resource wars—empirics

Salehyan ‘7 Idean Salehyan, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change,” Foreign Policy, 8/14/2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/08/13/the\_new\_myth\_about\_climate\_change

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

### Topicality

#### Here are a bunch of affs that would have been topical had the resolution said “tax incentives” but are not

Sawin et al. ‘4 Janet L. Sawin, Worldwatch Institute Project Director: Christopher Flavin, Worldwatch Institute In cooperation with Akanksha Chaurey, Y.D. Babu, and Amit Kumar of The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI), New Delhi, India Thomas Stenvoll and Miquel Muñoz, Research Assistants Editing: Secretariat of the International Conference for Renewable Energies, Bonn 2004, National Policy Instruments Policy Lessons for the Advancement & Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technologies Around the World, <http://wofuco.inet.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Miguel/Sawin__2004__National_policy_instruments.pdf>, Cited by Malgor [exception dancer] in his wording paper “RE Incentives wording paper”

Other tax related incentives can help promote renewable energy development by reducing the costs of investment, or by accounting for the external benefits of renewable energy. The latter include eco- or carbon-tax exemptions. The former include accelerated depreciation, relief from taxes on sales and property, valueadded tax (VAT) exemptions, and reduction or elimination of import duties on renewable energy technologies or components. It is important to note that import duties increase the upfront costs of renewable energy projects, and should be significantly reduced if not eliminated, at least until a strong domestic manufacturing industry can be established.

#### Financial incentives for production are distinct from investment support

O’Brien ‘8 Mike O’Brien, minister of state, Department for Energy and Climate Change in Parliament, “Clause 20 — Terms and conditions,” 11/18/2008, http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debate/?id=2008-11-18b.159.3

I have quite a lot still to say, so I shall try to give as full a reply, and as brief, as possible. Amendment (b) to Lords amendment No. 42 suggests we replace the term "financial incentives" in proposed new subsection (2)(a) with "payment". The use of the term "financial incentives" clarifies that the general purpose of the scheme is to incentivise low-carbon electricity generation through financial incentives, as opposed to other means such as a regulatory obligation or barrier-busting support, such as help with the planning system. We believe that such clarity is helpful in setting out beyond any doubt the primary purpose of the scheme. However, to give additional reassurances about our intentions, I would point to the powers under proposed new subsection (3) that specifies the term "payment" in all the key provisions that will establish the scheme. In others words, it is explicit that we are dealing with payments to small-scale generators. What is proposed will be a real feed-in tariff scheme.

#### They could get away with never increasing production

Camm et al ‘8 Frank Camm, James T. Bartis, Charles J. Bushman, “Federal Financial Incentives to Induce Early Experience Producing Unconventional Liquid Fuels,” RAND Corporation, prepared for the United States Air Force and the National Energy Technology Laboratory of the United States Department of Energy, 2008, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical\_reports/TR586.html

Production Incentives When a specific investor’s discount rate exceeds the government’s, investment incentives are more cost-effective than are production incentives. As the cash-flow analysis demonstrates, at project start-up, it costs the government substantially less to reduce a project’s real after-tax private IRR by one point with an investment incentive than with a production incentive. But after investment is complete, investment incentives are no longer available. In some projects, a production incentive can help the government ensure that, after investment costs are sunk, an investor still has an incentive to operate the plant it has built. This is the primary role any production incentive is likely to play in an incentive package that promotes private production of unconventional fuels. In a secondary role, an incentive could also be designed to induce more production each year to accelerate the learning process. The government’s goals should dictate which form of production incentive to use. Like investment incentives, production incentives come in many varieties—e.g., lump sum versus cost sharing, direct subsidy versus tax subsidy.6 Their relative costs and benefits mirror those of investment incentives. As noted, production incentives are most likely to be useful if a plant does not generate taxable net income without government support. As a result, the same concerns raised about the value of tax subsidies to an investor without taxable income arise here. One new wrinkle here is the choice between production incentives rewarding years of production and those rewarding production during any year. The distinction can be important if the incentive package does not effectively dictate, through purchasing and pricing agreements, how much the investor will produce in a year.

#### You make changing social norms topical

Lifshitz-Goldberg ’10 Yael Lifshitz-Goldberg, LL.B, Magna cum Laude, Joint Degree Program in Law and Education., Hebrew University Jerusalem, “ARTICLE: Gone with the Wind? The Potential Tragedy of the Common Wind,” 28 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol'y 435, 2010, lexis

n87 Wilson, supra note 16, at 1779. In addition to the direct financial incentives, these support programs could also contribute to the expanding of wind energy production by creating social norms, which effectively influence the private sector. See Victor B. Flatt, Act Locally, Affect Globally: How Changing Social Norms to Influence the Private Sector Shows a Path to Using Local Government to Control Environmental Harms, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 455, 457 (2008).

## 1NR

### Elections DA

#### Probability and magnitude—invasion escalates—multiple senior military and intel officials in the US and Israel say Iran has powerful proxy networks that cause wider conflagrations. Middle East power dynamics are shifting rapidly which risks great power intervention

Williams, Professor –Social Sciences - Indian Institute of Technology, 10 (Peril Awaits at the Strait of Hormuz, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-religion/2557996/posts>)

The Gulf-Southwest Asia region has always been a **hyper-**flash point of **global** conflict due to the dual strategic persistence of the Arab-Israel conflict and the geo-strategic and geo-economic rivalries over oil and its supplies across the critical sea gates of Straits of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandab straits. This has resulted in the near permanent forward basing of US and allied naval and air forces in the region with dedicated theater commands along with naval air assets with prepositioned amphibious and expeditionary capabilities. In recent years, the stakes of heightened conflict has increased by vast proportions by the intertwining of the conflicts in Iraq, the nuclear and missile proliferation in Iran and the domino effect that has followed by the Arab states. Iran holds the position of a pivotal state in the Gulf Region and has been energized in its quest to seek a great power status leveraging its Shiite ideology over the vast numbers of the Sunni dominated Southwest Asian region. Iran also has a civilization complex of being the Persian civilization and its affirmed superiority over the Arabs in its geo-historical contexts. Controlling the Straits of Hormuz and the sea gates in the region that has the densest energy-laden shipping and leveraging its enormous oil and natural gas assets into a regional geo-economic and geo-strategic grand strategy matrix has been Iran’s ambitions. Contending Iran in its aggressive quest of power expansion in its geo-strategic and religious ideology has been the US-western allied Arab states and the lone free democratic state of Israel. Geo-strategic importance of the Strait: The maritime archipelagic framework of the Gulf-Southwest Asian region is characterized by the Persian Gulf (also known as “Gulf” avoiding the contending Persian and Arab nomenclature claims), Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman constituting a primary jugular of the sea way of the region. The topography of the Strait is complex with the narrowest point the Strait being 21 miles wide. The shipping lanes consist of two-mile wide channels for inbound and outbound tanker traffic, as well as a two-mile wide buffer zone. Iran’s access to the Strait and the pivotal role as a littoral state to control shipping movements with the capability to jeopardize international shipping has been a critical sinew of strength. In terms of its power profile, Iran could marshal its economic, military and demographic power to overwhelm the fragile states of the Arabian Peninsula that includes the regional giant Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. The geo-strategic significance of the Strait of Hormuz would continue to increase in its criticality owing to Iranian motivations-capabilities of blocking oil shipping in the event of punitive actions against Tehran through very robust asymmetric naval capabilities of the Iranian navy and the sea-based elements of the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council). Adding to these capabilities, would be Iranian ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear or other WMD payloads that constitutes the critical gravity of threat in the region to the regional states, international shipping and for powers like China and India which have very critical hydrocarbon stakes in the region. The Iranian move to close the strait would have a very steep impact of jeopardizing the oil trade 6 External powers like France and India have increased considerable offshore access and basing presence in the region with naval support facilities for France in the United Arab Emirates where French naval special operation forces have access facilities along with forward deployment of French warships. Similarly, India has access and naval support facilities in Qatar. The Indian commitment includes a substantive naval security guarantee that would secure the offshore assets of Qatar and provides for the joint venture in production of weapons and military equipment. The maritime cooperation agreement provides India with a strategic naval base in the Gulf region. The India-Qatar maritime security initiative provides India and Qatar with a convergence of Indian naval power with Qatari naval forces to combat the variety of maritime asymmetric threats of terrorism, piracy and securing the offshore oil installations. It thus brings India into the Gulf Region with a secure access agreement. Four, the role of the Israeli Navy in the region adds to the interesting complexity and power balance in the naval theatre. Even as the Iranian clandestine nuclear weapons program races ahead, with the possible targeting of Iranian nuclear-industrial estate being contemplated by the US and allied western powers, Israel has an autonomous naval role in the region with several of its Saar-V class warships outfitted with Delilah standoff missiles with high powered microwave warheads and its German Dolphin class submarines armed with its Popeye Cruise missiles (of ranges 1500km) with a nuclear payload of 200kg have been in frequent deployment in the Gulf Region. This deployment brings to fore the increasing critical importance of nuclear tipped land attack cruise missiles in preemptive strikes against hardened Iranian targets in a prospective joint US-led strike against Iranian nuclear installations. Five, In an event of a conflagration in the Strait of Hormuz, there are increasing possibilities of an Iranian asymmetric move to use chemical or even radiation tipped warheads that could completely wreck civilian shipping with enormous primary and collateral loss and the crippling of shipping leading to an intense bottleneck preventing the entry of US-lead western allied intervention forces. The possibilities of such scenarios serve as important operational options for an Iranian leadership that is determined to stall a US-led preemptive strike. These naval operational realities cloud and condition the naval theatre of the Strait of Hormuz that is increasingly vulnerable and prone to assertive asymmetric strikes / counter strikes by Iran. Sources of Iranian Conduct and Responses: Iran’s template of operational conduct and responses is influenced by several political, economic, religious-ideological, regional rivalry and military factors. Iran is being painted as an irrational actor with an overdose obsession on brinkmanship. While the radical religious clerical leadership and the vanguard of the revolution viz: IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guards Council) would like to ratchet and escalate the conflicts in the region by the attempt of a WMD strike in the Strait of Hormuz and even daring targeting Israel, the Iranians in their strategic calculus have always been calculated in their responses. The penchant of an Iranian overdrive by an asymmetric operational strategy either by missile strikes or by naval disruptions could be either as an initiative to subdue the militarily weaker but the oil-rich Sunni Gulf Arab states and Saudi Arabia or as an attempt to deflect US-Israeli targeting by inciting the Hezbollah-Hamas terrorist brigades which are in effect the auxiliary units of the IRGC. A second source of Iranian strategic conduct emerges from its maritime aspirations to control the Gulf and Caspian Sea. With both seas being critically important as oil and natural gas rich repositories, Iran would prefer to maintain sea-control and sea-denial capabilities employing an asymmetric operational approach of sea-based strike missiles, submarines and aggressive naval posturing that could dent the effectiveness of any naval interventionist force. The third possible source of Iranian asymmetric conduct could come from its keen interest in developing EMP weapons (Electromagnetic Pulse) that could have perilous consequences both for onshore and offshore assets. In the last eight years, Iran has tested its missiles over the Caspian Sea with a potential EMP effect. With such serious intent, an Iranian attempt either to launch a Shahab-3 missile with an EMP payload off the US coasts from an innocent looking freighter or even using the same in the approaches of the Strait of Hormuz off the Arabian Sea coast could simply paralyze all interventionist forces. Iranian responses to an offensive strike could include the intense barrage of sea-skimming supersonic anti-ship missiles. The Iranian arsenal includes anti-ship missiles like the C-802 and Kowsar (the Chinese Silkworms and the Russian Sunburns) The C-802 anti-ship missiles are missiles that originate from China. Kowsar anti-ship missiles are basically land-based anti-ship missiles (land-to-sea missiles) which can dodge electronic jamming systems. Deploying an aggressive package of supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and the employ of EMP weapons could be a deadly cocktail that would complicate intervention and set the stage for more escalation of strikes against Iran and counter strikes that would cripple the maritime oil commerce skyrocketing the oil price over US $300 per barrel or even more dealing with a decimation to the global economy.

#### Election is key to solving global warming - extinction

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In approximately eight weeks, Americans will go to the polls to vote for their next president. The outcome will not only affect the American people, but everyone on the planet. Last year, the International Energy Agency (IEA)[warned](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change) that global warming will hit the point of no return in five years time. That means we have less than four years to solve this imminent crisis which threatens all life on earth. And, as the U.S. is the world's largest superpower, it's role is critical. In the [words](http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/climate-of-denial-20110622) of former U.S. Vice President Al Gore: "The United States is the only nation that can rally a global effort to save our future. And the president is the only person who can rally the United States." In other words, the fate of our planet largely depends on who wins this year's election. This summer, Americans got a bitter taste of what global warming looks like. Terrifying wildfires, biblical downpours and punishing heat waves all swept across the nation whilst the worst drought in half a century raised the specter of yet another food crisis. And, although such changes may seem apocalyptic, they were brought about by a mere 0.8 degree Celsius temperature rise. By the end of this century however, unless we radically rein in our global carbon emissions, the IEA says that the world may warm by [6](http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/april/name,26949,en.html) degrees Celsius. The fate of our planet quite literally hangs in the balance. That's why Republican nominee Mitt Romney simply will not do. At the recent GOP convention in Florida he [mocked](http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmcquaid/2012/08/31/romneys-rising-oceans-joke/) the incumbent's environmental concerns: "President Obama promised to begin to slow the rise of the oceans and to heal the planet." He then paused to allow the audience to laugh at the absurdity. In the [words of climate scientist Michael Mann](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/10/mitt-romney-climate-change-meet-the-press_n_1870727.html), someone who has "such a wanton disregard for the health of our environment" is not worthy of the White House. And what's worse, Romney recognized man's contribution to climate change just 12 months ago. In fact, he supported clean energy during his tenure as Governor of Massachusetts, but he has since backtracked on that position in order to garner support both from the oil industry and the more conservative members of this party -- many of whom regard climate change to be a hoax. Romney now [chides](http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/republicans-bite-back-obama-knocks-romney-dog-car-202040859.html) Obama's support for renewable energy: "You can't drive a car with a windmill on it." He says that green energy is a waste of money in a struggling economy, and if he gets into the White House this November, he will roll back [tax](http://getenergysmartnow.com/2012/09/03/obama-biden-campaign-awakening-to-climate-change-as-political-issue/) breaks enjoyed by this sector. But, according to the Center for American Progress Action Fund, the wind industry has grown over[35 percent](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/09/05/797921/the-romney-ryan-ticket-ceding-the-clean-energy-future/) per annum over the last five years. It now provides thousands of decent jobs, and [powers](http://www.ecomagination.com/us-wind-power-hits-historic-milestone) over 10 million homes in the U.S. That's why profit seeking banks like Goldman Sachs and Citigroup are all plowing their money into the sector. Romney may tout his business credentials, but he's turning his back on this lucrative sector and putting thousands of jobs at risk. Why? It seems that the Republican nominee may be in bed with the fossil fuel industry. According to the Center for Responsive Politics which tracks political donations, the [oil lobby has already given his campaign](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a10000b8-f50e-11e1-b120-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25TMRXhJu) over $8 million compared to a mere $1 million to the Democrats. And, even though the top five oil companies [earned](http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/09/05/797921/the-romney-ryan-ticket-ceding-the-clean-energy-future/) over $350 million a day in the first half of this year, Romney plans on maintaining their subsidies which [top](http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2011/0309/Budget-hawks-Does-US-need-to-give-gas-and-oil-companies-41-billion-a-year/(page)/2) over $40 billion per annum, whilst offering them further tax breaks. Moreover, his energy plan endorses further drilling both on U.S. soil and along the Atlantic coastline. If Romney wins this year's presidential race, any flicker of hope for pulling the world back from the brink of irreversible global warming will have clearly been lost. His Republican platform mentions "climate change" but once. Although many Americans feel let down by some of the promises that President Obama made when he rode into power four years ago, many of the changes that he put into place at the height of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression are taking time to come into place. In the [words](http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2012/09/05/Clinton-It-Was-Bush) of former U.S. President Bill Clinton: "No president -- not me or any of my predecessors -- could have repaired all the damage in just four years. But conditions are improving and if you'll renew the president's contract you will feel it." Moreover, recognizing that "climate change is one of the biggest threats of this generation," Obama has made clean energy a priority. It has already doubled under his stewardship, and he [plans](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/07/remarks-president-democratic-national-convention) on making at least 80 percent of the nation's electricity come from renewable energy by 2035: In the last year alone, we cut oil imports by one million barrels a day. And today, the United States of America is less dependent on foreign oil than at any time in nearly two decades. I will not let oil companies write this country's energy plan, or endanger our coastlines. According to recent polls, the two candidates are running neck in neck. That means that your vote this November is important. To [quote Obama](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/us/politics/president-obamas-prepared-remarks-from-the-democratic-national-convention.html?pagewanted=all): "More droughts, floods and wildfires are a threat to our children's future. And in this election, you can do something about it... When you pick up that ballot to vote -- you will face the clearest choice of any time in a generation." It's not just a battle for the soul of America. In the words of Al Gore: "What hangs in the balance is the future of civilization as we know it." And, in eight weeks time, you can do something about it.

#### Romney win rolls back EPA CO2 regs

Star Ledger, 12(6/3, <http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2012/06/scary_times_for_environment_--.html>)

The grim report on jobs Friday greatly improves the odds that Republicans will win in November, putting Mitt Romney in the White House and bolstering GOP positions in the House and Senate. If that happens, they promise to roll back the progress made under President Obama and Environmental Protection Agency administrator Lisa Jackson. Romney wants to strip the EPA of its power to regulate carbon emissions. Jackson relied on that power to enact rules that will double automobile efficiency standards by 2025 and toughen truck standards, too. Transportation is the largest single source of air pollution. So cutting emissions in half will make a profound change, especially in a car-centric state such as New Jersey. It also will reduce oil imports sharply, lessening our dangerous dependence on unstable regimes in the Mideast. Jackson’s tough limits on coal-fired power plants rely partly on carbon controls, as well. So those gains would be endangered. Again, the air in New Jersey will get dirtier. Because, while our own coal plants have exotic pollution control equipment, those to the west and south do not. Many lack even the most basic filters, known as scrubbers, and rely only on tall smoke stacks to push the toxins higher into the atmosphere.

#### EPA protections solve warming

Eilperin 9, Juliet, Washington Post Staff Writer, “EPA Presses Obama to regulate warming under Clean Air Act,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/23/AR2009032301068.html

"This is historic news," said Frank O'Donnell, who heads the environmental watchdog group Clean Air Watch. "It will set the stage for the first-ever national limits on global-warming pollution. And it is likely to help light a fire under Congress to get moving." But William L. Kovacs, vice president of environment, technology and regulatory affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said an effort to regulate greenhouse gases based on the EPA's scientific finding "will be devastating to the economy." "By moving forward with the endangerment finding on greenhouse gases, EPA is putting in motion a set of decisions that may have far-reaching unintended consequences," he said. "Specifically, once the finding is made, no matter how limited, some environmental groups will sue to make sure it is applied to all aspects of the Clean Air Act." The White House emphasized that the administration is simply fulfilling its legal obligations and will still press for a legislative solution to the question of curbing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. "The president has made clear that to combat climate change, his strong preference is for Congress to pass energy security legislation that includes a cap on greenhouse gas emissions," said White House spokesman Ben LaBolt. "The Supreme Court ruled that the EPA must review whether greenhouse gas emissions pose a threat to public health or welfare, and this is simply the next step in what will be a long process that engages stakeholders and the public." OMB spokesman Kenneth Baer did not give a specific timeline for when the White House will decide on how to proceed. Johnson's action came in rejection of his scientific and technical staff's recommendation. In December 2007, the EPA staff wrote the White House to urge that the agency be allowed to make the finding that global warming threatens human health and welfare, but senior White House officials rejected that proposal on the grounds that the Clean Air Act was not the best way to deal with climate-change issues. Since then, however, federal officials have provided additional rationales for such a finding. Last month, Howard Frumkin, who directs the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Environmental Health, testified before a Senate committee that the CDC "considers climate change a serious public health concern" that could accelerate illnesses and deaths stemming from heat waves, air pollution, and food- and water-borne illnesses. But even those who support cutting greenhouse gases warn that doing so under the Clean Air Act could be complicated. "This would be a regulatory maze far exceeding anything we've seen before," said David Schoenbrod, a professor of environmental law at the New York Law School. While the EPA's finding is not final, experts steeped in the Clean Air Act began debating yesterday what it would mean for utilities, vehicles, manufacturing plants and consumers. Kovacs predicted it could halt many of the projects funded under the just-passed economic recovery package. "This will mean that all infrastructure projects, including those under the president's stimulus initiative, will be subject to environmental review for greenhouse gases," he said. EPA spokeswoman Adora Andy said in a statement that if the administration goes ahead with the proposal, it will be subject to public hearings and comment before becoming final, adding that it "does not propose any requirements on any sources of greenhouse-gas emissions" and "does not impose any new regulatory burdens on any projects, let alone those funded" under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Daniel J. Weiss, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, a liberal think tank, said the EPA's proposal would allow the administration to tackle climate change if Congress does not limit carbon emissions through legislation. He added that even if the EPA were forced to regulate greenhouse gases, it would target emissions from coal-fired power plants and then vehicles -- which combined account for about half of the nation's global-warming pollution -- before requiring smaller operations to apply for new emissions permits. "The way I see it, it's, in case of legislative gridlock, break open the Clean Air Act," Weiss said. "It's a backup option, not ideal, but it's a way to make progress on emissions reductions."

#### Obama winning: polling shows he’s recaptured momentum but it’s tight

Silver 10/13 (Nate Arizona and the Spanish-speaking vote <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/oct-13-arizona-and-the-spanish-speaking-vote/?gwh=0C04074C2EC5412F01BC51FBCBF9FE57>)

President Obama halted an 8-day winning streak for Mitt Romney in the FiveThirtyEight forecast on Saturday, with his chances of winning the Electoral College ticking up to 62.9 percent from 61.1 percent on Friday.¶ One should be careful about making too much of this: Mr. Romney has made very strong gains in the forecast over the past week-and-a-half to draw the race nearly even. It is unlikely that there will be a major change in the landscape until Tuesday’s debate in New York.¶ However, the polls have shifted so much toward Mr. Romney in recent days that a mediocre day of polling for Mr. Obama may look good to the model in comparison to a very poor one, as he had on Friday.¶ Three of the four national tracking polls on Saturday, from Gallup, Rasmussen Reports, and Investors’ Business Daily, showed no change in their results among likely voters, although Mr. Obama gained one point in the version of the Gallup poll among registered voters. Mr. Obama did improve his margin by roughly one point in the online poll published by the RAND Corporation.¶ In general, the tracking polls have been slightly more favorable to Mr. Obama than other national surveys since the debate. The RAND Corporation poll has him leading by roughly 3 points, while the Investors’ Business Daily has him up by less than a full percentage point.

#### Framing issue at the top of the link of the link debate – all of their link turns about voter enthusiasm are talking about the wind production tax credit – they are NOT the wind PTC – the Plan takes away a critical wedge issue for Obama in Colorado because it’s a question of competing strategies for doing wind – regulatory change like the plan means he can’t draw distinctions with Romney

Talev & McCormick 8/9 (Margaret and John, Bloomberg News, "Obama Hits Romney on Wind Credit Stance in Colorado," 2012, [www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-09/obama-tells-coloradans-romney-wind-credit-stance-would-cost-jobs.html],)

President Barack Obama attacked Republican challenger Mitt Romney for opposing the extension of a tax credit for wind energy, telling a Colorado audience that letting it lapse would cost their state thousands of jobs. On the second day of a trip through the swing state he won four years ago, Obama returned to criticism of Romney’s tax and economic proposals. He repeated his accusation that Romney’s policies would favor the wealthy over middle-income Americans and big oil companies over alternative energy. “At a moment when home-grown energy, renewable energy, is creating new jobs in Colorado and Iowa, my opponent wants to end tax credits for wind energy producers,” Obama told supporters in Pueblo today. Romney was raising money in New York and New Jersey before flying to Boston. He told donors at one of two Manhattan fundraisers that Obama’s re-election in November would mean a future of “continued decline” for the U.S. Obama said his support for extending the wind power tax credit is part of his administration’s plan to put the country on sounder economic footing. The credit is set to expire at the end of the year. Romney’s campaign has said he would let the credit lapse. Congress probably won’t act until after the November election. Romney Approach A Romney campaign spokeswoman said that while the former Massachusetts governor is “a strong supporter of wind power” he disagrees with Obama’s approach. “Under President Obama’s approach of massive subsidies and handouts, the industry has lost 10,000 jobs while growth in wind power has slowed every single year of his term,” Amanda Henneberg said in an e-mail. Romney would boost the industry “by promoting policies that remove regulatory barriers, support free enterprise and market-based competition, and reward technological innovation.” Colorado got 6.6 percent of its power from wind in 2010, eighth highest in the U.S. and the industry supports 5,000 to 6,000 jobs in the state, according to the American Wind Energy Association. Iowa, another swing state where Obama will campaign next week, has the second-highest wind power capacity. There are about 75,000 U.S. wind-industry workers, including jobs in manufacturing, according to the association. Letting the credit expire will lead to the elimination of 10,000 wind-industry jobs this year and another 27,000 in 2013, the Washington-based trade group estimates. ‘Roaring Back’ Obama highlighted his administration’s bailout of the U.S. automakers General Motors Co. (GM) and Chrysler Group LLC, saying it brought the industry “roaring back.” “I want to do the same with manufacturing jobs,” he said, adding that Romney would have let the auto industry go bankrupt while subsidizing “an oil industry that’s already making a lot of profits.” Obama wraps up the trip with a stop later today in Colorado Springs, a majority-Republican area where the president will try to rally Democrats and appeal to independent voters. Romney, speaking to donors in Manhattan this morning, said the election’s outcome could set the course of American history for “perhaps for the entire century.” He compared the U.S. economic situation with that of Japan in the 1990s. “We are not Japan,” he said. “We are not going to be a nation that suffers in decline and stress for a decade.” The presumptive Republican presidential nominee raised about $1.5 million at a breakfast today at a Midtown banquet hall. That was part of about $5 million he raised yesterday and today in New Jersey and New York, according to Spencer Zwick, Romney’s finance director.

#### MLPs are a locus of tax loopholes—plan gets spun as creating new loopholes

Miller 12 DON MILLER, Contributing Writer, Money Morning JUNE 22, 2012

http://moneymorning.com/2012/06/22/investing-in-master-limited-partnerships-earn-higher-returns-and-beat-the-irs/

All you need to do is make one simple move. It's achieved by investing in master limited partnerships, or MLPs for short.¶ Due to an obscure law passed during the Reagan era, companies that service the oil and energy sector are allowed to funnel profits directly to their investors.¶ And because of a unique tax loophole, investors who hold MLPs for the long term can completely avoid paying taxes on 80%-90% of all of their earnings.¶ For MLP investors, those returns can be substantial.

#### The public hates loopholes

Levin 12 Carl Levin [US Senator] “Cut Tax Loopholes to Reduce the Deficit” 02-10-2012 http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/in\_the\_news/article/cut-tax-loopholes-to-reduce-the-deficit

¶ It is clear to almost everyone that revenue must be a part of our deficit reduction strategy. Presidents from Reagan to the elder President Bush to Clinton have used balanced strategies that included revenue as well as spending cuts to reduce deficits.¶ ¶ I will continue to fight for a number of other revenue measures, such as a surtax on millionaires and billionaires; eliminating tax subsidies for oil and gas companies; ending the Bush-era tax cuts for those earning more than $250,000; and ending the carried interest loophole. We need to make those changes. But so far, they have run into an ideological brick wall, as too many in Congress refuse to consider reasonable revenue measures. But even that rigid ideological stance should allow for ending the kinds of egregious loopholes our bill would combat.¶ ¶ First is offshore tax haven abuse. The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which I chair, has spent years shedding light on how these abuses aid the wealthy and corporations.¶ ¶ Our bill would give the Treasury Department authority to combat tax haven banks and jurisdictions that help U.S. clients hide assets and dodge U.S. taxes; crack down on offshore corporations that are managed from the United States from claiming foreign status to dodge taxes; eliminate tax incentives for moving U.S. jobs overseas or for transferring intellectual property offshore; and establish the presumption that, unless a taxpayer proves otherwise, a corporation formed by, receiving assets from or benefitting a U.S. taxpayer is considered under that taxpayer’s control for tax purposes.¶ ¶ These provisions and others would reduce deficit by at least $130 billion over 10 years.¶ ¶ Our bill’s second focus is on a tax loophole that subsidizes corporations giving stock options to corporate executives. Today, corporations can take massive tax deductions for stock options, but usually show a much lower expense on their books. Our subcommittee found that from 2005-2009, this loophole allowed excess tax deductions ranging from $12 billion to as high as $61 billion in a single year.¶ ¶ The CUT Loopholes Act would prevent corporate income tax deductions for stock options that exceed the expense shown on company books. It would preserve current tax treatment for individuals receiving options and for incentive stock options used by start-up companies.¶ ¶ According to Joint Committee on Taxation, these measures would reduce the deficit by $25 billion over 10 years.¶ ¶ The time for these measures is now. Here’s why.¶ ¶ First, the math is inescapable. We can’t reduce the deficit and do other important things – protect our country, care for our seniors, educate our young – if tax revenue remains at its lowest level in decades, and if the effective corporate tax rate is at historic lows, thanks in part to these and other tax loopholes.¶ ¶ Second, there is a growing recognition among Americans that loopholes like these and many, many others leave the deck stacked against them and their families. Overwhelmingly, Americans tell us: Close those loopholes down. Public opinion polls show strong support for closing tax loopholes, support that crosses partisan and ideological lines.¶

#### And, having specific loopholes Obama has proposed makes Romney’s case easier and removes a line of attack

Cohn 10-8 Jonathan [even more qualified than Nate] Cohn October 8, 20122 “This is How Obama Should Confront Romney Over His Tax Policy Evasions” TNR <http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/108237/how-to-confront-romney-tax-evasions-obama-debate>

Simon Rosenberg of the New Democrat Network has noticed something interesting. He went through Mitt Romney’s campaign website to see what tax loopholes Romney plans to close. He couldn't find references to a single one—not on the issue page that summarizes his plan for tax reform and not on the more detailed fifteen-page summary available via hyperlink. ¶ The omission tells us a lot. As you probably know by now, Romney has proposed a tax cut that would cost about $5 trillion in lost revenue. Romney says he’ll offset the cut by closing loopholes, in a way that would neither increase the deficit nor raise taxes on the middle class. But he won't specify which loopholes, perhaps because, according to multiple independent analyses, the math couldn't plausibly work as he says it would. ¶ You may have heard that changed last week, because of an interview that Romney gave to a Colorado television station. That's incorrect.¶ During that interview, according to the Wall Street Journal, Romney suggested he might try imposing a cap on itemized deductions. But that wouldn't change the math: The three promises would remain incompatible with one another. Besides, according to the Journal account (the only one I can find), Romney wouldn't even commit to that idea. He said simply that it was one example of what he might do. That doesn't really tell us anything.¶ The question isn't what Romney could do. It's what he would do.¶ Pinning Romney down on this, alas, has been difficult. Obama tried during Wednesday’s debate. But he did so in long-winded, complicated way that I imagine very few viewers understood. Afterwards, I suggested Obama should have put the question directly to Gov. Romney, in clearer and more succinct terms:¶ OK, governor, you say you can offset the $5 trillion cost of your tax plan. Tell us how, with real numbers. Are you getting rid of the home mortgage deduction? The exclusion for health insurance? Be straight with the American people about what you are proposing.¶ ¶ Or maybe even that's too complicated. Maybe what Obama needs is a simple, instantly recognizable phrase. Like this one.¶ Show me the money, governor. Show me the money.

#### Obama up: polling

Rasmussen 10/8 (Election 2012; Colorado president <http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/elections/election_2012/election_2012_presidential_election/colorado/election_2012_colorado_president>)

The Colorado presidential race remains neck-and-neck as President Obama moves slightly ahead of Mitt Romney for the first time this year.¶ The latest Rasmussen Reports telephone survey of Likely Colorado Voters shows the president with 49% of the vote to Romney’s 48%. One percent (1%) prefers some other candidate, and two percent (2%) are undecided. (To see survey question wording, click here.)

#### Merely the absence of Obama pressure causes Israeli strikes—triggers our impacts

Hayden 12 Tom is a writer and blogger. “The coming war with Iran Is GOP rhetoric setting the stage for an Israeli attack?” 2/19/12 <http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/coming-war-with-iran/content?oid=5104826>

Standing in the way, according to the article, is President Barack Obama, whom the Israelis suspect “has abandoned any aggressive strategy that would ensure the prevention of a nuclear Iran and is merely playing a game of words to appease them.” The same conclusion has been suggested elsewhere. So the stage is set for nuclear brinksmanship in an American presidential-election year. The role of Republican candidates is to ensure that the second condition is met, that of “tacit support” for an Israeli strike, even if forced by political pressure. The balance of forces is lopsided at present, with most Americans worried about Iran and unprepared to resist a sudden outbreak of war, Congress—dominated by supporters of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee—and the media are not prepared to oppose a strike. A short “successful” war—a highly dubious prospect—would be accepted by American public opinion until serious consequences set in afterward. Any public expression of protest against this war is far better than silence, of course. But the greatest opportunity for protest may be in the arena of the presidential-election drama now playing out. It is fair and accurate to say both Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich are collaborating, for political reasons, to push Obama into war during the presidential election, with Rick Santorum on the bench if needed. The New York Times has also now documented, in a front-page story, the millions spent by casino billionaire Sheldon Adelson and his Israeli wife to save Gingrich’s presidential campaign. Adelson was pleased when Gingrich, seemingly out of nowhere, recently condemned the Palestinians as “an invented people.” Adelson owns a newpaper chain in Israel supportive of the Netanyahu government and is a vocal opponent of a negotiated settlement. No one in the mainstream media so far has written the story of Romney’s past consulting and business partnership with Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu at Boston Consulting Group, but his campaign rhetoric echoes Netanyahu’s position, that Obama can’t be trusted to prevent Iran from getting the bomb. The Romney and Gingrich campaigns create an unrelenting pressure on Obama to support an attack on Iran with little countervailing pressure. But neither the Republicans nor the Israeli hawks are comfortable being charged with using political pressure to start a war. Santorum, whose Republican ranking is third, is equal to Romney and Gingrich in his hawkish position toward Iran. Santorum has deep support from right-wing Christian groups who believe that war in the Middle East will hasten the Second Coming. Avoiding war with Iran may be Obama’s best option in policy and politics, if he can navigate the campaign winds. The question is whether any organized force has his back.

#### Obama pressure constrains Israel from striking—US has massive leverage through military assistance and monetary debts

Feiffer ’12 John Feiffer, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus, “Bribing Israel,” Huffington Post, 3/13/2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-feffer/bribing-israel\_b\_1342357.html

The bully came to Washington. The American president told him in no uncertain terms that the United States would not support a military attack on Iran at this moment. The bully met with 13,000 of his U.S. supporters in an effort to pressure the White House. It didn't work. The bully went home empty-handed. This is the conventional news analysis of Benjamin Netanyahu's recent visit to Washington, his discussion with President Barack Obama, his speech at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), and his consequent loss of face. Many elements of this analysis are true. So, for instance, it's certainly true that the Israeli hawk failed to convince the Obama administration to green-light an attack during the so-called zone of immunity before Iran achieves its putative desire of membership in the nuclear club. It's certainly true that Netanyahu's hard-line speech on Iran quite nearly brought down the house at the AIPAC shindig, where the audience included more than half the members of Congress. And finally, the Obama administration did indeed hold to its position of "diplomacy backed by pressure." For many observers, Obama has gone at least a pawn up in the intricate chess game with Israel. The president "established a position his critics may find hard to assail," concluded The Guardian's Chris McGeal. "He forced those many members of Congress and beyond who have conflated America's interests with Israel's on to the back foot by saying that on Iran there are differences -- and he will serve U.S. interests first." James Fallows in The Atlantic agreed: "The question is whether this tone genuinely buys Obama more time and freedom of action, rather than constraining his next decisions. I am betting we will look back on this as a chessmaster move. I am hoping that, too." But this story of Obama the diplomat standing up to Netanyahu the bully omits some important information. During Netanyahu's visit, the Obama administration reportedly offered Israel a package of advanced military technology, including bunker-busting bombs and long-range refueling planes, as long as it postponed any attacks on Iran until 2013. In other words, Obama wasn't only buying time, he was bribing Israel to prevent the kind of October surprise -- or even July surprise -- that might derail his reelection bid. And he was doing so with precisely the weapons that Israel could use to execute an attack on Iran. Bribery is deeply embedded in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Half of all U.S. overseas military assistance, after all, goes to Israel. That's $3 billion a year. And it will continue to rise every year until 2017, thanks to an agreement worked out under the Bush administration. And military assistance to Israel is unlike assistance to other countries in quality as well as quantity. "Israel's $3 billion is put almost immediately into an interest-bearing account with the Federal Reserve Bank," explains Walter Pincus in the Washington Post. "The interest, collected by Israel on its military aid balance, is used to pay down debt from earlier Israeli non-guaranteed loans from the United States. Another unique aspect of the assistance package is that about 25 percent of it can be used to buy arms from Israeli companies. No other country has that privilege." That Israel has been cutting its military spending -- an otherwise admirable decision -- means that the United States is increasingly picking up the slack. It also means that Israel, in theory, has increased its dependence on the Pentagon, which should translate into more U.S. political leverage over Israel. But with rare exceptions, the United States has not exercised this leverage. Israel, as I have argued elsewhere, is to the United States what North Korea is to China. These client states take everything from their putative benefactors except advice. Indifferent to international law, armed to the teeth, and isolated in their respective regions, Israel and North Korea dance to their own tune, however discordant it might be for everybody else.